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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE: AN APPROACH TO REGIONAL
STABILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
by
Astrid Bettina Boening
Florida International University, 2006

Miami, Florida
Professor Elisabeth Prugl, Major Professor
This thesis examines how multilateral institutions can contribute to democratization
and regional stability. It is a case study of the Central European Initiative (CEI), a
regional intergovernmental organization founded by Italy and Austria in 1989 to
undertake a regional integration process, and of its role in stabilizing post-communist
democracies. Documents were collected at the CEI offices

in Trieste, Italy, and

interviews conducted with CEI officers, and data obtained from the websites of related
organizations and of CEI member countries.
The thesis probes the relevance of concepts derived from theories of international
regimes and social constructivism. It shows that the CEI diffuses norms and institutional
rules conducive to consolidating democracies, including the development of a free civil
society, a relatively autonomous political society, rule of law, state bureaucracies that are
usable by the new democratic governments, and functioning free market economies,
addition, and fosters habits of dialogue, socializes participants, and supports the creation
of supra-national identities.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction and Historical Background
This thesis focuses

on strategies

which have proven successful

in the

democratization process in Central- and Eastern Europe. Specifically, I will investigate
the Central European Initiative (CEI)', an intergovernmental regional organization
founded by Italy and Austria in 1989 to undertake a regional integration process, and its
role in stabilizing post-communist CE democracies at a time when Austria's and Italy's
eastern borders were threatened by the neighboring political destabilization.
While West European integration progressed steadily since the founding of the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, it stopped at the Iron Curtain until the
1980s. Although some Eastern Block countries had experimented with economic and
political reforms in the 1970s, they had little success. Mikhail Gorbachev's reign of the
Soviet Union, however, initiated an unstoppable trend of fundamental reforms through
"glasnost", openness to popular political debates and participation, which he hoped
would support "perestroika" (economic restructuring). By the late 1980s the populations
became increasingly outspoken in the critique of their governments and glasnost opened
the Eastern block far beyond what Gorbachev had intended. With press censorship
receding, the media began, to the embarrassment of the authorities, to expose the severity
of Soviet economic and social problems, such as "poor housing, food shortages,
alcoholism, widespread pollution, creeping mortality rates and the second-rate position of

1 CEI membership as of June 2006 is comprised of the following eighteen countries: Albania, Austria,
Belarus (this country represents an exception to regional membership but it does not influence the results of
this case study), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
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women" (Glasnost - Wikipedia). This contrasted sharply with the very positive view of
Soviet life previously promulgated by the authorities and it weakened the public's faith in
their system.
The unintended consequences of glasnost spread to the Soviet Union's client states
where nationalists swept elections. Labor turmoil in Poland in 1980 led to the formation
of the independent trade union, Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa. Fearful of Soviet
intervention, Polish Communist leader Jaruzelski, declared martial law in Poland on
December 13, 1981, suspending trade unions and temporarily imprisoning its leaders.
Solidarity continued to exist underground with the support of the Catholic Church and
had become strong enough by the late 1980s to frustrate Jaruselski's reform attempts,
particularly through the nationwide strikes of 1988, forcing the government into dialogue
with Solidarity. In April 1989 Solidarity was legalized again and allowed to participate in
Polish parliamentary elections on June 4, 1989. "A Political Earthquake followed" (ibid.)
when Solidarity won almost all available seats in parliament.
Hungary seized its independence next in 1988 when parliament adopted a
"democracy package". It involved trade union pluralism, freedom of association,
assembly and the press, a new electoral law and a radical revision of the constitution,
among other measures. After the last Communist Party congress in October 1989 the
Hungarian parliament adopted legislation providing for the transformation of the People's
Republic into the Republic of Hungary with multi-party elections and direct presidential
elections, guaranteeing human rights, and an institutional structure which included the
separation of powers between the judicial, executive and legislative branches of
government (Ibid.).

2

By 1989 the Soviet Union had repealed the Brezhnew Doctrine in favor of nonintervention in the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies (Ibid.). This facilitated the
former Soviet client states seeking alternate

alliances and internal government

restructuring. For example, with the opening of Hungary's borders increasing numbers of
East Germans began to emigrate through Hungary to West Germany. Mass protests at
West German diplomatic facilities in other Eastern European capitals continued to grow.
Unable to stem the continued exodus of their citizens, East German leadership caved in
and allowed its citizens to leave via all border points of the Berlin Wall on November 9,
1989. This proved fatal to the GDR (Ibid.) and the SED monopoly on power had ended.
On October 3, 1990, East and West Germany were reunited.
By the end of 1989 revolts had spread from one capital to another, ousting
the regimes imposed on Eastern Europe after World War II. Even the isolationist
regime in Albania experienced political repercussions... Once it became evident
that the feared Red Army would not intervene to crush dissent, the Eastern
European regimes were exposed as vulnerable in the face of popular uprisings
against the one-party system (Ibid.).
In Bulgaria, the Communist Party gave up its claim on power in February 1990 and
the first free elections since 1931 were held in June 1990. In contrast to the other Eastern
European countries, however, Romania had not undergone even limited de-Stalinization.
Although Gorbachev actually asked Ceausescu to resign during the latter's visit to
Moscow in November 1989, he refused and was re-elected for another five year term.
Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction of the Romanian population had boiled to the surface by
December 1989 and the Ceausescus were deposed and assassinated. Free elections were
announced in Romania by an interim National Salvation Front Council for May 1990.

3

At a time when Moscow faced a severe economic decline and needed Western
support, Eastern Europe had become an additional economic and political burden.
Rempel (1995) pinpoints the end of the Cold War to a declaration by the leaders of the
two world superpowers at the Malta Summit on December 3, 1989. These events altered
the balance of power globally and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union also
marked the beginning of the Post-Cold War era.
Glasnost had inadvertently released the long-suppressed national sentiments
of all peoples within the borders of the multinational Soviet states... One by one
the constituent republics created their own economic systems and voted to
subordinate Soviet laws to local laws (Ibid.).
On July 1, 1991 the Warsaw pact was officially dissolved at a meeting in Prague.
At a summit later that month Gorbachev and President George H.W. Bush declared a
strategic partnership on the basis of the U.S.-Soviet cooperation during the Persian Gulf

War in 1990-1991, resolving bilateral and world problems (Ibid.).
The post-Cold War era in Central- and Eastern Europe brought extensive
challenges of economic and political re-integration of this area with the West. Not only
did the Czechs and the Slovaks decide to divide Czechoslovakia into two sovereign
states, but the Balkan crisis is another example where the West was not able to react proactively quickly enough to avert a protracted humanitarian crises in light of the very
rapidly crumbling of the Soviet Union: The thirty-five year rule of General Tito in
Yugoslavia until his death in 1980 had successfully kept the lid on the smoldering
multiethnic country on the Balkan peninsula. In the summer of 1991 Slovenia and
Croatia, the most Westernized, anti-Communist republics in the federation declared their
independence (Keylor 2001, 477) and the Serb minority in Croatia and Slovenia, in
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cooperation with portions of the Serb-dominated former Yugoslav federal army took up
arms against these newly independent states. A UN-brokered ceasefire restored peace in
1992 to these two countries, only to flare up in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia later in
1992. Neither side could be pacified by Alanticist and European cease fire proposals until
NATO air strikes against Serbian positions (threatening UN-designated protected
territory, inhabited mainly by Muslim civilians) was finally concluded with the signing of
the Dayton Accord on October 12, 1995 (Ibid., 480/1). This agreement effectively
established a NATO protectorate in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
While the UN IFOR peace implementation force in Bosnia oversaw the restabilization in Bosnia, another conflict boiled over in Serbia itself. The ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo, long tired of perceived discrimination by the Serb-dominated government in
Belgrade, proceeded to press for secession. President Milosevic sought to repress the
rebellion by sending in his troops to terrorize restless Kosovans into leaving their
country. When Russia supported Serbia2 in rejecting the peace agreement at Rambouillet
in February 1999, NATO intervened again with almost 10,000 bombing missions over
seventy-nine days (Ibid., 483). After Milosevic finally agreed in June 1999 to let the
Albanian refugees return to Kosovo, the latter reciprocated with some revenge ethnic
cleansing on their own (Ibid.), forcing Kosovo Serbs to flee to Serbia proper. A NATOled multinational ground force (KFOR) remains in Kosovo to oversee the return of
Albanian refugees and to restore law and order in the devastated country.

2 Serbia was referred to formally as "Serbia and Montenegro" between 2003 and May 21, 2006, when
Montenegro voted for independence .
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In light of these huge geo-political realignments due to underlying socio-political
instability, Western Europe became alarmed at the prospect of a spill-over effect of civil
wars and political upheavals. Though the concern was not in terms of spreading political
unrest (since the underlying circumstances in western Europe were different), the
prospect of hundreds of thousands of refugees, illegal weapons trading and other
activities reflective of lawlessness due to ineffective new governments were cause for
grave concern in countries bordering Central- and Eastern Europe. This study seeks to
examine how democratization could be made more successful and regional stability
achieved. Specifically, how has the Central European Initiative contributed to the
stabilization of the new, post-communist Central European (CE) 3 democracies?

3 The acronym "CE" will be used in this study to refer to the current member states of the Central
European Initiative. CEI member states currently also encompass some Southern- and South-Eastern
European countries as well as some NIS states, such as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.
By comparison, in geographicterminology, Central Europe refers to "the region lying between the
variously and vaguely defined areas of Eastern and Western Europe. In addition, Northern, Southern and
Southeastern Europe may variously delimit or overlap into Central Europe. The understanding of the
concept of Central Europe varies considerably from nation to nation and also has from time to time. The
region is usually used to mean: Germany, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic,

Austria, Hungary and Slovenia (Wikipedia, Central Europe). This region is defined by its geographic
boundaries, the Baltic countries in the north and the Apennine peninsula (Italy) across the Alps. The eastwest borders are culturally more fluid (Ibid.), since these countries were historically part "of the central
European kingdoms and empires, such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Habsburg
monarchy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Imperial Germany" (Ibid.). Within the cultural
definition the following countries belong to Central Europe: (western) Belarus, Croatia, Lithuania,

Romania (Transylvania), Serbia (Vojvodina), Ukraine (Galicia, Volhynia, Pdolia) and Italy (South Tyrol,
Friuli-Venezia Giulia) (Ibid.). Historically, following World War II, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary and Slovenia were considered Ccentral European to distinguish them from those behind the iron
curtain (i.e. Balkan-, Baltic and Russian Orthodox and Muslim countries) (Ibid.).
In contrast, Southern Europe refers geographicallyto the southern half of the landmass of Europe
(Southern Europe - Wikipedia). "This definition is relative, with no clear limits" (Ibid.). While the Alps
represent a north-south barrier in the eastern part, this boundary disappears further west. While the official
UN designation does not include France, a climatic definition would only include the immediate land strip
bordering the Mediterranean. Linguistically and culturally, one could divide Southern Europe into the
Iberian Peninsula (Portugal, including Azores, Madeira), Spain (including Baleric Islands, Canary Islands),
Andorra, Gibraltar, and Southern France (including Corsica), Monaco, the Italian peninsula (including
Sicily, Sardinia, Vatican City and San Marino), the Balkan Peninsula (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece (including Ionian Islands, Aegean Islands, and Crete), Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia, Slovenia and the European part of Turkey (Rumelia) plus the Mediterranean States of Cyprus and

Malta (Ibid.).
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This thesis focuses on strategies which have proven successful in the regional
stabilization and democratization processes in Central- and Eastern Europe. Specifically,
I will investigate the Central European Initiative (CEI)4 , an intergovernmental regional
organization founded by Italy and Austria in 1989 to undertake a regional integration
process, and its role in stabilizing post-communist CE democracies at a time when
Austria's and Italy's eastern borders were threatened by the neighboring political
destabilization.
The CEI was the first regional cooperation forum on the political map of Central-,
South Eastern- and Eastern Europe (CEI website). Today it has the longest tradition and
covers the largest territory of all multi-lateral efforts in the region. Its origin lies in the
agreement signed on November 11, 1989, just a few days of the fall of the Berlin wall, by
Italy, Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia, "establishing a platform for mutual political,
economic, scientific and cultural operations" (CEI website). It was called at the time

Eastern Europe is similarly vaguely defined geographically as the region between Central Europe
and Russia (Eastern Europe - Wikipedia), with the "eastern limit either the Ural Mountains or from the
pacific coast of the Russian Far East [and] its western limit is the boundary between the European Union

and the Commonwealth of Independent States (sometimes excluding Kaliningrad)" (Ibid.). The overlap and
fluctuation in regional boundaries extends politically to Eastern Europe covering "all of northeastern
Eurasia, since Russia is one single transcontinental geopolitical entity. Cyprus is also frequently taken to be
a European state, although geographically it is in Asia. The same approach is also sometimes taken with the

post-Soviet states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus" (Ibid.). With the fall of the Iron
Curtain, Eastern Europe refers retroactively sometimes to that European region which was part of the
Soviet Union (Ibid.). Culturally Eastern Europe was defined by 19th century German nationalists
"synonymous with 'Slavic Europe', as opposed to Germanic (Western) Europe" (Ibid.).
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania,
Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey are also sometimes referred to as Balkan countries.

As we can see, the geographic and cultural boundaries in this region are vague and socio-politically
dependent (more on the topic of "fuzzy boundaries" in the sections on "Space and Boundaries" and
"Identity and Ethnicity" of the literature review in Chapter Two).
4

CEI membership as of spring 2006 is comprised of the following eighteen countries: Albania, Austria,
Belarus (this country represents an exception to regional membership but it does not influence the results of
this case study), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
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"Quadragonal Co-operation," and later "Pentagonale" and "Hexagonale" with successive
enlargements. As other Central European countries became members5 , it was renamed
"Central European Initiative." The CEI has expanded from its original four members 6 to
presently eighteen member states7 , extending its membership to south-Eastern Europe
and beyond (see Figure 1). In 1993 the Secretariat for CEI Projects started operating at
the European Bank for Redevelopment (EBRD) in London.
My general research question is: How can an Intergovernmental Organization
(IGO) affect post-Communist democratic consolidation in Central Europe through
regional stabilization? Specifically, how has the Central European Initiative contributed
to the stabilization of the new, post-communist Central European (CE) democracies?
Democratization is neither automatic nor necessarily permanent once endeavored.
Yet the significance of democratization in the world, and in particular the successful
democratization of CE, which was before -

and after - Communism politically

extraordinarily unstable, is obvious. Huntington (1991) has identified three stages in a
country's democratic transition from authoritarian rule, the last one, democratic

5 This paper takes the national boundaries of its member states as given according to the internationally
accepted definition of each state (i.e. the boundaries of the states resulting from the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, including the disposition of Kosovo, Czechoslovakia and Serbia and Montenegro were

accepted by the CEI as defined by the UN.
Quadragonale: Albania, Austria, Italy, Hungary and Yugoslavia, and with additional enlargements later:
Pentagonale (adding Poland) and then the Hexagonale with the addition of Czechoslovakia.
6

7 Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy,
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine, seven of
which are also EU members.
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consolidation, being critical in stabilizing a new democracy successfully. This study
seeks to examine how democratization could be made more successful and regional
stability achieved. Once strategy Western Europeans used to create stability in Central
and Eastern Europe was to integrate the newly democratizing countries into Western
institutions such as NATO (to provide Central- and Eastern Europe a strategic substitute
for Warsaw Pact membership), the Council of Europe (which provides a political anchor
and supports the Central- and Eastern European democratic integration process with the
West) and ultimately the European Union. This was seen to aid the consolidation of
democracy and in this way the post-Soviet pacification of the region.
The CEI constitutes a unique approach to bringing CE countries into Europe that
had encountered particular difficulties in the transition process.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine how the approaches used by the
CEI as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) facilitate democratic consolidation in
Central- and South Eastern Europe.
The secondary purpose is to determine whether this approach could be applicable to
democratic consolidation in other countries.
There are three facets to the research problem: First, what challenges does postCommunist CE face in consolidating its democracies? Second, how has the CEI
contributed to fostering democracy in CE? Third, what institutional assistance (e.g. via an
IGO) has proven useful to the democratic consolidation process in CE?

10

The study is significant for three reasons: First, the post-communist transition of
and its concomitant political (in-) stability is a significant security issue for those Western
European countries bordering CE (and others, of course). Second, since democratization
is currently progressing more rapidly globally, lessons learnt from the CE process might
be applicable to other regions. Third, the role of IGOs, including institutional efforts,
such as the European Union's (EU) accession proceedings or the EU Neighborhood
Program, is to be evaluated for its contribution to the democratization process.
This thesis is a case study which examines how the activities of a particular
intergovernmental agency, the Central European Initiative, affect the consolidation of the
post-Communist Central European regional democratization process. Chapter two
contains a review of the literature and the theory of democratic consolidation, national
identity formation, regional cooperation and constructivism synergies within international
regime structure. Chapter three addresses the methodology used in this thesis. Chapter
four contains the data analysis and discussion of CEI programs and activities. The
conclusions of this thesis are presented in chapter five.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review and Theoretical Background
While there is no literature on the specific role of an IGO in the consolidation phase
of democracy,

there is abundant

literature on the characteristics

of stabilized

democracies. The data analysis serves to establish whether and how CEI programs play a
role in stabilizing the new democracies of CE by identifying the necessary pre-conditions
as well as characteristics of a consolidated democracy outlined in the following literature
review. First I will analyze the available literature on democratization from a standpoint
of the internal parameters which reflect consolidated democracies. Then I will proceed to
investigate some of the dynamics other scholars have found to support democratic
consolidation, including theories on state and identity formation and a constructivist
approach to the agent-structure synergy of the CEI and its member states within the
parameters of an international regime.

Internal parameters which reflect consolidated democracies
There is an extensive literature on democracy in political science. Lipset (1959)
was interested in mechanisms which contribute to successful democratizations. He
identified three necessary components for this process. They are the following: Economic
and social background conditions, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy,
prevalent urban residence and a broad middle class without extreme income polarization.
Rustow (1979) concurred with Lipset that certain beliefs (civic attitudes) such as
the belief in consensus including consensus about the right to differ, and the willingness
to participate are essential ingredients of successful democratization.

12

The degree of a

democracy's legitimacy can be measured by how well the system performs, e.g.
institutions are not threatened and groups have access to the system.
According to Lijphart (1992), just as Lipset had also pointed out, democratic
stability requires conflict and reconciliation in the political process as well, i.e.
democratic values need to be congruent not only in the political arena, but also in
authority structures throughout society, such as businesses, trade unions and culture. Or
in Schumpeter's classic words "democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are
held accountable for their actions... through the competition and cooperation of their
elected representatives" (Schumpeter 1943, cited by Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76).
Thus, the literature on democracy has emphasized the key role of civic values and
economic conditions. However,

central to the establishment of democracy are

institutions. Huntington (1991, 6) defines a democracy as characterized by "sources of
authority for government, purposes served by the government, and procedures for
constituting a government". The central procedure of democracy is "the selection of
leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern" (Huntington 1991, 6),
including a choice of parties, as well as "the existence of those civil and political
freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate
and the conduct of electoral campaigns" (Huntington 1991, 7).
At the simplest level, Huntington (1991, 35) observes three stages to a democratic
transition from authoritarianism:
"

the end of an authoritarian regime,

"

the installation of a democratic regime,
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*

the consolidation of the democratic regime (stabilization phase). This latter
observation is similar to the "habituation phase" identified by Weber (1949)
and echoed by Linz and Stepan (1996, 6). In this study I will refer to this
stage as the "consolidation" phase.

The challenges faced by a new democracy can be, according to Huntington (1991, 208),
categorized into three types:
"

First are transition problems stemming from the event of regime change
from authoritarianism to democracy, e.g. new constitutional and electoral
systems, changing/abolishing authoritarian agencies and institutions, such as
the secret police or the one-party system.

"

Second, contextual problems endemic in the country pose a challenge to
any government, authoritarian or democratic, such as regional antagonisms,
communal conflicts, poverty, and low rates of economic growth (Huntington
1991, 36) and are not coincidental to the transition. In this context Max
Weber's work (1949) is often cited. He argued that differences in national
patterns often reflect key historical events which set a certain process in
motion in one country and a different one in another.

"

Third, systemic problems are those resulting from a working democracy,
such as the inability to reach decisions, remnants of overly concentrated
decision making, deficient feedback, and dependence on performance
legitimacy.

Consolidation success, according to Huntington (1991) can be influenced by several
factors:

14

"

Characteristically, democracies

do not succeed in creating a stable

democracy with their first attempt (Ibid., 270);
"

A high correlation exists with the level of economic development (Ibid.),
and

"

A supportive external/intemational environment and foreign actors are
conducive to consolidation (Ibid., 273).

Huntington tests successful consolidation via the "two turn-over test" (Ibid., 153),
whereby a party which is in power in a country, but looses the next election, is able to
regain power in a subsequent election.
Pietrzyk (2003) discusses in his article the continued usefulness of the historical
term "civil society" in the context of the challenges faced by post-communist Central
European countries in their transitions to liberal democracies. While the idea is deeply
rooted in the tradition of political thought, it emerged in modern philosophy along with
the rise of capitalism and liberalism and was used by Smith, Hegel and Marx in referring
to the bourgeoisie. Pietrzyk (Ibid.) argues that one of the main tasks in CE is the
establishment of this civil society not only as a descriptive category but also as a
normative one. In the context of post-communist democratization the revival of this term
can be useful when applied to political ideas in changing the social and political world as
representing a goal in the struggle against the totalitarian state. Civil society in this sense
refers to that
sphere within which citizens may freely organize themselves into groups and
associations at various levels in order to make the formal bodies of state
authority adopt policies consonant with their perceived interests... and can be
said to support the maintenance both of a strong constitutional-democratic
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system and a more human and equitable version of the market economy (Ibid.,

38-39).
Pietrzyk also suggests that the development of civil society and the democratization of
the "social and political spheres should be seen as a mutual process leading to political
and economic stability" (Ibid., 38).

Dynamics in consolidating democracies
Having thus identified internal parameters which reflect consolidated democracies,
we now turn to a review of works which deal with the transition to democracy in terms of
how to actually establish these parameters in practice, i.e. different approaches to
studying the dynamics of establishing consolidated democracies. For this purpose, I draw
on literature in International Relations. While this may be counterintuitive, I pursue here
Huntington's suggestion that a supportive international environment is conducive to
democratic consolidation. Theories of cooperation and constructivist theories on the
relevance and diffusion of norms are particularly relevant to this suggestion.
Keohane points out that
if we use rational-choice theory properly, we should expect a substantial
amount of cooperation in the international relations of the advanced marketeconomy countries, that the rational-choice theory and the theory of collective
goods help to show why institutions are significant in world politics, and even
crucial to successful cooperation (Keohane 1984, 70).
In other words, even though realists are often viewed as almost diametrically opposed to
constructivist views in international relations, Keohane argues that rational-choice is
actually an integral part of cooperation in the context of a collective good. In this study
the collective good is "peace" - a good which is more likely to be achieved if there is
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democracy as democracies traditionally have not waged war against one another.
Furthermore, democracy is facilitated through a collective action process of the countries
concerned, in this case CE.
Following this thought process, I am first linking literature on the action of states
domestically and internationally to policy outcomes (the policy outcome under discussion
in this thesis is regional stability through democracy consolidation and regional
integration) via different pathways. Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno (1988) distinguish
two approaches in linking the state to policy outcomes: The first views "the state
primarily as an organization structure, or set of laws and institutional arrangements
shaped by previous events. In this view, institutions, once formed, tend to endure" and
develop non-linearly only at moments of crisis. "The second approach conceives of the
state as an actor and focuses directly on politicians and administrators in the executive as
independent participants in the policy process" (Ibid., 10) According to these authors,
institutions are petrified behemoths which do not contribute to the evolution of the state
internally or externally and only politicians and administrators can affect the policy
process.
Peter Haas (1992), in contrast, proposes a more dynamic approach of how decision
makers, unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem in the international
context of institutions, define state interests and develop viable solutions. With respect to
issues of international cooperation, he raises the issue of "determinism versus free will
and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed and
... whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system-level
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factors, unit-level factors, or some complex interplay between the two" (Ibid., 1). His
findings were six-fold:
"

Ideas inform policies (Ibid., 26)

"

Actors' understanding of the world and the formulation of alternative
actions are shaped by belief systems, operational codes, and cognitive maps

(Ibid., 28)
"

Consensual knowledge may contribute to policy coordination and to more
comprehensive policies (Ibid., 29)

*

Policy choices are often made by discrete networks of actors (Ibid., 31)

"

Coalitions are built trans-governmentally and trans-nationally (Ibid., 32)

"

Organizations are not always captured (Ibid., 33).

In other words, applying his ideas to positioning the domestic challenge of democratic
stabilization in a foreign policy context, P. Haas also examines the processes through
which international policy coordination and cooperation and order, i.e. regional stability
in this case study, emerge.
Recognizing that human agency lies at the interstices between systemic
condition, knowledge, and national actions [his approach examines the] "role
that networks of knowledge-based experts - epistemic communities - play in
articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, framing the
issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient
points for negotiation (Ibid., 2).
With other words, P. Haas addresses what would later be recognized as the mutual
construction of agents and structures in the democratic process. Expanding this approach
to include the external context of this process, Katzenstein (1996, cited in P. Haas 1992,
2) distinguishes more specifically between the extent to which nation-states differ in the
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centralization of the state and society and "the range of foreign policy instruments
available to state officials in the conduct of foreign economic policy". This observation is
an extrapolation of the examination of modi operandi effective in the internal
consolidation of democracies. In this thesis I show how the external role of the CEI in the
domestic democratization processes in CE is essential to the regionalintegration.
Returning to the concept of epistemic community, Ruggie (1998) developed this
idea further and refers to it as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue area" (Ruggie 1998, 83). He developed the idea
between "the power of broader visions of reality, or epistemes, that provide the
assumptions from which policies follow and shape the pattern of politics over the long
run" (Ruggie quoted in P. Haas 1992, 26) from an institutionalizational grid of the state
and the international political order through which behavior is acted out: Epistemes can
serve to visualize political relationships (Ruggie in Ibid.).
Ruggie gleaned the term "episteme" from Michel Foucault (1979) and developed it
further into the idea of "international regime" within the meaning of international
relations theory. According to Kenneth Waltz' model (1975) of international structure
which does not consider any type of transformation, Ruggie (1998) explored "the basis
on which the constitutive units of the system are differentiated from one another and on
the basis of which they assume their identity as constitutive units" (Ruggie (1998, 132). I
find the significance Ruggie attached to the uniqueness of the units (such as the culturally
very different states of CE) as being able to assume an identity as constitutive units (e.g.
"CE" in this case). Ruggie developed the concept of 'regime' to go beyond the realists'
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perception (such as Waltz, Morgenthau and Lippmann) that "international politics was all
about 'interest defined as power"' (Morgenthau quoted in Ruggie 1998, 4) "so that power
itself becomes the proximate interest of any state's foreign policy" (Ruggie 1998, 5).
Instead, Ruggie points out that
no one in any position of authority anywhere in Europe responded to the
most profound geopolitical changes of the postwar era - the collapse of the
Soviet Union's East European empire, of the Soviet Union itself, and German
reunification - by advocating, or quietly preparing for, a return to competitive
bilateral alliances. All of the options on the table concerning the external
mechanism for achieving security in Europe, East and West, were multilateralin

form (emphasis mine) (Ibid., 197).
These authors recognized the potential of multilateral integration not just for the
sake of power but to build a transformational structure for the purpose of regional
stability.

However, little has been written about actual modi operandi which would

contribute to the consolidation of these young democracies. In particular, the role of
international regimes has not been studied in this context. Samuel Huntington (1991)
refers to the third stage of democratic transitions as the "consolidation" phase. If this
phase is not accomplished successfully within a country, democracy will not persist.
Consolidation, according to Huntington, requires successful institutionalization and
stabilization.These two factors are necessary simultaneously and have a reciprocal effect
on one another. While consolidation was originally thought to consist of defining the core
rules of democratic competition agreed upon in earlier stages of democratization, the
consolidation phase was viewed as characterized primarily by an increased importance of
routinized institutional structures that start to influence the behavior of political actors
(Kopecky 2000, 520) rather than simply actors struggling at will to define the postauthoritarian political landscape.
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This study applies Huntington's

conceptualization

and probes processes of

institutionalization and stabilization. It also draws on an additional body of theory taken
from the field of International Relations to argue that the aim of the CEI is regional
democratic institutionalization, leading to the formation of an international regime, a
transnational socio-political governing process (Ruggie 1998; Keohane and Nye 1971).
The liberal theory of peace and war incorporates the hypothesis that economic
interdependence promotes peace with the theory of international (democratic) institutions
(Russett and Oneal 2001). For some this represents the systematization and empirical
testing of Kant's (1796) conception of perpetual peace based on democratic institutions,
free trade and international law and institutions.
The theory of neofunctionalist integration focused on regional and later, with a
pluralistic polity postulated as a precondition, on global integration (E. Haas 1958, 1961,
1964). In the 1970s, E. Haas later realized that the integration process was more direct
and politically driven than the circuitous and largely technocratic mechanism he had
specified in his theory (Ruggie 1998, 6). He then turned his focus to the role of
international interdependence and regimes.

Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalism

were hence merged into the theory of constructivism (Onuf 1989). My theory about the
role of an international regime, such as the CEI, in the consolidation of new democracies
extrapolates from Ernst Haas' model of international cooperation based on learning, i.e.
scientific, consensual understandings as factors in politics, to a synergistic constructivist
process in regional integration and democratic consolidation in CE.
Keohane (1988) weighed in on the debate about international institutions by
distinguishing the rationalisticapproach from the reflective approach, "which stresses the

21

impact of human subjectivity and the embeddedness of contemporary international
institutions in pre-existing practices" (Keohane 1988, 379). He promoted a synthesis of
the two perspectives "to form the basis for historically and theoretically grounded
empirical research" (Ibid.). This thesis addresses this "subjective" regional cultural
heritage as it is synthesized into contemporary institutions through CEI programs within
an international regime. While realist and neorealist theories are avowedly rationalistic,
one has to bear in mind that "behavior can be adjudged objectively to be optimally

adapted to the situations" (Simon 1985, 294, cited in Keohane 1988, 379). In this thesis I
show how the programs of the CEI offer the opportunity within this international regime
structure for member states to engage in cooperative behavior for the purpose of regional
integration and democratic consolidation.
While cooperation is an active deed which occurs in (or is necessitated by) the
absence of harmony but which actors choose to avoid discord, this undertaking requires
the actions of separate individuals or organizations - which are not in pre-existent
harmony -

be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy

coordination (Keohane 1984, 51). Incorporating a sociological approach with a rationalist
approach to the study of institutions entails combining the role of impersonal social
forces with the impact of cultural practices, norms, and values that are not derived from
calculations of interest (Gilpin 1981 cited in Keohane 1988, 381). In this case study I
have examined how the regional integration process through the cooperative programs of
the CEI do not simply entice member states purely for reasons of power, but through
socialization and norming to integrate CE and consolidate their democracies.
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Embedded in this process is the concept of cognitive evolution (Adler 1991; P.
Haas 1992) as a constructivist interpretation of collective social learning, involving
innovation, selection and international diffusion, the notion of institutionalization of
collective understanding, and contributions made by Wendt (1992 and 1994) to
understanding security community-like collective identity formation. Other scholars who
also elaborated on institutionalist approaches as applied to collective security systems,
regional security communities and alliances are Kupchan and Kupchan (1991), and
Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander (1999).

In particular, Schroeder (1994), Risse-

Kappen (1996), and Adler and Barnett (1998) have taken the constructivist approach to
the study of institutions, alliances and security communities and emphasized the role of
norms and collective identity.
Buzan (1993) and Hurrell (1993) approached constructivist ideas as part of the
English school by stressing the existence of an international society which is driven by
norms and identity. While there were, of course, extensive debates by other schools, e.g.
German scholars like Kratochwil, who also contributed to the constructivist debate
between instrumental rationalists and communicative rationalists, I do not think that these
nuances are relevant to my analysis of the function of the CEI in democratic
consolidation at this point, however.
Instead, this thesis examines the CEI in 2005 as a regional regime made up of the
elements described in the international relations literature on international regimes. These
include: 1. A shared purpose, which is in this case the achievement of regional stability
through consolidated democracies, 2. shared norms, rules, procedures and institutions, 3.
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a hegemonic impetus in its establishment and 4. the hegemon is not predominantly
involved in the continued maintenance of this regime. Or, as Ruggie, states:
insofar as international regimes embody principles about fact, causation,
and rectitude, as well as political rights and obligations that are regarded as
legitimate, they fall closer to the consumatory end of the spectrum, into the
realm of political authority. Thus, the formation and transformation of
international regimes may be said to represent a concrete manifestation of the
internationalization of political authority (Ruggie cited in Krasner 1983, 196).
Additionally, constructivist versions of international regime theory conceptualize
socio-political cooperation as ideational and normative: In this study I also draw on these
approaches to analyze the activities of the CEI in Central Europe on the state level.
Furthermore, I analyze CEI programs from a system level perspective, asking how has
the normative element of CEI activities as explicitly designed to consolidate democracies
AND develop regional cooperation, affect trans-national cooperation and institutions
regionally in CE. This synergistic approach, delineated in my analysis of the CEI"regime", differs from Waltz' model of the international system (1979). According to
Waltz, "structural features are sharply distinguished from unit-level processes, and
structure is the productive agency that operates at the level of the system. Accordingly,
only structural change can produce systemic change. But as Ruggie has noted, in Waltz'
model nothing produces structural change. According to Ruggie,
the problem with Waltz' posture is that, in any social system, structural
change ultimately has no source other than unit-level processes, and these
somehow must be linked to structure if it is to be capable not merely of
recording change after the fact, but explaining and predicting it (Ruggie 1998,

153).
In this case study I view the CEI and its programs within the structure of an international
regime since Ruggie's regime theory comes closest to explaining the efficacy of CEI
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programs in consolidating democracies in CE via the interaction of agency at the
transnational/regional, the state and the local level of political and civic actors with the
structure of institutionswhich are developed by the actors through CEI programs.
Kopecky echoed this approach in confirming that the synthesis of structural and
agent approaches
must allow for forward [structures select agents and determine their choices],
as well as backward linkages [choices and agents define institutions and rules
which in turn alter or nullify structural determinants]. Comparative
democratization theory should revise its strong assumptions about the state and
nation as given units, as well as its assumptions about democratization as being
primarily a domestic political process (Kopecky 2000, 528).

Space and Boundaries
"Europe as a space of political organization and institutionalization has no clear
boundaries" (Risse 2004, 258). However, he refers to studies which have shown that "the
more Europe is identified in civic rather than cultural-ethnic terms, ... and the more
cultural diversity is emphasized, ... the less in-group [and the greater the European
identification] projection might take place" (Risse 2004, 259/60). If this argument were to
be extended to CEI member states, it would mean that ethnic conflicts would be
minimized as civil society increasingly defines the domestic and regional cultural
discourse.
Parallel to this development Risse (2004) suggests that the socio-psychological
concept of "entitativity" which refers to the reification of a common fate, increased
salience, and boundedness, will lead to collective identification and hence peaceful
behavior among group members. This contrasts with political processes of exclusion
which promote regional instability as e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have shown

25

(these processes of "destabilization" had started before the CEI's programs were able to
assist the integration of these countries politically and socially). In fact, I observe that
some CEI programs detailed in Chapter Four: "Results and Discussion" focus specifically
on regionalcivic development among its member states in order to "transcend" previous
in-group projections, such as between the Slovenians and the Croats or the Czechs and
the Slovakians, while simultaneously supporting those programs which increase CE
"entitativity", such as the Central European University and the CEI Youth Orchestra
among many others. These developments are especially significant in the region
encompassing CEI member states as they augment the social and political stability. sought
by the founders of the CEI in light of the recent fragmentative history in this region.
Additionally, the CEI focuses substantially on the physical concept of "space" and
"space development", such as those programs raising consciousness and those pertaining
to the protection of the environment, e.g. through joint geo-spatial university courses as
well as those projects which contribute to defining the new post-soviet political space of
CEI member states in this region. Hence focusing on space and overcoming cultural
boundaries among the people in CE is intended to deepen the sense of common fate and
enhance collective identification in this region as a shared purpose (one of the criteria of
an international regime), i.e. regional stability and peace.

Institutions
Herrmann and Brewer (2004,

1)

emphasize the usefulness of international

institutions as conflict managing strategies and as forums for pacific settlements. This
basic neofunctionalist strategy promotes shared identities beyond an exclusionary
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commitment to the nation-state through cross-border functional cooperation so that
eventually "communities of common identity" (Hermann and Brewer 2004, 2) would
spill over into broader sectors of society, not only to reduce the possibility of war but to
secure individual liberties and to provide normative patterns for the development of their
civil society. Hermann and Brewer (2004, 2) note that institutions (such as the CEI) not
only provide information and coordinate transnational programs but also contribute to the
solution of issues (such as crime and public health) which exist especially in countries in
political transition. They function to enhance the confidence of new democracies, and to
compensate for the deficit in trust among some former enemies which would prevent
cooperation today and in the future. The normative feature of an international regime
such as the CEI is partially due to the shared rules of its programs which augment the
confidence and trust of the young democracies in CE.
V. Tilly (2002, 171) concurs that the formation of democratic states in post-Soviet
CE involves not merely the government, but also the development of international
institutions, i.e. that complex of rules and norms generated by interactions with
international society to obtain an entity-like presence in international law and politics.
Institutionalism has also been referred to as norm-oriented constructivism and has its
roots in sociology. For Skocpol (1992) and Finnemore (1996) states' interests are in part
"constructed through social interaction ... [and] shaped by internationally shared norms
and values which structure and give meaning to international political life" (Finnemore
1996, 2-3). "Prominent norms - and changes in those norms - can alter states' interests
and behavior [and] ... shift patterns of global relations (Burch 2002, 66). This study
shows how the programs and policies of the CEI re-structure political processes, beyond
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the notion of institutions constituting actors, but by integrating post-Soviet CE with a
myriad of international and West European institutions to assist the democratic
consolidation process. In this case the shared purpose of regional stability of the CEI as
an international regime leads to the states' external environment reflecting inward to
affect elite and nationalist thought about all aspects of socio-political significance, from
the role of minorities, to economic and infrastructure development and scientific and
cultural collaboration. This strongly favored institutional compatibility also imports
certain behavioral and procedural standards into the civil design of post-communist CE
states (Finnemore 1996), thereby enhancing civil society.
While Putnam (1993) argues would that it is lack of civic engagement which leads
to lacking democracy, Tarrow (1996) also sides with the argument for the institutional
significance in democratic consolidation by stating that
the pattern of state building effects indigenous civic capacity... State agency
shapes public culture more than historical vagaries in CE today: if we define
democracy as effective polity performance, we run the risk of falling into an
elitist definition of democracy (Ibid., 245)... But if...we follow the classics and
define it as popular sovereignty and individual rights, ... history gives us little
reason to expect a strong association with institutional performance ... "The
causes are structural: attacking the lack of social capital by encouraging
association is attacking the symptoms not the causes of the problem (Ibid., 247).
I agree with Tarrow that without well developed democratic institutions (whether
public and private), civic engagement will be compromised which in turn impedes
democratic consolidation. This need for well structured democratic institutions is
addressed by a number of CEI programs (which are detailed in the data section of
Chapter Four) which foster broad institutional development on the national and
transnational political, economic and social levels in CE.
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Institutional reform in CE through CEI programs within international regime
structure intersects with different contextual styles of politics to produce a synergistic
effect between the shared purpose of CEI member states (i.e. the common good of
"peace"/regional stability through democratic consolidation which can also be viewed as
the impetus for the civic - and political - engagement of the member states along the
thought process of Putnam) and the norms and values which are reflected in the
institutional implementation of CEI programs. Hence cultural interpretation and public
choice (in contrast to the Soviet era, when the public had little choice over the design of
its public institutions) have a common ground in the programs within the international
regime structure of the CEI. From this angle structuralists can approach the concept of
social capital as structural as well as having a normative dimension.

Identity and Ethnicities
The disintegration of the Soviet Union, and with it that of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia, drew attention to the importance of state identity in the first place and
(as discussed in the previous section on space and boundaries) it actively focused on the
need for pan-national state identities in the region of the CEI (Herrman and Brewer 2004,
vii) for the purpose of developing legitimate governance. The reason the concepts of
identity and ethnicity are of particular significance in this region in that following the
disintegration of the Soviet Union the concepts of space and place were not longer
synonymous with national identity in many cases as discussed in the first chapter of this
thesis. Furthermore, the political leaning "closer to Europe" following the disintegration
of the Soviet Union brought a completely new identity into play in CE. As we will see in
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the data section, certain CEI programs specifically address concepts of space and place
and some dealing specifically with identity, ethnicity - and their evolution and re-shaping
in this transition from the former Soviet influence new and changing nation states and the
expression of ethnicities and national vs. regional identities.
Katzenstein (1996) defines the formation of the national state identity in a foreign
policy context. The formation of state identity can be stabilizing on alliances with other
states, or the consolidation of an anti-hegemonic posture or of crafting its membership in
a security community (defined as sharing some kind of deep commonality built on a
concept of principles). In post-Soviet CE, with some nations themselves dissolving,
developing a new state identity, both in a regional security framework as well as within
economic, cultural and scientific shared principles have been significant in stabilizing
these new democracies as well as the security of those countries bordering them,
especially to the West.
The literature on national identities is vast, but suffice it to say that identities can
be nested in one another like Russian nesting dolls, cross-cutting with partial overlap of
several identities, or they can be completely separate from one another, or they can
partially blend (Wendt 1999). The CEI plays a significant role not only in the creation of
national and transnational socio-political identities among its member states, but it also
contributes to the formation of post-national identities with considerable security
implications. If CE can extend its identity to a broader Europe, the CEI contributes to
stabilizing Italy's and Austria's borders via its international regime structure and the
regional identity developing through it.
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While the specific boundaries of "Europe" may not matter definitively in this
discussion, the question of "what is Europe?" is one of "fuzzy boundaries" in Risse's
(2004) terminology. Since Moldova and Belarus are also CEI member states, the "fuzzy
boundaries" dilemma extends to this study. Europe is rife with examples of fuzzy
boundaries. For example, while the Council of Europe includes Ukraine and Russia, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) includes the United States
and Canada as well. The EU might expand as far south-east as Turkey, but the European
Monetary Union (EMU) encompasses only 12 EU member states, and the Schengen
accord does not extend to the U.K., but includes Switzerland and Norway. In other
words, "'Europe' as a space of political organization and institutionalization has no clear

boundaries" (Risse 2004, 258).
The feeling of regional "boundedness" is more than just a feel-good goal of the CEI,
but rather an utmost political aim: Risse (Ibid., 264) sees this as disconfirming C. Tilly's

(1975 and 1985) idea that community building and nation building are inherently linked
to war making. On the contrary, "if the EU defines what it means [in the sense of
personal identity] to be European, the European integration process has left its marks on
the deepest levels of state- and nationhood in Europe" (emphasis mine), (Ibid., 264). This
confirms Habermas' (1994, 1996) "vision of a post-nationalist European identity and
statehood" (Risse 2004, 264), where European-ness centers around a civic identity of
liberal values such as human rights, democracy, a market economy and the welfare state
(Ibid., 264). CEI program activities are designed towards accomplishing equivalent goals
in member states: One of the CEI's purposes from inception has been to bring CE closer
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to Europe (a sentiment expressed numerous times during my interviews at the CEI in
Trieste).
The phenomenon of transforming a group into an entity following the development
of perceptions of common fate, proximity and boundedness is evident in the structure of
the CEI as an international regime and the region of its member states. The significance
of the transformation of CEI member states towards a collective self in the context of an
international regime for socio-political purposes, such as regional stability, lies in the
structure of its cooperative programs which encourage and enable this development.
Cooperation on the other hand can contribute to gains for both sides in cases
where the parties did not formerly trust each other (as is the case in the prisoners
dilemma) (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, 10). In this setting a "neutral" party, such as an
IGO like the CEI, can provide information, verification, reassurance, increased
efficiency, predictability and general confidence to take a transaction from an ideological
goal to a realized construct (Ibid., 10). The trust which institutions are able to generate is
notable in security dilemmas (historically a significant factor in CE) as well as in
transactions lacking commercial efficiency, as can be the case in young democracies,
inexperienced with open and competitive markets. Institutional strategies have been
identified as promoting the construction of an overarching common identity among
member states such as in the CEI (Ibid., 11). In the case of the CEI its rules and norms
have become part of the social and power structure which define the member states'
socio-political environment and are co-constitutive of each other (Ibid., 13).
The significance of identity in CE is a) that some of the democratic values of the
hegemons (Austria and Italy) are being assimilated by the other member states, and b) a
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shared regional identity ("Central- and South-Eastern European") leads to increased
cooperation and trust, positively influencing increased regional stability. Several CEI
programs distinctly stress the construction of a "post-national civic identity" in the
Habermasian sense (Habermas 1994, 1996), emphasizing democracy, human rights, a
market economy, the welfare state and cultural diversity (Risse 2004, 256). Just as these
values have become constitutive for the EU, they also appear to have become constitutive
for CEI member states since CEI by-laws are obligatory for its members.
The cultural identity of (West-) Europeans is linked to their region as a whole, while
their civic identity is attached to the EU (Ibid., 257). This concept of an EU culturalversus civic identity is similar in Central- and South-Eastern Europe, not only because
some countries there have become EU members, while others actively aspire to do so, but
also due to the normative influence of CEI programs and rules, many of which are
modeled after the EU. In this context the CEI has created an atmosphere of mutual
understanding, where large national projects and international programs can be discussed,
planned, studied, financed and implemented. This strategy is aimed at contributing to a
more cooperative, safe and stable Europe overall by re-integrating Central- and South
Eastern Europe with Western Europe, as had been the case historically during different
periods. The CEI is hence a model of national self-determination of sovereign peoples
united into a community of shared rules, norms, principles and purpose.
The social-institutional adaptation of a group (e.g. a minority) or an entire
political system to changing international conditions, including a Eurocentric adaptation,
may be considered a cultural loss. However, cultural fluidity, i.e. change, is often
required of groups and nation states following historical events which sever previous
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structures (V. Tilly 2002). Nevertheless, V. Tilly (Ibid.) points out that ethnic identities
are not entirely malleable by the "ethno-architect". There is a limit to their fluidity since
they are attached to a myriad of social experiences, collective memories,
and [their own] norms, which carry their own logics and inertia. Political
claims may also embed in popular consciousness, shaping social
perceptions of ethnic identities [and altering political behavior] (Ibid., 161),
i.e. deriving from deeper cultural traits or meaning systems. Hence recognizing in CE the
shared, as well as the divergent, history between countries and the limits this might place
on any plans for "instant democratization" is significant - and realistic. This would
position "ethnicity" in the primordial Geertzian sense (vs. the instrumentalist approach
which treats ethnicity as a social, political and cultural resource for different interest
groups). In practice, the state template (in the case of CE as influenced by the synergistic
effect of CEI programs) translates these international norms into standards which modify
state elite perceptions and values concerning ethnic diversity and possibly even the social
construction of ethnic identities itself (Ibid., 165). V. Tilly views this as "the cognitive
terrain of nation building" (Ibid., 166) since part of a state's legitimacy rests on
manifesting a unified nation willing to live under one government. This is not simply a
theoretical concept but of great significance in CE as the disintegration of the Soviet
Union led to disintegration of several CE countries due to ethnic conflicts based on
longstanding cultural and religious differences discussed in Chapter One. Having respect
for and integrating e.g. ethnic minorities is spelled out in the November 1994 "CEI
Instrument for the Protection of Minority Rights" and is additionally an explicit
component of several CEI programs and international agreements. This serves as one of
the powerful norming influence in the formation of state templates regarding the
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treatment of ethnic minorities (an unresolved issue pre-1980s) in CEI member countries
since the CEI advocates integrative, rather than fragmentative, identity politics.
There are two models to explain identity change due to institutional activity (e.g.
an IGO in the form of an international regime, such as the CEI): The constructivist
socialization model assumes that institutions by their existence create changes in the
political environment which eventually alter the members' perceptions of community,
interdependence, and trust (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, 14). Through this process
identities/interests and institutions become endogenized over time and part of the social
and power structure which "forms the social environment in which people act" (Risse
2004, 263). This is not a uniform effect and "socialization models allow for different
degrees of experience with institutions among people in the same population, with
corresponding differences in depth and level of identification with those institutions"
(Hermann and Brewer 2004, 14). This may involve developing a dual identity, one
representative of the "native" culture, the other reflective of the values of the newly
introduced institution (Risse 2004, 263), i.e. the values of the CEI promoting democracy,
human rights, a market economy, the welfare state and cultural diversity.
The second, rationalistmodel, of identity change considers institutions themselves
as active agents of change through the direct role which institutions play in creatingand
engaging corresponding social identities (Hermann and Brewer 2004, 15). This may be
"a potentially valuable resource that can be drawn on to achieve legitimization, engage
group loyalties, and energize collective effort" (Ibid.). Risse (2004, 261) does not
consider this "rationalist" model as significant in the formation of European identity as
the socialization model.
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Since my study focuses on the different social, political and cultural levels affected
by the CEI in their member states, particularly for the purpose of democratization and
regional stability, a liberal intergovernmentalist model applies in my opinion to certain
aspects of the CEI and its programs. According to this model, "preferences are
aggregated by national governments, which then negotiate binding agreements and
institutions to insure credible commitments" (Ibid., 263). For the process of democratic
consolidation, this is one of the most significant mechanisms of an IGO, such as the CEI,
whose purpose is peaceful regional integration leading to democratic consolidation. It
does not account, however, for all the other mechanisms also involved in the international
regime structure of the CEI and its programs to achieve regional stabilization and
democratic consolidation.
Regardless of whether one views the "group socialization" effect of CEI programs
on officials and ordinary citizens in member countries as a result of the socialization- or
the persuasion model (or a combination of the two), the CEI probably has a significant
effect on the identity formation of the post-Soviet populations in CE in terms of
conveying behavior, norms, and institutional rules conducive to the development of a free
and lively civil society, a relatively autonomous and valued political society, rule of law
to ensure legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms and independent associational life, a
state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic
institutionalized economic society.
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government

and an

Agent - Structure: Norms, Internalization and Learning
Wendt (1999) proposes three different theoretical paths in analyzing how norms
matter through the degree to which they are internalized: Norms can be internalized to
produce the same structure through "force", "price", and "legitimacy". According to
Wendt, "it is only with the third degree of internalization that actors are really
'constructed' by culture, while the prior degrees of norm internalization simply represent
culture affecting the actors' behavior or beliefs about their environment" (Wendt 1999,
250). An empirical question would be to determine the degree of internalization in order
to show the degree to which the actors (states and their civilian representatives) are
constructed through the culture of the CEI international regime. In this case study I am
surmising that the norms and values which are made available to CEI member states both
on the governmental as well as the civic values level are internalized by the actors on the
legitimacy level, as they joined the CEI voluntarily. The availability of various project
funds did likely encouraged this acquiescence however. It is important to contrast "force"
as a criterion which was frequently applied in the Soviet Union to achieve compliance
with the CEI's norms, rules and purpose within the international regime structure.
Cultural selection can take place through imitation, whereby standards are
constituted by shared understandings but vary in the cultural and social learning context
(i.e. the interaction of CEI member states in a cooperative and economically supportive
environment) rather than e.g. leaving CE EU-applicant states to their own devices in
figuring out the acquis communautaire (e.g. the "democracy" requirement) in preparation
for their EU membership. Constructivist approaches highlight the possibility that learning
may also have a constructive effect on identities and interests (Ibid., 327): identities and
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their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are
treated by significant others (Ibid., 328). This is also known as "mirroring" because
actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see or "appraise"
them, such as being treated as an enemy because "Other" views oneself as such. This
phenomenon is essential in CE since CEI programs facilitate social learning among its
member states through joint programs in an environment which generates trust.
Rationalists usually assume that learning and perspective-taking do not change
actors or what they want, but only their ability to achieve their wants in a given social
context (Wendt 1999, 333). In contrast, interactionists (constructivists) assume that
learning may also change identities and interests. Finnemore (1996) has shown how
individual agency led to the establishment of certain institutions which then in turn
asserted their norms on individual state preference. Wendt (Ibid.) takes this argument
further by pointing out that constructivism treats identities and interests as endogenous to
interaction; they are thus dependent variables. This is exactly the effect of CEI programs
on CE regional stability and democratic consolidation I hope to demonstrate: as the states
(actors) become increasingly integrated in the international regime structure of the CEI,
not only do their preferences change, e.g. by aligning their domestic policies with CEI
program opportunities, but their civic and political goals change to a preference for
cooperation rather than mistrust and hostilities. In fact, the development of a collective
identity ("CEI member states") leads to a structural change of seeing the neighbor not
through the lens of ancient animosities, but as a potentially trustworthy economic,
scientific and cultural partner for tomorrow in a Kantian sense, making cooperation rather
than military actions possible in CE.
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In terms of agent-structure language, Cerny (1990) also points out that structure is
both enabling and constraining and has constitutive effects. In the data section of this
thesis in Chapter Four I will show how the CEI in CE offers through its programs access
e.g. to institutional, political and social structures which support in this region democratic
consolidation and regional cooperation as well as discourage disintegrative socio-political
practices, a process which would become internalized by CEI member countries.
Historical

institutionalism

has developed the

agent-structure

and co-constitution

paradigms extensively, largely within sociological institutionalist approaches (Hay and
Wincott 1998). The efficacy of ideational factors such as culture, norms and ideas and
social efficacy are more significant than simply their functional utility however (Ruggie
1998, 33). In other words, "'norms count' because they constitute actors' identities and
interests, which should be considered endogenous and socially constructed rather than
exogenous and given" (Ibid., 16). In Onuf's (1989) words, rules are central to the process
of social construction. In this paper I argue that norms are co-constitutive, i.e. they coconstitute actors and structures; collectivities having both causal, constraining effects
(Lapid and Kratochwil 1996) in the structure of the CEI as an international regime. This
study shows how social rules are a medium of social construction in CEI member
countries transitioning from Soviet authoritarianism to democracy. The prior institutional
forms of collective action were being demolished and reconstructed in a fashion strongly
influenced by the new, prevailing forms of transnational societal self-identification in a
historical transformation of the past regional (Soviet) system (Hall 2002, 122).
Constructivists also seek to explain the constitution of actors' identities and
interest as a prelude to understanding their rational choices (Burch 2002, 62), i.e. the
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processes and the co-constitution of political actors and structures. Co-constitution of
conditions (i.e. ideas and material conditions), according to Burch (Ibid., 25) involves
three aspects: agent rationality, structure, and culture as a source of meaning. The norm
of rationality often "becomes the accepted and legitimate form" (Ibid.) in organizations, a
state, or in an IGO like the CEI with its guidelines and rules of procedure. According to
Onuf (1989, 54-58), a comprehensive

constructivist approach recognizes the co-

constitution of conditions (ideas and material conditions) of society (agents and
structures) and of subjective meaning among individuals and groups (emphasis mine). In
other words, social structures constitute actors' identities, interests, or capabilities, just as
actors' choices constitute patterned social structures, while rules are significant because
they link the material and ideational aspects of social structures (Burch 2002, 69).
Constructivist "research highlights three fundamental questions: What is the source
of the interests and identities of individual actors? Are prevailing structures material [in
every sense, such as the most basic one of 'who provides funds': the EBRD or a Soviet
institution] or also social? What are the processes through which agents construct
structures and structures constitute agents" (emphasis mine) (Ibid., 62). In the case of the
CEI the international regime structure represents a synergistic source of material and
social structure (through its norms and shared purpose underlying its programs as well as
funding options) which constitute the agents, as well as being constituted by the
subjective (national, cultural) meaning CEI member states attach to them..
In fact, "Onuf's constructivism acknowledges that there are multiple sources of rules
and norms constructing the world's social structure" (Kubalkova 1998, 197): Local
identity and culture are both significant influences on the interpretation and creation of
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rules by agents, since norms and rules reflect national, ethnic, religious, and other
identities which bear on the social processes in - or between - particular cultures
(Kubalkova 1991, 197). Wendt (1999, 338) points out that a change in the structure of
any internalized culture that is associated with a collective identity, involves also the
breakdown of an old identity and the emergence of a new one. This would mean that in
the case of CE the internalized old, authoritarian culture needs to be broken down and be
replaced with democratic values.
The difference between CEI programs within an international regime and the usual
interactions among participants of an IGO is that the latter are often the result of
"Realpolitik", treating the Other in self-interested terms, "casting them as if they were
nothing but objects" (Ibid., 341), while the CEI provides a mutually co-constitutive
forum for the creation of new state identities, which are regionally linked. Wendt (Ibid.)
defines this type of representational practice as "pro-social", which involves treating
others as if one not only respected their individual security concerns but also "cared" for
the individual, a willingness to help them even when this serves no narrowly selfinterested purpose, casting the Other as a friend rather than assuming an adversarial
stance. To observe this in post-Soviet CE would mean to observe regional cooperation
and stability rather than continued regional political and social fragmentation.
I propose that the model of international regime theory can be applied to the
programs utilized by the CEI as contributing to regional stabilization and democratic
consolidation in CE, whereby Central European regional stabilization and democratic
"consolidation" are dependent variables of the CEI's international regime structure and
programs administered within this framework in a co-constitutive process.

41

This study, by focusing on "international regime" building, does not approach
democratization in terms of "nation building", e.g. factors of nationalism and ethnicity
which Rustow (1970), and to a certain extent Weber (1949), have alluded to except as
they relate to democratic values and other shared norms of the CEI. As Muller and
Seligson (1994) warned: "causal models of the relationship between civic culture
attitudes and democracy should be formulated to take into account the possibility of
reciprocal causation between these variables" (Ibid., 635). In the context of the CEI this
means that norms and institutions were not simply "handed down" (in the sense of
"imposed on") to member states. Rather, the international regime was co-constituted also
via a "bottom up" dynamic by the civil and local political actors in contributing to the
continuous design and refinement of programs and socio-political approaches nationally
and transnationally in CE. This thesis does not focus on the mechanisms of transition
between phases that Huntington (1991) has exhaustively described. Rather, this study
focuses explicitly on mechanism contributing to the consolidation of young democracies
via regional stabilization within an international regime, keeping in mind the favorable
context in which this third wave of democratization in CE has been taking place
(Kopecky 2000, 531). This has involved a shift from previous coercive approaches to
those requiring 'conditionality' (Whitehead 1996 in: Keystone 2000, 531).
While the literature is extensive on the elements necessary for democratic
consolidation and regional stability, no analysis exists to my knowledge which identifies
the pathways an IGO could specifically follow to achieve consolidated democracies for
the purpose of regional security.

42

Chapter Three
Methodology
The focus of this thesis is democratic consolidation, which Huntington identified as
the third stage in democratic transition from an authoritarian regime and which must be
achieved for a democracy to be stabilized. I hypothesize that the CEI assists through the
unique structure of its programs in the regional stability and the consolidation of
democracy in member countries ("CE"). It does so in two ways, as identified in the
literature review. First, it seeks to achieve the internal parameters of a consolidated
democracy, which can be summarized, following Linz and Stepan (1996, 7) as involving
the following five areas:
First, the conditions must exist for the development of afree and lively civil society.
Second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valuedpolitical society. Third, there
must be a rule of law to ensure legal guaranteesfor citizens' freedoms and independent
associationallife. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new
democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society
(emphasis mine).
Additionally, the CEI programs utilize international mechanisms to contribute to the
stabilization of new democracies in CE, i.e. they involve member states in an
international regime that values democracy and cooperation, and that constructs
"entitativity", namely regional identities that transcend the nation. The co-constitutive
mechanisms that produce these outcomes involve socialization and imitation, but also
rational calculation.
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This is an individual crucial case study designed to test the theory whether
democratic consolidation of a country can be facilitated by its international environment,
specifically by becoming part of an international regime and its programs, whose specific
purpose is regional stability. A single crucial case study such as this one of course is not
designed to quantitatively support the pathways to democratic consolidation and regional
stability through a delineation of CEI programs. However, it uniquely enabled me to
explore some of the tools used, the mechanism activated, and the outcomes made
possible.

Data Collection Methods
This case study utilized primary and secondary data in order to answer the research
question, of what CEI programs, and how, they augment criteria of democratic
consolidation as outlined in the literature and hereby contribute to regional stability.
The first stage of data collection involved an archival review of CEI activity- and
project reports as well as the by-laws of the organization since its inception in 1989.
These data were in part handed to me as documents by CEI officers at their offices in
Trieste/Italy. Others are available on the websites of the CEI, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, and related organizations. I describe the path of the
CEI and its establishment as an IGO within the framework of an international regime
from the moment of inception in November 1989 through an Italian seed grant (as Italy
had great immediacy to this project both in terms of external security and great
familiarity in dealing with instability in CE during previous centuries ) throughout the
following

period

of the disintegration

of the
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Soviet

Union

and

subsequent

democratization of Central European countries until today. By analyzing official CEI
documents, I examined democratic and civic culture norm transplantation, civil society
learning and regional economic and political cooperation as part of CEI programs. I take
successful norm transplantation (e.g. cooperation), defined as functioning democratic
civil and political institutions, as an indication that the CEI as an international regime
contributed to the stabilization of democratic institutions and values. I collected
information in particular about programs which contribute a) to the establishment of civil
society by promoting civic values (e.g. environmental projects or those enabling election
participation) or b) to the establishment of political society (e.g. the annual CEI meeting
of the heads of member states) or c) those projects which focus on cooperation (e.g. joint
civil infrastructure projects between formerly adversary countries in CE, such as the
Central European youth orchestra or the Central European University) and d) those
promoting other criteria identified

in the literature

as indicative of successful

democracies, such as recognition of minority rights and a free market economy.
The second stage of data collection consisted of a field study of the CEI in
Trieste, Italy, to substantiate my archival findings. The field study portion consisted of
data-collection via semi-structured elite interviews of CEI officers at their headquarters in
Trieste/Italy. These interviews were conducted with semi-open-ended descriptive and
inferential questions to allow these officers to expand the discussion to topics with which
I was not familiar before the interview. The interview guide is attached in appendix 1, as
is approval by the Institutional Review Board.
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Data Analysis Methods
My data analysis involved searching for social and normative patterns in the
activities of the CEI which contribute to democratic consolidation. In addition, I probed
those programs which bind the countries peacefully in this region in such a way as to
reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, such as through socialization, imitation and
rational choice. I suggest that the active involvement of the presidents of each country,
the ministers of the particular area in which a project is being discussed, as well as the
civilian representatives responsible for developing and implementing a particular project
promotes democratic stabilization at different levels within the CEI regime (i.e. the
transnational-, the national- and the local official- and civil representative level).
The theory underlying this study is that the programs of the CEI work in a dovetail
manner to reinforce democratic processes in its member states. This happens not least due
to the international regime structure of the CEI which necessitates peaceful cooperation
per the rules (by-laws) and norms of the institution. Cooperation is defined in this study
as conflict resolution without engaging in armed warfare. As mentioned in the literature
review above, the rational actor model is applicable in this context as "peace" is a public
good calling for cooperation of the concerned parties (i.e. CE) to maintain it.
If my hypothesis is confirmed, I expect to find that the unique structure of CEI
programs is effective in contributing to characteristics other authors have delineated as
essential to a democracy per se as well as to democratic consolidation, and we should
find that none of the CEI member countries have reverted to authoritarian rule.
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Limitations and Biases
Since the CEI is a unique IGO in terms of the purpose for its creation and the extent
of its programs, these programs cannot be compared directly to other IGOs, hence
affecting the reliability of my interpretation of international regimes promoting
democratic consolidation and regional stability. Furthermore, to my knowledge an IGO
has never been studied within the frame work of a regional international regime for the
purpose of contributing to democratic consolidation post-authoritarianism in a region.
The validity of this case study is limited because I cannot compare my findings to
another, similar case. Furthermore, even though the activities undertaken by the CEI
appear to have a positive correlation (though of unproven causality) with the theoretical
parameters of democratic consolidation and the actual stabilization of Central European
democracies, they may not apply to other geographical regions striving for democratic
consolidation. Causality itself is not established in this study.
Positioning CEI programs within international regime theory appeared to me as the
most consistent with established international relations theory. However, another
researcher, studying the same case, may prefer to develop the concept of democratic
consolidation more specifically along other theoretical models, e.g. along theories about
epistemic communities only, or in terms of cooperation in securities models. The findings
could be subject to other interpretations, mostly with respect to the effect of intervening
variables such as the democracy-supportive efforts by NGOs in CE and by isolating the
normative effect itself of the prospect of future EU membership (as this effect constitutes
a component of CEI modi operandi in certain programs).
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This study was confined to interviewing current CEI officers - and no past officers
- and to publications made available by these officers as well as those on the CEI- and

related websites. Also, I have not examined every single CEI document available which
could lead to a different interpretation of the data - hence a potentially significant bias in
the study. Nevertheless, since I detected consistency within the great abundance of data
available to me, it is doubtful that any further data would present a completely different
picture of the CEI.
No formal fieldwork was conducted in other CEI member countries. This might,
however, also present a completely different angle of CEI programs as opposed to that
presented at CEI headquarters in Trieste.
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Chapter Four
Results and Discussion
CEI History and Objectives
The Central European Initiative is an IGO which was established 1989 with a two
million Euro seed grant from the Italian foreign ministry to further the political, economic
and cultural cooperation of its member states in order to enhance regional stability in CE.
It is the oldest and largest of sub-regional cooperation initiatives which emerged in
Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the communist system. At that time its
main aim was to assist its member states in the transition from post-soviet authoritarian
governments "to come closer to the EU" (a phrase heard repeatedly during my field
interviews to express the CEI's aim of coordination and cooperation among its member
states as well as to integrate socio-economic and political processes in CE with Western
Europe). There is no democracy requirement for member states (in contrast to the EU).
Rather, in the beginning there was simply the desire on the part of the CEI to bring about
socio-political and economic coordination and cooperation in CE, based on democratic
principles among its members for the purpose of regional stabilization. If this succeeded
and indeed brought member states "closer to Europe" as a result of CEI programs, it
would also be an indication of democratic consolidation, since a stable democracy is a
membership criterion for the EU, and EU membership was in fact attained by some CEI
member states.
With its latest enlargements the CEI re-focused its priorities on countries in special
need such as Belarus and Ukraine. No longer belonging to the USSR and unable to meet
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membership criteria for the EU, these countries were unable to establish another bilateral
institutional relationship at the time of joining the CEI. The CEI recognized this as a
potentially regionally destabilizing socio-political influence and, although Belarus is
geographically located outside Central- and Eastern Europe, the CEI agreed to engage
this country in the process of democratic dialogue development and for it to also observe
approaches to democratic cooperation. The ability to participate, especially in a nonthreatening, accessible institutional democratic setting may contribute to the development
of civic attitudes according to Rustow (1979).
However, it is important to note that the CEI recognized the significance of not only
engaging CE simply in dialogue, but it also recognized the need for these newly
independent states to acquire the tools necessary for democratization. As was discussed
in the literature review, not only are the establishment of democratic institutions
important for the successful functioning of a democracy, but the political culture of
democratic discourse needs to be cultivated in countries transitioning from authoritarian
rule, as is the establishment of civic values and the development of civil society,
supportive of a successful market economy.
Hence, although there is a focus to assist member countries in their EU applicant
proceedings, the initial focus of the CEI was on the economic and political stabilization
of this region for the purpose of maintaining peace along the Eastern border of Austria
and Italy through the prevention of new dividing lines not only politically but also
economically across Europe between the more and the less advanced countries. It is
important to note that with the latest expansions, now including besides Moldova,
Ukraine and Belarus also five South Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia and
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Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia), the CEI has shifted its focus on the
strategic goal of pan-European integration. This means that the traditional goals of
promoting

member

states'

participation

in

the

European

integration

process,

comprehensive cooperation between member states, and the promotion of transitional
processes in member states have been expanded to also fostering "the capabilities of the
least developed member states as well as of those that urgently need accelerated
economic development or economic reconstruction" (Website of the Slovenian foreign
ministry, accessed 1/19/2006). This includes facilitating and co-financing transfer of
know-how and developing negotiating experience for new member countries. The
strategic goal of the CEI is pan-European integration by working to prevent the
emergence or even deepening of new divisions in Europe, regardless of whether they be
caused by the EU or NATO enlargement strategies or by differences in economic
standards and development (Website of the Slovenian foreign ministry, accessed

1/19/2006).
The CEI today represents an integrated framework of dialogue, coordination and
cooperation among its member countries in the political, economic, cultural and
parliamentary fields, creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding in which national
projects and transnational

programs

are being

discussed, planned,

studied and

implemented (OECD website 2/4/06). The heads of state and foreign ministers meet once
a year, usually in November. The rotating presidency is assisted by the CEI Executive
Secretariat in Trieste. The presidency of the CEI rotates annually at the beginning of the
calendar year based on the alphabetical order of the English names of CEI Member
States, unless decided otherwise (see Appendix 3: CEI Guidelines and Rules of
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Procedure). These mechanisms, detailed more below, contribute to democracy as a
system of governance in which politicians are held accountable to the public for their
actions by their constituency (Schumpeter 1943, cited by Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76) in
contrast to the absence of this possibility under authoritarian rule. These are also political
patterns observed both in the UN (with whom the CEI cooperates closely) and the EU,
indicating the normative influence not only of Western Europe but in fact of global
institutions for cooperation.
The CEI language is (neutral) English and translations have to be borne by the party
requiring them. Decisions in the CEI are taken as a rule by member consensus. Another
indication of shared norms and common identification among CEI member states is the
CEI flag. It is not by coincidence similar to the EU flag in colors and design in order to
reflect the geographic identity and the socio-political integrative aspects of CEI member
states with the EU (see figure 2).

CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE
Figure 2: CEI Flag
Source:

CEI website, www.CEINET.org

The CEI's legal status is that of an intergovernmental organization, responsible for
the administrative and conceptual

support in the preparation and follow-up

of

democratically agreed upon programs and activities. It maintains a permanent office at
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the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in London to assist the
Executive Office in Trieste with economic, strategic, and investment projects (detailed
later in this chapter), as well as with certain international events, such as the CEI Summit
Economic Forum.

CEI Organizational Structure (Norms and By-laws)/CEI Levels of
Involvement in Member States
CEI principles, objectives, membership and participation, organization and
structure are defined in the "Guidelines and Rules of Procedure" (see Appendix 3) and
are compulsory for all members. Non-compliance can result in the expulsion of a member
state from the organization. This indicates the strong normative quality of democratic

CEI principles.
The CEI has established an integrated framework of dialogue, co-ordination and
consensual operation among its member countries in the political, economic, cultural and
parliamentary fields in an atmosphere of mutual understanding in which national projects
and transnational programs are discussed, planned, studied and implemented (EastAgri
website, accessed 2/4/06). Civil society is hence not simply a descriptive category, but
also a normative one within the CEI. The CEI is organized as an intergovernmental
cooperation forum, which is not institutionalized in terms of specific goals, but instead
attempts to be as flexible as possible in order to accommodate the unique historic-cultural
dynamics and infra-structural realities of member countries in their process of democratic
consolidation, in large part within the frame work of the CEI and its programs in which
member states participate. This approach allows an "organic" development of the
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normative structures "bottom up" in member countries in addition to the "top down"
effect of CEI norms, as shown in the programs I delineate in the rest of this chapter.
The CEI's general modus operandi is to build relationships and to strengthen
communication between member countries. Their programs substitute partially for the
role which Comecon previously played in CE. CEI programs also provide mechanisms
for its member countries transiting from centrally controlled economies to participate in
free market forums and training programs pertaining to free market operations. These
help create epistemic communities, i.e. "networks of professionals [as reflected in the
listing of Working Groups (WGs) below] with recognized expertise and competence in a
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
domain or issue area" (Ruggie 1998, 83). They contribute to shaping the pattern of
politics from an institutionalizational grid of the state and the post-Soviet international
political order through which behavior is acted out, or those through which regional and
international political relationships are visualized as P. Haas (1992, 26) has described.
This implies that the international structure of the CEI as an international regime
represents a key dimension for transformation through the programs detailed below, by
providing the basis on which the constitutive units (member countries and/or their
programs) assume their identity as constitutive units and that basis on which the
constitutive units are differentiated from one another (Ruggie 1998, 132). This allows for
national individualization based on the democratic voices in different countries.
The details of the CEI's three-pillar organization are as follows: (Note that some
criteria of the CEI structure are normed by those of the EU's European Council,
European Commission, and European Parliament).
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The Governmental Dimension as the first pillar is composed of representatives (experts
from various ministries and other governmental as well as non-governmental institutions)
from all member states and lays the groundwork

for good governance

8

and

multilaterality within CE.
They develop activities within the framework of the eighteen WGs detailed later in
this chapter. The governmental dimension includes:
The annual Meeting of the Heads of State of each member country ("CEI
Summit" with its annually rotating CEI Presidency) whereby consensus is obtained from
the highest level of government from each member country for various political,
economic and social programs. There are also:
Annual Ministerial Meetings e.g. of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of the
ministers of different economic sectors (such as transport, tourism, energy), in order to
delineate the proper authority

for implementing trans-border projects (e.g. the

development of new train routes, the re-connection of those interrupted during the 1990's
Balkan crisis, joint marketing of tourist destinations (such as "Balkan vacations"), or
energy security (including open joint discussions about nuclear alternatives). While these
topics may appear as inconsequential, one must keep in mind that the disintegration of
the Soviet Union and with it that of several countries, such as Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia, century-old animosities surfaced. This lead to the well-known military
confrontations and destruction of infrastructure in some countries before their CEI
membership. The result was a partial inability of some CEI member states to relate to
each other politically and economically at times. The definitive structure of CEI by-laws,
combined with the soft-power approach in guiding member state governments through
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politically charged times, provided the normative structure to lead members towards
trans-national cooperation and to establish the socio-economic institutions which would
facilitate democratic consolidation.
The Parliamentary Dimension (see Appendix 4) is the second pillar of the CEI.
Parliamentarians are also regular participants at all high-level CEI meetings. They are
involved in work group (WG) activities and develop their own ad hoc committees.
Parallel to the CEI Summit Meeting is the CEI Economic Forum which utilizes the
presence of the heads of state in extending legitimacy to economic programs developed
by CEI member countries to improve various aspects of the transition to a free market
economy and to support each country's economic viability (which is one of the criteria
identified as essential for successful democratic consolidation).
Sub- ministerial and sectoral events, monthly meetings of the committee of
National Coordinators, and meetings and other activities of CEI Working Groups
covering areas such as economics, human and institutional development, co-financing,
plus conferences, workshops, and training courses as outlined in the "CEI Document on
Working Procedures of the Parliamentary Dimension" (Appendix 4) not only increase
transnational cooperation within the CE region among CEI member states at the civil
society and local political levels, but contribute to the development of civic and
democratic values, by requiring delegates to debate and vote on program proposals in a
wide variety of sectors, as well as teaching them the institutional steps required for
materializing their projects (e.g. utilizing CEI funds to undertake feasibility studies which
are then submitted to the EU Commission or the EBRD for project funding).
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The CEI Working Procedures of the Parliamentary Dimension also explicitly
emphasize

multilateral

establishment

cooperation,

and deepening

complemented

of partnership

by

structures

bilateral

relations,

based on principles

the
of

parliamentary democracy and of guaranteeing human rights, creative collaboration to
facilitate reform processes and transition in Central and Eastern Europe, and to improve
the European environment in member States ("CEI Document on Working Procedures of
the Parliamentary Dimension". Appendix 4), such as respect for international law and
humanity, justice and democracy (values also embraced by the UN which show that the
CEI is not simply a mechanism of Western European expansionism).
The Business Dimension is the third pillar of the organization and acts as a regional
forum for cooperation and consultation among the chambers of commerce in all CEI
member states. This level reaches down to the local level of democratic institutions, and
to constructing civic values and civil society, supported by a healthy economy.
The Summit Economic Forums, held annually following the CEI Summit of the
Heads of Government, are a gathering of government officials, industry leaders, private
industry

executives,

entrepreneurs,

investors,

financial

institutions,

international

organizations, promotion agencies, representatives of local authorities, bankers, fund
managers, and service providers, both within and beyond the CEI region, to search for
tangible opportunities for investment and growth in CE and to identify solutions to
institutional bottlenecks due to inadequately developed free market institutions and
capabilities, to examine investment opportunities, to establish trade partnerships and
cooperation agreements. The Summit Economic Forums function as a market for goods
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and services, to present project ideas and to find business partners (CEI Wholesale
Markets Foundation News website, accessed November 29, 2005).
As mentioned previously, CEI projects and activities often complement and expand
the programs of other European and international organizations (such as the EU, the
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the UN Economic Commission in Geneva, and
UN specialized agencies and international financial institutions, such as the EBRD) and
those concerning Central and Eastern European countries in particular (Appendix 5) in
order to facilitate the integration of responsible CE democratic governments into global
institutions. This also corresponds to the aim for multilateral alliances which were
envisioned (Ruggie 1998, 197) in the international political arena following the
disintegration of the Soviet Union to prevent new bifurcations in this region.

Funding
In addition to the seed grant by the Italian government in 1989, the CEI maintains
four types of funds/funding activities (see appendix 5 for samples of projects and

funding):
The CEI Cooperation Fund was established in 2002 and is based on annual
contributions from member states. It co-finances activities in the various workgroup
areas, provided that at least fifty percent of the resources are available from another
donor. This encourages CEI member states to develop further multilateral institutional
links to other organizations in order to procure the additional fifty percent financing.
Since its inception in 2002 the CEI Cooperation Fund has supported more than eighty
cooperation activities in member countries with a total contribution amounting to 1.5
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million Euro, or about sixteen percent of the total value of these projects (CEI website,
accessed January 6, 2006).
This Cooperation Fund is additionally a good example of cooperation theory applied
in practice: Those early CEI member states, which benefited greatly from the assistance
of the more affluent founding members and the international resources they were able to
summon for their own economic, human, technical and administrative development
(contributing to their successful EU membership) are now expected by the CEI to assist
their less advanced neighbors and newer CEI member states. This will start another cycle
of regional "cooperation", envisioned to perpetuate regional stability in an area which has
been historically less than stable and cooperative transnationally. This also counteracts
the development of new dividing lines between the richer and the poorer member states
which could become a source for new regional unrest. This approach also augments the
establishment of a cohesive regional identity based on interdependence and identification
with neighboring states to overcome the divisiveness of the past.
The fund - as all other CEI programs - also "showcases" the democratic evolution
of its member states: embedded in the Cooperation Fund is the CEI Evaluation Unit,
comprised of representatives from all member states, which oversees the distribution of
funds assigned to the various activity areas and promotes a balanced allocation of funds
among CEI member states and activities. This represents not only a democratic process in
financial allocations and transparency, but also transnational (regional) cooperation and,
most importantly accountability, including the freedom and duty to speak out, and be
heard, in case of a suspected discrepancy: some of the most important building blocks of
a consolidated democracy.
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The CEI Solidarity Fund, established in 1998, is based on voluntary contributions from
member states and is managed by the CEI Executive Secretariat. It facilitates
participation of representatives and experts from member states in special need (e.g.
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania,
Serbia, and Ukraine) at CEI events by reimbursing their travel and accommodation
expenses. This program is significant, not for the actual amount of moneys involved, but
to contribute to the legitimacy of CEI programs and structures: rather than member states
simply using the CEI financially and politically to advance their internal development,
member states contribute within their means to the continuation of the (cooperative)
programs which they have set up among old and newer member states. This proactively
integrates new members in this regional cooperative international regime which the CEI
represents, both at the governmental and the civic level by incorporating the democratic
and multilateral procedures, rules, and norms internally as well as in foreign relations and
economic practices.

The third Modality of Funding is the CEI Funding Unit. With the impending EU
membership (at the time of establishing this fund) of several CEI member countries
(Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland) and three EU candidate countries
(Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia), as well as five Western Balkan countries (Bosnia
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia) and three NIS countries
(Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) the CEI created this "Match-Making"-unit

(in their

terminology) in 2004 to attract EU regional funding (accession funds etc.) for certain CEI
projects, for which some member countries were now eligible, hereby linking EU funds

with CEI project funding (Appendix 6).
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Additionally, this unit seeks other outside funding for CEI projects and promotes the
participation of CEI countries in trans-national projects at the European (including
private) level (not necessarily EU level) by maintaining a data base ("Project Seeking
Partners") of inquiries for project funding and coordinates the search for project partners
in CE. In cases where a CEI project involves CE EU-member state and one non-EU CE
state the CEI will attempt to cover the non-EU member's share, such as in the "Town
Twinning Program".
Since its inception in January 2004 until April 2005 this project supported the
application of twelve EU-projects with a total value of fifteen million Euros, of which
four projects with a value of approximately five million Euros were approved as of April
2005 (Kreid 2005). While this may seem like a small number, one must consider the
lengthy application process for EU projects until approval. This approach is significant
because many NISs are not familiar with EU bureaucracy and its procedures and would
miss out on funding opportunities if left to their own resources. Instead, CEI assistance
not only increases the availability for funding which would otherwise not have been
attained, but it also serves to strengthen the ties between non-EU CEI member states and
the EU. This increased familiarity with procedures and institutions not only facilitates
future economic and political exchanges between the "new" and the "old" Europe on
many levels, but also has a norming influence on CEI member states by exposing them to
"best practices" approaches as well as to the opportunities per se available in free market
economies.
The fourth CEI funding modality is the institutional link (via the Secretariat for
Projects) with the EBRD through a trust fund since 1996, making both organizations
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also longstanding members of the Local Economic and Employment Development
(LEED) program. LEED is an OECD program to support entrepreneurship, small- and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and local development with offices in Trento, Italy.

(OECD website, accessed 4/27/2006). In 2004, for example, the EBRD spent 2.2 billion
Euros for investments in the CEI region (CEI Newsletter #32, 2: April 2005). This
investment led, among other things, to progress in Moldova and Ukraine in their
advancement towards the EU-"perspective" (Ibid.).
Some CEI programs are detailed in the following sections of this chapter, such as
those carried out by the Secretariat for CEI Projects in London which organizes and
supports economic cooperation activities, such as training programs, conferences,
workshops and other relevant international events. These cooperation projects are
managed by the executive offices in Trieste and involve investment projects and technical
cooperation projects (CEI website, accessed November 29, 2005). One example of a
trans-regional cooperation project involved another regional organization, the Adriatic
Ionian Initiative. This organization co-financed in 2005 a joint tourism project with the
CEI in small communities which are ignored by main stream tourism despite their
attractive cultural heritage and other assets with tourism potential in countries which
belong to both organizations (i.e. Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and
Montenegro).
The CEI also signed a memorandum of understanding (Appendix 8) with the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) for CEI programs with generaland country specific strategies, especially pertaining to trade and transport facilitation,
small and medium enterprises, transport and environment in relation to the dissemination
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and implementation of ECE norms and conventions. These programs are carried out
through cooperation (including UN financial support) with sub-regional groupings in
order to provide a further forum for dialogue aimed at bringing about a better
understanding of different aspects of the transition process and for the negotiating of
normative technical and institutional frameworks in these areas.

The fifth CEI funding modality is the Trust Fund, briefly referred to earlier. The CEI
is not a donor organization but utilizes the interest earned from the original seed grant
established by Italy in 1992 not only to conduct member meetings and administrative
functions for its programs, but also to fund feasibility studies for cooperative projects
between member states (with the funding for the actual project coming from one of the
sources described in the previous sections). The twenty-seven million Euro contributed
by Italy as of 2004 is decidedly effective: For example, a CEI four million Euro project
grant has facilitated (through technical cooperation with the EBRD investments worth
360 million Euros. The feasibility studies were designed to outline potential projects for
building and improving small- and medium-sized enterprises, agricultural cooperatives
and other institutional structures that would contribute to the success of the new political
and economic order.
Cooperative projects are decided on by consensus, a significant exercise in
democratic administration: They require the faith of CEI member states that, while a few
countries had their project approved in any one year, the others will have an opportunity
to have their own cooperative project approved in the future. In fact, the four million
Euro, which the CEI had spent at one point on these initiatives ultimately generated some
fifty million Euro in bank loans, while the ratio of seed money to EBRD investments
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equals one to eighty (International Centre for Theoretical Physics website: What is New?
Accessed February 4, 2006).

Working Areas/Projects
Following EU accession of five CEI member countries in 2005, the 2004-06 Plan of
Action (Appendix 9) shifted from the CEI's original goals of bringing the newly
independent countries of Central Europe closer to the west to focus more on economic,
human and institutional development and various horizontal issues. The purpose was to
facilitate transfer of knowledge and best practices from CEI Member States acceding to
the EU to those remaining outside it at the time. Specifically, the areas addressed
included:
"

Economic development and technical co-operation.

"

Development of infrastructure in transport, energy, telecommunication,
agriculture.

"

Strengthening the democratic institutions and observance of human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, and
humanitarian matters.

*

Protection of human environment.

"

Cooperation in the field of science and technology, media, culture,
education, youth exchange, tourism.

"

Cross-border and interregional co-operation

"

Consultations on political matters of mutual interest
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The above priorities and criteria are being realized by WGs consisting of civil
society and governmental representatives from each member country. In the following
sections I will discuss the areas in which the WGs were active (in alphabetical order).
They are based upon the CEI Plan of Action 2004-2006. The WGs are headed by one
country, rotating the chair annually among all member states.
These programs augment those factors which, according to Huntington (1991, 270,
273) support democratic consolidation processes, such as the level of economic
development, and high per capita income with a broad middle class without extreme
income polarization, and a supportive external/international environment as well as
foreign actors who are conducive to the democratic consolidation process, widespread
literacy, and congruent democratic values in the political arena and in authority structures
throughout society, such as business, trade unions and culture.
I describe a few programs in greater detail to show how much can be achieved in
terms of technical know-how transfer, civil society building, regional integration and
economic development in a free market economy even within the existing means of
these newly independent states. We need to keep in mind that one of the crucial
challenges facing these countries, which existed "behind the iron curtain," is for the
citizens to accept and accommodate the new demands and pressures of technological
progress which took place during the past decades outside the Soviet Union, in addition
to the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.
Agriculture
One very important program supporting CE regional cooperation is the development
of a micro-credit system (in cooperation with the World Bank and UN/ECE) for farmers
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and the establishment of agricultural wholesale and assembly markets' 9 . The CEI
provides a program for institutional development and technical assistance to modernize
these processes and to calibrate some procedures with those of Western Europe. It is
envisioned that good agricultural practices would be transferred to non-accession
countries, based on EU directives and international conventions on food safety standards,
protection of soil, water and habitat through application of ecological farming methods,
rural

infrastructure

development,

promotion of biological

and

environmentally

sustainable agricultural production, agro-industry development, integration of databases
and support for using GIS (Geographic Information Systems), and promotion of biomass2 0 for energy production (in cooperation with the WG on energy).
A practical example is EastAgri, a network of agriculture and agribusinesses
working in CE which was established by the CEI to improve the quality of services and
achieve common objectives through information sharing. The EastAgri CEI network
covers the current eighteen member countries and serves as the hub of information
relating to agricultural projects and sector knowledge. It seeks to promote innovative
approaches towards agricultural/agribusiness investments among international financial
institutions and banks operating in the region. It is not the goal to replace current
channels of communication, but to facilitate them by broadening visibility with the aim of
increased efficiency and effectiveness by creating synergy between the financial- and the
operational levels.

19 These are simple agricultural industries such as processing the milk and eggs delivered by individual
(small) farmers to co-op style processing facilities to prepare them for sale to retailers.
20 As an example, the use of sunflower oil (a renewable energy source) as a truck fuel has found good
acceptance in Western Europe and one finds extensive acreages growing sunflowers in CE.

66

Civil Protection

The main goal of the CEI in the field of civil protection is disaster prevention and
accident intervention coordination of national rescue teams by adapting relevant
EU/NATO procedures in CE. The protection of the population against natural and
technological disasters is being improved through modernized vocational training courses
in the field of disaster management and risk prevention. An individual analysis of
programs and operational approaches currently utilized in member countries is
envisioned to lead to a coordinated approach between member countries, many of whom
are neighbors and could potentially be similarly affected by a disaster. This concern is
being addressed by an improvement of border-crossing procedures for persons and
equipment entering the affected country from abroad, which is occasionally still difficult
due to infrastructure which was destroyed during the unrest of the past decade and
possible social tensions still remaining at the local level.
Combating Crime
Several IGOs, e.g. the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Barents Euro-Arctic
Council, the CEI's Working Group on Combating Organized Crime, and the AdriaticIonian Initiative met for the first time in January 2005 to discuss possible ways of future
inter-IGO cooperation in training courses and seminars. Topics included trafficking in
human beings and stolen vehicles, organized crime (including money laundering) and
financial fraud with particular regard to illicit credit card use. The latter issues are
addressed by involving international resources and organizations, such as VISA and
MasterCard, the OECD Financial Action Task Force and banks. Illicit trafficking in
human beings and stolen vehicles have gained momentum in CE, partially due to the gap

67

in law enforcement since the end of authoritarian rule and the establishment of a
functioning civil society with laws guaranteeing human freedoms and non-corrupt
officials. This requires an energetic commitment to both training of law enforcement
personnel and the rapid cross-border exchange of information among authorities despite
possible lingering distrust among states.
The G8 network for computer crimes will be enlarged to CE in order to enhance
and supplement traditional methods of assistance. The G8 created this network to
investigate threats and other types of computer related crime in several countries.
Instruments to fight corruption underlying all of these aspects in CE are an additional
focus of CEI programs. Since these are global issues, the CEI coordinates local
approaches with UN procedures for multilateral solutions to counteract the threat of parts
of CE falling into lawlessness post-authoritarianism.
Cross-Border Cooperation and Local Development
The CEI will expand its interregional and cross-border cooperation and local
development,

especially

in

Eastern

and

South-Eastern

Europe,

through

the

implementation of tangible solutions in coordination with other WGs such as Culture and
Education, Information and Media, Combating Organized Crime, Civil Protection,
Tourism, Transport, Environment, Minorities, Migration and SMEs. In addition to CEI
joint international events and cooperative projects which involve WGs detailed below,
other programs specifically aiming at cross-border institution building are Commercial
Law training I and II, and the CEI contribution to cleaning up of the Danube (which
affects several CEI member countries).
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These programs reflect not only regionally shared norms and values (e.g.
environmental protection), one of the characteristics of an international regime, but also
global concerns of cooperation and security as discussed in the previous section. They
contribute in the case of the CEI explicitly to that mutual socio-political development
within and between CE countries which are constructive on all levels (local, state and
international). They also support the socio-psychological concept of "entitativity" (Risse
2004), i.e. the reification of a common fate, increased salience, and boundedness, which,
according to Risse (Ibid.) lead to collective identification and positively impact peaceful
behavior in CE.
Another pathway in which these programs also enhance regional stability and
democratic consolidation is through that cognitive evolution which, according to Adler
(1991) and P. Haas (1992), results from collective social learning. In Wendt's (1992,
1994) view these programs contribute to regional stability and democratic consolidation
through the selection, international diffusion and institutionalization of collective
understanding and contributions to the security community-like collective identity
formation. Again, the CEI is affecting this on the regional CE-level, but it is a process
which integrates CE with global developments espoused by the UN.
Culture
The key element of CEI cultural cooperation continues to focus on projects
relating to the conservation of tangible and intangible cultural heritage (including
museums, monuments, archaeological sites, music, art and traditional crafts). This is
achieved through the development of know-how in cultural management and by
advancing the ability of governments and civil society to support cultural policies as a

69

contribution to socio-economic development (cultural industries development; cultural
tourism; sponsorship and donations in the arts), as well as the promotion of cultural
diversity (especially linguistic and religious). These programs aim at fostering a better
understanding among people as well as among regional ethnic groups, particularly
pertaining to cross-border cooperation in the mobility of individuals and groups in the
arts. CE participation in existing programs by the EU, UNESCO and the Council of
Europe is also promoted. These programs require the development of civic attitudes and
that willingness to participate, which Rustow (1979) considers essential to successful
democratization, and as an indication of a democracy's legitimacy based on how well a
system performs.
Some specific examples of cultural promotion by the CEI in CE are: The CEI
Youth Orchestra (discussed in greater detail in the category "Youth" below), the CEI
Venice Forum of Curators of Museums for Contemporary Art, the CEI Writers'
Meeting/Literary Roundtable of Vilencia, Slovenia, the CEI Journalists Forum, and the
Mittelfest of Cividale, Italy, as an annual encounter of artists and performers from CEI
countries. The involvement of the CEI in the Council of Europe's "Creating Cultural
Capital" project is also under consideration. These programs are effective in contributing
to democratic consolidation e.g. by enabling free written and artistic expression as an
avenue for dissent - and consent - of civil society. In particular the youth programs seek
to prevent restrictions on free expression which were placed on their parents under
authoritarian rule.
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Education

The CEI recognizes the importance of education in enabling the newly independent
states not only to catch up technologically but also economically. Hence it supports
education in member countries in many aspects, such as improving education in rural
areas and among groups having suffered from a lack of social inclusion to making the
citizens of member countries IT-literate. This assists countries in improving their
services, innovate faster, make better use of public funds and expose groups previously
marginalized to values and ideas not accessible to them before in order to integrate them
more equitably into society. Furthermore, the CEI has recognized that a well-educated
population can produce more value-added products and services rather than developing
its competitiveness based on cheap labor and good manual skills alone. The CEI supports
member countries' IT policies and research infrastructure harmonization with EU
standards as a first step in IT regional integration and cooperation with those CEI
members which later became EU members.
The launch and expansion of the CEI University Network with currently eighteen
coordinating universities from member states is the foundation of CEI cooperation in the
educational field. The main concept of this program is to facilitate mobility of faculty and
students among "coordinating" as well as "participating" universities in the CEI region as
per the University Network Founding Charter (CEI website: Education, accessed
November 29, 2005). This program offers grants and scholarships for joint programs in
the fields of economics, communication, IT, and public administration for (post-)
graduate study. As part of the CEI University Network, the CEI and the EU cooperate on
a summer school program in Igalo, Montenegro, to support the next generation of law
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students from Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe to gain a better understanding
of European enlargement and corresponding legal reforms. These programs also
contribute to the development of a common regional identity in the process and further
transnational institutional transparency and participation.
Another CEI sponsored educational program is the "Masters for the Balkans".
It consists of three separate master's programs ("Master's in Transport, Logistics and
Economic Integration with the Balkan Area", "Master's in Geographic Information for
Spatial and Economic Decisions", and the "Master's in Technological Transfer and
Industrial Product Development Systems") and is organized by the University of Trieste
within the framework of the CEI University Network and taught by its Faculty of
Architecture,

the Department of Geographical

and Historical

Sciences and the

Department of Economic and Statistic Science of the Faculty of Economics. The
program's aim is to promote the mobility of students and teachers in South-East Europe
(see appendix 10 for a sample list of Joint Programs in 2004).
One can argue, following Finnemore (1996), that the strongly favored institutional
compatibility observed in the programs described in the preceding paragraphs imports
certain behavioral and procedural standards into the civil design of post-communist CE,
thereby enhancing civil society and ultimately contributing to the success of the
democratization of this region. With other words, coordinating institutions with some of
those in the west as well as with each other in CE will by necessity effect changes in
behavior (e.g. modernization, even if at first only in a technical sense), partially because
the population now has a much greater variety of options available to influence their lives
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on an individual level as well as on the community level, both politically and socially,
and partially because cooperation becomes easier and hence feasible.
While Finnemore stresses how institutional compatibility has a reciprocal ("agentstructure") effect on the population, the mechanisms strived for in these programs are
also echoed by Risse (2004, 256/7) and Habermass (1994, 1996) in terms of post-national
European civic identity (emphasizing democracy, human rights, a market economy, the
welfare state and cultural diversity) as becoming constitutive in CE, while the cultural
identity is associated with the local area. I refer also to Wendt (1999, 327) who stated that
cultural selection can take place through imitation, whereby standards are constituted by
shared understandings. In fact, learning both in a formal as well as in informal settings
was specifically identified by Wendt (Ibid., 333) as contributing to a change of identities
and interests. Hence the CEI's educational programs contribute to the diffusion of
democratic norms, values and procedures to the "next generation" while at the same time
remedying lack in technological knowledge and democratic awareness among adults.
Additionally, by furthering mutual understanding throughout its programs, the CEI
contributes to a more cooperative, safe and stable CE - and Europe - overall from the
local level up to the national- and transnational levels and hopefully minimize the
chances of further civil wars in the region.
Energy
Energy production and know-how transfer as well as the research and
development of renewable energy sources are a top priority in the economic development
of CE (which the literature recognizes as supportive of regional democratization and
consolidation). Additionally, as the availability of energy is becoming more and more a
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security consideration, especially in relation to Russian oil and gas, renewable energy
development is critical to the economic growth and political stability in CE. The CEI
implements ad-hoc projects, programs and activities in order to assist in the development
of these sectors. One goal is the use of biomass as an alternative source of energy. Other
renewable sources of energy (solar, wind, etc.) in countries with relevant financing
resources to make this type of project self-sustaining are also investigated. Another focus
pertaining to energy is the improvement of fuel consumption efficiency and the reduction
of energy and heat consumption. This area is particularly supported by Provincia di
Bologna, Italy.
It is interesting to note that also Austria, as one of the "hegemonic impeti" of the
CEI, is particularly involved in this field. One of the Energy-WG meetings was held in
Vienna in 2004 with the Austrian co-chair of this WG, an official of the International
Atomic Energy Association (IAEA). With excess nuclear materials from the former
Soviet Union readily available, the CEI is notably pro-active in addressing various
aspects of nuclear power - and likely in the context of the responsibilities and provisions
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of which all CEI members are members.
Environmental Protection
Environmental protection under the CEI umbrella focuses on: noise, tourism, water,
renewable energy, safety, spatial planning, sustainable consumption and transport. The
projects of this WG have been supported particularly by Austrian consultants with
financing provided by the World Bank, OECD, and others.
Environmental protection programs in the CEI do not simply involve programs to
protect the environment in the conventional sense, but seek to raise the awareness beyond
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the environment to space, spatial planning, influencing sector policies in the fields of
education and spatial planning, involvement of experts and semipublic and private
organizations that are responsible for spatial planning issues and education in this field,
and general awareness-raising through educational TV programs and the dissemination of
the results of this project. A couple of examples of the CEI Space Project, founded
officially in June 2005 in Podgorica, Montenegro, follow:
The CEI cooperates with R.A.V.E. Space ("Raising Awareness of Values of Space
through the Process of Education)2 ' which is a program focusing on spatial awareness
and regional identity. It addresses trans-European cooperation on a transnational level,
cross-border cooperation and trans-regional cooperation, and aims to achieve higher
territorial and economic integration within the cooperation area, and promotes a more
balanced and harmonious development of the European space. Other R.A.V.E. programs
cover issues like spatial, urban and rural development and immigration, transport
systems, access to the information society, landscape, natural and cultural heritage,
environmental protection, resource management and risk prevention (European Union

website: INTERREG III B CADSES, accessed 2/4/2006). The significance of these
programs, beyond their obvious goals, is not only cooperation, but also furthering a
consciousness of regional entitativity (i.e. seeing other CEI members as bound by a
common fate, rather than as adversaries) and a shared identity in CE. Considering the
historical background of this region these are an important sociological processes in order
to augment regional peace and stability.
21 This is a program of the EU Neighborhood Program's former INTERREG III
B CADSES (Central,
Adriatic, Danubian and South-Eastern European Space) programs. Portion "B" deals with problems of
education about spatial planning and sustainable spatial development in primary and secondary schools.
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The R.A.V.E. Space project consists of nine partners from six countries (Greece,
Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Slovenia, and Serbia) and was formed to raise awareness of
sustainable development and current spatial needs in view of future generations,
incorporating environmental, spatial, economic, demographic and other data. It meets the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) Strategy of promoting
sustainable development through education (R.A.V.E. website, accessed 2/4/2006).
As mentioned above, the concept of space is closely entwined with entitativity, common
fate and collective identification. In other words, the R.A.V.E. project is not simply a
matter of focusing on sustainable development, but also serves to focus on shared as well
as national space as a regional commonality and on overcoming cultural boundaries
among the population of CE and to indirectly deepen the sense of common fate,
collective identification to the region and as a result, to contribute to regional stability.
Again we see that with this series of programs the CEI is addressing the construction of
civic values, civil society, economic development and cooperation to hopefully prevent
future dividing lines.
Another CEI program in the area of environmental protection with potential for
regional intelligence implications for CE is the Central Europe GPS Reference Network
Integration in Geodetic and Geodynamic Programs of the CEI. These programs include
the second phase of the European Project CERGOP-2/Environment (Central Europe
Regional Geodynamics Program), which is financially supported by the European
Commission. Projects include cooperation within the framework of the CEI Working
Groups on Science and Technology Section C "Geodesy" in the application of satellite
positioning systems as well as their regional analyses (e.g. the Romania Plate, Tatra
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Mountains, Balkan Peninsula etc.), university education standards, satellite navigation
systems, and cooperation with the European Geophysical Society (EGS) and the
International Association of Geodesy (IAG). These have led, among other achievements,
to the establishment of the Colored Eco-Genetic Relationship Map (CEGRM) consortium
of institutes. These are viewed as a seedbed of new European projects and initiatives
requiring not only cooperation but also economic development.2 2
These programs are not only scientifically significant but politically and militarily
relevant today. They also show how programs and policies of the CEI re-structure
subsequent political processes, e.g. certain aspects of defense coordination beyond the
notion of institutions constituting actors. Instead, the shared purpose of the CEI as an
international regime continues as a thread through these programs to the states' external
environment reflecting inward to affect elite and nationalist thought about all aspects of
political and social significance (Burch 2002, 66).
Human Resource Development
CEI programs in this area focus on activities aimed at promoting life-long learning,
including vocational training and adult education. This is inter alia significant in terms of
"re-training"that part of the population which received its social and business education
under Soviet auspices in order to enable the socio-economic transfer to a generation
raised under authoritarianism practices entry into a free market economy today.
Additionally, special attention is given to young entrepreneurs for start-up businesses by
The entire project makes available velocity field and strain maps for future geodynamical investigations
and hazard mitigation, data for climate research and weather forecast, data for real time navigation and a

seamless data-bank for scientific and public access (Sledzinski 2004).
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providing them with the necessary management skills, including English language
training for those who had studied Russian as a second language, to successfully develop
their companies. Another focus of this WG is to update bureaucratic working methods
and the efficiency of the public service. Again, this is an area which under communism
was notoriously inefficient and not service oriented to its "consumer", the public.
Streamlining business approaches with those of the West and increasing efficiency and
service will strongly augment the development of a free market economy which supports
democratic consolidation in CE. Furthermore, institutional strategies for the development
of human resources such as these have been identified as promoting the construction of
an overarching common socio-political identity among member states, whereby the rules
and norms become part of the social and power structure which define the member states'
socio-political environment and are vice versa also co-constitutive of each other
(Hermann and Brewer 2004, 10-13). The agency of institutions, i.e. "understanding how
people think about institutional norms and rules, and the discourse they engage in, is as
important in evaluating the significance of these norms as measuring the behavior that
changes in response to the invocation" (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1988, 765). One of the
results anticipated is the augmentation of a strong middle class to avoid extreme income
polarizations in CE which have been identified in the literature on democracy as
potentially destabilizing.
The CEI collaborates with a number of international institutions, a process which
shapes actors' preferences as much as these are co-constitutive of the local institutions
they spawn by adapting their structure to regional idiosyncrasies and preferences. While
this may appear inane to the Western reader, it must be remembered that the population
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in CE had neither well-developed democratic institutions nor the modern business
environment (such as norms, mechanisms or the necessary institutions to cooperate
democratically and peacefully post-communism) necessary to succeed in a nonauthoritarian free market environment.
Information and Media
The focus of CEI cooperation in the field of information and media is the extension
of cross-border television project, already operational between Italy and Slovenia, to
other CEI countries and the review of media legislation. Examples of these cooperative
broadcast activities are the "Neighbors without Frontiers"-TV series dealing with the
preservation of cultural heritage, the renovation of old city centers and old castles, the
preservation of languages and national identity, and the promotion of cultural events.
Another TV production proposed is the project "What is it that Europe wants from us?", a
series of programs focusing on the status of implementation of reforms in Serbia,
Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the fields of legislative system and
jurisdiction, education, democratization of institutions, and human rights.
This television exchange represents a valuable contribution to CEI cultural and interethnic cooperation and is hoped to be expanded with EU funds to independent TV
production groups for cross-border activities. While this may be one of the more "visible"
forms of "Westernizations" or "Europeanization" resulting from CEI activities, offering
at least a template for the free (political) expression of opinion in a democracy offers CE
the learning experience to control future media content in their own programs.
Additionally these programs contribute to building a "common European narrative" with
an encompassing fusing identity as opposed to the divisive ones of the past.
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Migration
This topic currently addresses migration issues in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in
particular as the other CEI members already have extensive regional and international
mechanisms for regulating the movement of people across their borders. These issues
involve the tandem concerns of trafficking in women and organized crime, and they
involve special cooperation with the EU, the International Organization for Migration and
other regional organizations. They involve additional training of immigration and police
officers (in a temporary training center of one the above countries) as well as with more
flexible visa requirements within EU limits. The extent of globalization, together with the
drastic increase in the movement of people after the lifting of the Iron Curtain,
necessitates broad European cooperation and extensive international coordination in this
area.
Minorities
While states manifest externally as a unified nation willing to live under one
government, West European countries guarantee the right of minorities to respect and
integration into the main society. The CEI Instrument for the Protection of Minority
Rights (Appendix 11) spells out in twenty-seven paragraphs for CEI member states to
recognize that national minorities need to be addressed in a truly democratic political
framework based on the rule of law, guaranteeing full respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens, condemning aggressive
nationalism, racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, discrimination, and
reaffirming the protection of national minorities to preserve and develop their ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious identity. The CEI Instrument for the Protection of
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Minority Rights was designed to facilitate access by ethnic non-elite groups to
government employment and even mass democratic access to the political system
through the exchange of best practices regarding the economic conditions of minorities
and facilitation of cultural contacts of minority groups separated from the main
population either historically or by new borders in CE. These steps are being taken in
coordination with other international organizations and institutions active in this field,
such as the Council of Europe and NGOs.
The publication "Minorities and the Central European Initiative", published in
October 2004 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the "CEI Instrument for the
Protection of Minority Rights", is now available in eleven languages (including the
Romany/Roma language) to ensure that the populations for whom the protection is
intended are aware of their rights. The CEI is also developing additional projects aimed at
the promotion

of minority

languages

in

public life

(media,

schools,

public

administration), e.g. through support of cross-border TV programs in cooperation with
the WG on Information and Media.
The significance of the CEI's focus on ethnicity and minorities lies in its founding
imperatives, namely to prevent the spill-over into Western Europe (particularly Italy and
Austria) of ethnic conflicts based on longstanding cultural and religious differences being
rekindled (particularly in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) upon the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. Creating trust not only trans-nationally within CE but also internally in
CEI member countries among different ethnicities is one of the greatest challenges in
post-communist CE. The successful development of a collective civic identity is hoped to
lead sociologically to a behavioral change of seeing the neighbor not through the lens of
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ancient animosities but as a trustworthy partner. The steps taken in CE address the lack of
ethnic integration of minorities, such as the Roma, institutionally through rules, such as
those spelled out in the Instrument for the Protection of Minorities.
Science and Technology
The CEI Science and Technology Network was established with five research
centers in Trieste. It operates now through six lead scientific institutions in Trieste and
partner/affiliated institutions in other countries, involving broad and comparatively
sophisticated programs. It makes research grants available to CE scientists and cofinances scientific meetings in the fields of theoretical and applied physics, biogenetics
and biotechnology, neurosciences and applied mathematics. A special grant enables
scientists from CE to commercialize their research results. It also offers young scientists
from CE, especially those outside the EU, the opportunity to participate in graduate
courses, training programs and research activities in fields such as theoretical and applied
physics,

bio-genetics,

neurosciences

and

applied

mathematics.

The

successful

implementation of Geodesy2 3 programs and Geodynamics, as well as Geophysics and
Geohazards, with financial support from applicable EU programs (see below) also
continues.
The CEI's founding purpose was to promote a dialogue and cooperation between
systems (both with respect to the EU and intra-regionally) and ideologies that had
previously viewed each other with suspicion and hostility. While Central and Eastern
European countries traditionally enjoyed scientific excellence, additional new networks
23 The scientific discipline dealing with the measurement and representation of the earth's gravitational

field and geodynamic phenomena, such as polar motion, the tides and crustal motion in three-dimensional
time/varying space.
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have been established by sponsoring the participation of scientists from member states in
research and training activities (the CEI "primary" science and technology network), as
well as a "secondary" network of direct contacts between certain institutes and member
countries. Furthermore, additional agreements are sought with centers of scientific and
technological excellence willing to dedicate part of their activities to the CEI region. The
CEI is particularly looking for programs and partners which would further enhance
information technology in member countries. Furthermore, the mobility of researchers
and junior trainees will be facilitated, last but not least through the improved
interconnection of the transportation infrastructure in CE.
The CEI has forged a partnership with the International Centre for Theoretical
Physics (ICTP) in Trieste, Italy, itself operating under a tripartite agreement among the
Italian Government, UNCESCO and IAEA, to foster advanced studies and research,
especially in developing countries (Ibid.), and with the International Centre for Genetic
Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB), Elettra Synchrotron Light Laboratory and
International Centre for Science and High Technology (ICS) (Ibid.). Under these
agreements scientists from CEI member states participate in ICTP workshops and
conferences, e.g. pertaining to wireless communication, photonics, optics and plasma
physics. This allows scientists from all member countries to work in international settings
and to take full advantage of their skills and talents in an environment of mutual
cooperation and exchange.
These programs offer a chance to build partnerships among high-level scientists from
all member countries and improve the prospects of gaining the collaboration of these
scientists in efforts to assist colleagues in the South-Eastern portion of the CEI (who have
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joined the CEI more recently) (G. Denardo, ICTP Website). This scientific integration
also assists in the prevention of new dividing lines within CE, be they economic, social,
or political. These programs are examples of the complexity of peaceful regional
integration also in the fields of science and technology, particularly since some of these
programs are already in their "second generation" of grant renewals.
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)
As many international relations scholars have pointed out, democratic success
hinges significantly on a country's overall economic success, and is particularly enhanced
by a broad middle class. The CEI is especially committed to support both of these aims
and has developed many programs for this purpose:
The Know-How Exchange Program (KEP)
This is a special financial instrument through which the CEI supports the transfer of
specific knowledge for the economic transition and institution building which the new
EU members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) have gained
over the past decade. In light of the recent EU membership of five additional CEI
members, this program was created so that these states will assist non-EU CEI-members
(e.g. Bulgaria, Rumania, Croatia) by transferring their EU-accession experience. This
program is financed through a special window in the CEI Trust fund at the EBRD.
The CEI had originally focused on improving the region's overall infrastructure,
e.g. by upgrading local transportation and communication systems, and by increasing the
reliability of local power networks. The CEI later expanded its efforts to the role which
knowledge, especially the mobility of knowledge, plays in the region's future well-being

(H. Kreid 2/4/2006 in ICTP website, accessed 2/4/2006).
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One specific example of a KEP is the "Company Incubator for Moldova" program

which
aims at creating a virtual 'permanent entrepreneurial development centre',
something like a 'company incubator'... by enhancing the level of
entrepreneurship in the area of micro and small companies... [and, among other
program phases] 'sensitizing' and training private and public actors who will
support start-ups; a 'promotional' phase for increasing awareness of
entrepreneurial opportunities among young people in a specific sector followed
by a promotional phase including at least three 'self-entrepreneurship sensitizing
seminars' (CEI Newsletter No. 44, 3).
This program addresses the question of youth unemployment, insufficient marketing
skills in post-Soviet CE, lacking entrepreneurial personal initiative, the economic
development of the middle class to prevent extreme income polarizations, the
development of IT skills development and a transnational cooperation modus by tying
this program to the Padua, Italy, Chamber of Commerce as an institutional anchor.
CEI

participation

in

the

Organization

for

Economic

and

Cultural

Development's (OECD) Local Economic and Employment Development Program
(LEED) program as part of the OECD's Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and
Local Development. These programs include such programs as "Employment and Skills
at the Local Level", "Entrepreneurship at the Local Level", "Globalization and Local
Authorities", "Local Governance and Partnerships", and "Social Innovations at the Local
Level". These programs are clearly designed to support the region's economic
development in a free market economy on all levels, from the local to the CE-regional.
Europe-wide and globally.
Another example of SME development is the participation of the CEI LEED
Program in the annual CEI Summit Economic Forum. The
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8

th CE

Summit Economic

Forum's main theme was "Reforms as Key to Competitiveness": Assistance in the
modernization of financial institutions and insurance companies in light of the
privatizations in these sectors and the technical upgrading of procedures (e.g. in the areas
of motor vehicles, property, personal accidents, life, travel and health insurance) are
paramount in a region in which under communism there was a limited need for these
products, but which are now essential in conducting business in a free market economy.

The CEI-LEED Local Development Network of Advisors is hosted by the LEED
Trento Center for Local Development. It formalizes the first common permanent CEILEED initiative and structure (OECD website: LEED Programme). This initiative will
enhance business best-practice know-how transfer, institutional development and further
business opportunities.
The Chambers of Commerce of the CEI Member States
This association launched a cooperation program in 1994 with the collaboration of
the Italian Union of Chambers of Commerce parallel to the CEI's international regime
structure. It is also head quartered in Trieste (per the decision of the Chamber presidents
of the participating countries). One of the immediate successes of this group was a
conference on projects for reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina (answers.com website
by Columbia University Press, accessed 2/4/2006).
The CEI Enterprise Program
The main purpose of this program is to promote and support sustainable
development of enterprises as well as the enterprise culture in CEI countries. This
program is enhanced by the EBRD's TurnAround Management (TAM) program which
provides industry-specific advisors to potentially viable SMEs, enhancing the knowledge,

86

confidence and capabilities of their management and assisting transition towards success
in market driven economies.
An extension of this program is the multi-donor program "EBRD/TMG Business
Advisory Services in CEI Member States" which promotes the improvement of quality
and competitiveness of SMEs. Yet another project is the "Challenges for global
competition: new synergies between the Italian Trade Fairs System and the CEI Trade
Fairs" to encourage broad business development in the free market economies of the
young democracies to partake in globalization rather than be left behind.
The Local Development Network (LDN)
The LDN was designed toaugment cooperation across a "horizontal" flow of
experience and know-how. It was envisioned to be a network of cross-border
communities of experts and consultants in a variety of fields acting as local development
advisors in SME support centers, responsible for the development of and advice to local
institutions and SMEs directly and for promoting local employment and visibility. Expert
assistance expands to the following areas: advisory missions, assistance in negotiations,
assistance in the preparation of investment projects and applications for grant or aid
programs, project evaluation, exchange visits of experts, management assistance for
institutions in the beneficiary country, management workshops for strategy issues, need
assessments,

surveys of problems and performance, technology transfer for the

application of research and innovation, preparation of manuals, promotional or technical
materials, web sites, interactive computer-based trainings, setting-up administrative
systems and computer software in institutions of a beneficiary country, translation of
laws, treaties, manuals, (CEI know-how exchange program brochure, 2005) relating to
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foreign direct investment promotion, trade facilitation (liberalization, customs regimes
and -best practices), privatization and private sector development, public administration
and institutional development (including public finance management, public procurement
regimes, the absorption capacity for EU programs and institution capacity building) and
legislative reform in the above mentioned areas.
One need not point out that these goals not only enhance free market "economic
society building" through institution building and privatization of business and
government monopolies. These programs additionally further the development of
safeguards against corruption by incorporating standardized public accountability
mechanisms. Many of these programs also fall into the category which Wendt (1999,
339) referred to as "internalization of roles in identities which generate subjective
commitments to objective positions in society" as a mechanism for building a collective
identity, both domestically and regionally in CE. This group of CEI programs, like the
others observed, contributes greatly to regional economic stabilization and cooperation
which support democratic consolidation.
Tourism
Tourism represents an important source of income for many CEI member states.
Hence the expansion of tourism through improved service and infrastructure standards
and resources for attracting tourists is a priority in the economic development of this
region. The main thrust of CEI activities in this area is the improvement of the tourism
sector through horizontal cooperation by strengthening the ability to work on a
multilateral basis. Eco-, rural and cultural tourism, including cruising the Danube Valley,
the Joint Wine Route (Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and spas, or the "Joint Project in
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Adventure and Extreme Sports Tourism: Rafting on the River Tara" are being promoted
as is the harmonization of CE standards with those of the EU and other international
organizations, such as the International Air Travel Association (IATA). To make the less
advanced member states attractive for foreign tourism and tour operators, customer
service and efficiency standards are being raised through seminars, training programs and
traineeships

for hotel personnel, managers, and tour operators. This aspect of

harmonizing with prevailing (Western) market standards is an imperative norm transfer
in a region where neither customer service nor technology were sufficiently developed
during communism to make this sector competitive and viable today in a free market
economy.
Transport
The transport sector in CE was in special need of development, partially due to the
civil strife in several CE countries which lead to the destruction of roads and railroad
tracks. CEI activities in this area focus on the promotion of inter-modal transport and the
construction of airfreight infrastructure facilities to prepare for the anticipated economic
expansion in member countries and to meet EuroControl standards to enable air
connections to Western Europe. Railway and road networks in CE have a similar need for
rehabilitation and upgrading of standards to support the tourism- and trade promotion
programs mentioned

above. Concerns in this sector also overlap with Energy,

Environment, and Cross Border Cooperation WGs and are addressed by the relevant
Working Groups.
A specific example of CEI involvement in the transport sector was the International
Symposium "Port Planning - Urbanism, Economics, Design" in November 2002 in
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conjunction with the annual CEI Summit Economic Forum (compare Appendix 7 for a
table of CEI investments in transport e.g. in 2002). The symposium was devoted to
investment opportunities for port planning in CE, covering methodologies and best
practices for identifying and financing bankable projects for port infrastructure. Other
topics discussed at the forums are transport issues in relation to projects and programs for
institutional and business development in CE, including the development of trade within
the CEI region and towards global markets, infra-structure projects, agriculture, banking
and financial products, technical cooperation projects, development of technology and
human resources, local development systems, programs for EU integration and crossborder cooperation and EU enlargement (especially considering that several member
states were, and are applicants). Additionally, the CEI cooperates with the EU Project
FASTER (Fostering Alliances for Sustainable Transport in European Research), aimed at
the participation of selected SMEs in the transport sector, which shows multilateral
integration in CE not only politically but also e.g. in the transport- and SME economic
sectors.
The CEI's effectiveness as a cooperative forum with the goal of regional integration
and stabilization is especially highlighted in this sector since transport in a globalized
economy by definition needs to be interstate. Transport also needs to be safe and efficient
to be competitive. By augmenting this sector the CEI is assisting CE's democratization
processes since this sector is essential to support economic stability, including preventing
extreme income polarization through SME involvement, as essential for democratic
consolidation.
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Youth Affairs
The Youth Forum
This program is an annually organized event in conjunction with the CEI Summit to
provide an opportunity for young people from all eighteen member countries to meet,
share information, exchange opinions on the most widespread youth problems such as
unemployment, quality and security of jobs, education and training, information access,
mobility, welfare and social security, equal opportunities for all ethnic, gender, religious
and age groups, and to fight against illegal and unethical acts.
The CEI seeks to address two core issues in the area of youth affairs: promoting
active citizenship by encouraging the involvement of youth in national and international
political debates, and the prevention of youth crime and youth unemployment through
policies creating more job opportunities for the young since youth unemployment is
considered one of the prime causes for attracting inexperienced youth to a criminal
environment. An example of an implemented program is the "CEI Youth Training
Course on Organizational

Management and Capacity Building of Youth Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGOs)" for representatives of youth NGOs. The purpose is
to strengthen the youth non-governmental sector in the region through training in
organizational

management,

developing

organizations,

fund-raising,

and strategic

planning to build capacity in the youth civil sector.
Another activity was the international conference in 2004 in Rijeka, Croatia, on
"Young People of Europe ... : The founding values of European integration". The topic
"Which History in Schools?" was an integral part of the meeting with the participation of
high representatives from ministries, rectors of universities, mayors and presidents of
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local and regional authorities from the CEI region as well as the Secretary General of the
CEI University Network. A seemingly innocuous topic such as this is nevertheless
critical in building a common narrative of a "new" joint regionalhistory and cultural and
civic identity. Augmenting regional social identity by teaching democratic practices to the
next generation have been identified by authors such as Risse as contributing to regional
cohesion and stability
CEI Youth Orchestra
This orchestra was founded in November 2004 to bring together some of the most
talented young musicians from CE. It is the only one among European transnational
youth orchestras to work with eleven to eighteen year olds. Its headquarters are in Brdo,
Slovenia, and it performs during the summer and Christmas holidays as well as during
the CEI Heads of Government November meeting. It involves young teenagers not only
in a trans-national cooperative endeavor, creating trust and social capital (in Putnam's
sense), it is hoped, in the "next generation". It is also a unique intercultural experience,
providing an open teaching methodology which takes full advantage of the various
approaches to musical education practiced in the countries of origin of the faculty.
Furthermore, it increases the trans-national exposure of youth through recording sessions.
Their work being heard internationally develops familiarity with the cultural centers of
CE as well as bringing about an awareness of the meaning of an enlarged Europe by
emphasizing the common heritage of the participants, rather than the divisive aspects of
the past (CEI Youth Orchestra brochure). In other words, this program is designed to see
"the other" not as different or "the enemy" but instead to recognize the familiarity and
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common identification which is hoped to enhance regional stability and contribute to
democratic consolidation in the long term.

Data Summary
As is evident from this review of activities, CEI programs are developed by
democratic consensus of all CEI members to enhance regional stability through
cooperation and legitimate integration. They not only encompass the socio-economic
aspects of development, but augment them by involving population groups which are
currently active in socio-political life as well as the next generation. I find that the CEI is
an example par excellence of what P. Haas (1992) has identified as the dynamic process
in human agency which lies at the interstices betweens systemic condition, knowledge
and national actions and
the role it plays in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex
problems (i.e. regional stability and democratic consolidation), framing the
issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies and identifying salient
points for negotiation (Ibid., 2).
In fact, the findings in this study concur not only with the criteria of an international
regime in positively impacting its shared purpose of regional stability and democratic
consolidation, but I also observed many of the elements identified by P. Haas (1992) in
the dynamic approach of an international regime in the international context of how
institutions affect decision makers (who were unfamiliar in the case of CE with many
technical aspects of democracy and a free market economy), in defining their state
interests and developing viable solutions to problems of post-communist transition.
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The list of successful projects detailed above is but a small sampling of actual
projects undertaken by the CEI during its seventeen year history at this point. My
hypothesis, that the effects of the CEI as an international regime contribute functionally
to an increase in regional integration and democratic consolidation in member states
through norm transplantation, civil society learning and regional economic and political
cooperation through CEI programs is supported.
The CEI has successfully applied the liberal theory of peace and war, which
incorporates the hypothesis that economic interdependence promotes peace, integrated
with the theory of international (democratic) institutions (Russett and Oneal 2001) for the
purpose of regional stabilization and progress in democratic consolidation in CE, as
measured by EU-membership (requiring stabilized democracies) of several CEI member
states and continued peace once the post-soviet geo-political restructuring in CE had
taken place.
Considering the regional stabilization effect of the CEI as an international regime on
the unrest in the former Yugoslav republics and on the Balkan wars of the 1990's,
however, one can only stipulate: Obviously, an institution which was founded at the very
end of 1989 was not able to prevent ethnic warfare which in some cases had been pent up
since the end of World War II when the borders around a new country, Yugoslavia, were
drawn up irrespective of underlying ethnic and cultural incongruities and which date back
centuries in other cases. Since this is not a quantitative study, I can only hypothesize that
the framework which the CEI developed in CE culturally, socially, economically, and in
identity and civil society norming as well as in assisting in the establishment of
democratic institutions has been offering a peaceful alternative to the warring parties, and
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hereby possibly shortened the fighting which might have continued even longer despite
UN, NATO, US and EU efforts to stop it. At a minimum it assisted significantly in
rebuilding democratic and economic institutions and enhanced civil society post-conflict
and/or authoritarianism in order to re-stabilize the countries at war and integrate them
regionally for the purpose of making democratic consolidation a viable option.
In terms of the CEI's validity today, 2006, Ambassador Kreid (CEI Newsletter No.
44, 4) (emphasis mine) stated that
There is room for an organization such as the CEI that has demonstrated its
capacity of serving its Member States in their efforts of transformation and in
overcoming the barriers which still exist between many of them... While the
accompanying role of the CEI in preparing for EU membership remains
paramount, there is also a real need for fostering good neighbourly relations by
means of well-targeted and well-defined co-operation projects among countries
which were a few years ago still divided by ideology and ethnic strife, while
some of them have only recently emerged as new nations.
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Chapter Five
Conclusions
According to Wendt (1999, 251)
there are two problems of order in social life. One is getting people to work
together toward mutually beneficial ends like reducing violence or increasing
trade, and for this reason it is sometimes known as the 'cooperation problem'.
This is what political theorists going back to Hobbes have usually meant by the
problem of order, and it justifiably has been central to IR scholars and foreign
policy-makers alike, given the difficulties of cooperation under anarchy and
potential costs of failure. There is another problem of order however, what
might be called the 'sociological' as opposed to a 'political' problem, which is
creating stable patterns of behavior, whether cooperative or conflictual.
Wendt identifies the complexity of cooperation under anarchy for the common
good which in this case study is "peace". In this study I outlined an approach utilized by
the CEI to assist in the regional stabilization of CE. The programs of the CEI are
designed to contribute to a solution to the political dilemmas faced by the post-Soviet
societies in this region in the context of the current political and socio-economic
reorganizations during the last seventeen years. The young democracies of post-Soviet
CE faced a variety of threats due to ethnic unrest, ill-defined judicial, political and free
market systems, unstable borders, memories of pre-1945 despotisms and historical
conflicts (e.g.

in Yugoslavia).

To assist regional

stabilization and democratic

consolidation after communism in CE the CEI was founded as an international regime
with the shared purpose of peace as well as with shared values and norms, upon the
initiation of Italy and Austria as the regional hegemons. Analyzing the CEI as an
international regime allowed me to address the political as well as the socio-economic
mechanisms observed in this IGO geared towards regional stabilization.
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Within the CEI, the internationalregime is the medium for the discursive practices
of democratic consolidation. Both the normative aspect of multilateralism and the
transnational aspects of regional cooperation within CEI programs contribute to an
institutionalized pursuit of the collective good, peace. In answering "what is the source
of the interests and identities of individual actors? Are the prevailing structures material
or also social? And what are the processes through which agents construct structures and
structures constitute agents" (Burch 2002, 62), I found that in the case of the CEI the
international regime structure seeks to alter both material (i.e. economic) and social
(cooperative and democratic) structures and thereby contributes to the mutually
constitutive process of regional integration and identity formation. The CEI is not
operating as a colonizing institution for Europeanization, but rather as a cooperative
forum within an international regime where the international regime produces both
material and socio-political structure (through its programs) which are reciprocally and
actively adopted by the actors (i.e. the member states through their political and civic
involvement). The CEI functions through a variety of approaches promoting vigorous
citizen participation and assisting extensive commercial, technical, scientific and cultural
training of member state citizens within their regionalcultural context. This is reflected
in a well-organized, efficient bureaucracy, normed to a large extent by the best practices
of Western Europe and giving them additional validation by frequently mirroring UN
norms. This contributes to the integration of CE into a larger economic and political
"present" (i.e. Western Europe replacing the former Soviet economic and political
structures). The transparency of the CEI as well as its democratic organization set the
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stage and provide the framework for members to adopt these norms and utilize these
models for their own new institutional structures.
The findings of this case study are congruent with the hypothesis of this thesis that
the CEI assists through the structure of its programs - which can be enabling as well as
constraining - in the regional stabilization and democratic consolidation of its member
countries. Democratic consolidation in CE has been facilitated by the international
environment (political, social, financial etc.), which the CEI. This unique structure of the
CEI appears very effective in creating characteristics which have been delineated in the
literature as essential to democratic consolidation. The unique structure of the CEI
incorporates the following elements scholars have identified as defining regimes:
First, CEI member states have a shared purpose: Peace and regional stabilization of
CE through democratic consolidation following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
This

involves

the establishment

of new constitutional

and

electoral

systems,

changing/abolishing authoritarian agencies and institutions, and combating regional
antagonism, communal conflicts, poverty and low rates of economic growth.
Second, the CEI embodies shared values, norms, rules and procedures. Central to
these is the practice of cooperation. Cooperation provides a common language to express
needs, dreams and goals of a region in renaissance, exploring and developing its political,
economic, cultural and ethnic individuality, supported by investments in education,
technology, infrastructure and business development. Member states are committed to
democratic values, e.g. multi-party elections, popular sovereignty, and individual rights,
and seek to achieve them through a synergy of programs via "top-down" (e.g. agreement
by heads of state to cooperate) and "bottom up" processes (e.g. WGs design and execute
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civil projects). They seek to realize communities of common identity that are anticipated
to spill over into broader sectors of society to reduce the possibility of war and to secure
individual liberties and provide normative patterns for the development of civil society.
They seek to accomplish these values through multilateralism in favor of bilateral
relationships between countries.
Third, there existed a hegemonic impetus in the founding of the international
regime: both Italy and Austria can be considered the regional hegemons in the case of the
CEI. This study shows that not only the geographical proximity but also the shared
history throughout centuries gave both countries the motivation to initiate this
undertaking, the necessary sensitivity and political and economic means to carry this
project out over almost eighteen years now.
Fourth, a hegemonic impetus may not be necessary after the initial formation of the
international regime: Since CE has become increasingly economically, politically and
socially stabilized, CEI member countries may theoretically not need the continued
partnership of the hegemon(s). In practice, however, the CEI might loose its forward
momentum were this the case.
The general research question of this thesis has been answered in my study of the
CEI as contributing to the stabilization of the new, post-communist CE by establishing
the institutions and behaviors identified by the literature on war and peace as essential for
young democracies to consolidate. The specific research question of this thesis has been
answered by locating a mechanism (international regime) through which the CEI
develops and designs its programs on a multilateral basis among member states on all
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levels (local,

national, transnational),

utilizing both material and socio-political

mechanisms.

The primary purpose of this paper was to examine the approaches used by the CEI
as an international regime to facilitate democratic consolidation in CE, such as a shared
purpose (peace and regional stabilization), shared norms (democratic cooperation),
shared values (national, regional and European identity formation), as well as
multilateralism in favor of bilateral relationships between countries.
The secondary purpose was to find how the programs and mechanisms utilized by
the CEI contribute to the consolidation of new democracies and can likely be applied in
similar situations. I showed that applying programs which augment democratic
consolidation within the framework of an international regime appear to greatly
maximize these programs through their synergy as compared to applying them
individually and without interconnectedness

as is the case e.g. with programs

administered by NGOs or stop-gap aid provided by individual governments. The
multilaterality and synergy of programs and international regime structure resulted in
what Seligson (1994, 635) referred to as reciprocalcausationbetween the variables.
The CEI has contributed to fostering democracy in CE by supporting the internal
parameters which are indicative of consolidated democracies. It has expanded the
dynamics which contribute to consolidated democracies in CE, such as fostering
cooperation, the development of trust in institutions and multilateral approaches to solve
economic

and

educational

deficiencies.

This

has

entailed

the

formation

and

transformation of an international regime and what Ruggie (cited in Krasner 1983, 196)
has called a manifestation of the internationalization of political authority.
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The unique synergy of CEI programs, based on these norms, rules and principles
for cooperation affects good governance. It also helps develop social interactions among
the member states and civil society actors accommodating the new institutional structures
of consolidated democracy. These programs produce a new structure manifesting in a
new societal identity and in social and political system change among member states
(Hall 2002, 122). New intellectual systems and associational participatory politics of the
CEI alter the character of public life in CEI member states fundamentally. In addition,
CEI economic programs contribute to the development of free markets, the economic
foundation for democratic consolidation, through transfer of know-how and technology
from the further developed countries to the less advanced CEI member states, the
promotion of investment, scientific research and post-graduate training in economics,
computer science and public administration and the development of internal and export
markets. The institutional assistance arranged through CEI programs proved useful to the
democratic consolidation process in CE by providing a supportive external/international
environment and supporting integrated foreign actors (such as epistemic communities,
NGOs and other IGOs) supportive of democratic consolidation. The CEI through its
programs within an international regime structure helped foster both polity and civil
society and create institutional structures which could influence the behavior of political
actors facilitating the actors' understanding of the democratic world and formulating new
cognitive and belief systems. It enabled learning through international cooperation by
providing the environment

for collective

social

learning,

innovation,

and the

institutionalization of collective understandings of democracy. Institutional assistance not
only provides information, coordinates transnational programs, and creates trust and
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confidence, but it also contributes to the solution of problems (such as crime, poverty,
public health and lacking state structures) and related policy coordination.
These strategies are aimed at creating a more cooperative, safe and stable Europe of
sovereign peoples united in a community of shared values, rules, norms and principles
reciprocally constructed nationally and transnationally through international regime
structure and a regional entitativity, overlapping with West-European norms and culture.
The fact that several CEI member states were able to join the EU and that several other
member states have currently EU applicant status suggests that significant democratic
stabilization has taken place in several CE countries.
The CEI has a significant effect on the populations in CE in terms of conveying
behavior, norms, and institutional rules conducive to the development of a free and lively
civil society, a relatively autonomous and valued political society, rule of law to ensure
legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms and independent associational life, a state
bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government and an institutionalized
civil society. The CEI has successfully contributed during its very short seventeen year
existence in the wake of the radical geo-political destabilization following the dissolution
of the Soviet Union to the regional

cooperation and considerable

democratic

consolidation in an area which now encompasses eighteen countries and which had the
potential of further escalating violent socio-political conflicts.
The resurgence of communist parties in several Central European countries is
viewed as a democratic expression in these countries. While a few CEI members are
decidedly not (yet) democratic, the votes received by communist parties in democratic
countries are considered by scholars as the swinging of the multi-party pendulum in a
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democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996). It is not considered a failure of a young democracy
but rather an indication of its consolidation.
The assistance from other parts of the world, notably the US, e.g. in the form of
technical know how transfer through NGOs, no doubt played a significant role in
stabilizing the newly democratizing countries of Central- and South-Eastern Europe as do
the development parameters established by the UN. The sheer depth and breadth of CEI
involvement in this region on a consistent basis from almost the beginning of Soviet
disintegration through today can probably be credited not only for preventing a much
greater spread of regional instabilities in the 1990s but for having contributed
significantly to the democratic consolidation of many of its member countries.
The CEI's approach to reforms for the purpose of democratic consolidation and
regional stabilization is supported by findings of the UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs report (Vos 2006) which state that
widening income gaps between countries, particularly since 1980, a dual
divergence [of a] widening gap between developed and developing countries
and a divergence among developing countries ... make it more difficult to
achieve the [UN] Millennium Development Goals... sustained productivity
growth requires structural change and economic diversification [and although]
institutions matter ... gradual governance reforms may be better than 'big bang'
transformations ... sustained growth in successful countries was accompanied
by structural change of output and labor from low- to high-productivity sectors.
This UN-study confirms the desirability of the gradual progress taken by the CEI to avoid
diverging (regional) growth and development and the potential for an IGO's role in
containing it in developing countries through a
flexible agenda for development [by] fostering active trade and production
sector policies for economic diversification, improving the international trade
environment, ... ensuring sustained levels of public spending to make necessary
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investments in infrastructure and human capital, and promoting gradual,
country-specific and home-made institutional reforms (Ibid).
While the extensive projects of the CEI continue to be a work in progress, partially
because several members have only joined very recently and have not had the benefit of
long-term participation in CEI programs, the considerable efficacy of the CEI in
undertaking regional cooperation and democratic consolidation continue.
This represents a significant alternative to shot-gun (both in a temporal, material and
in a military sense) approaches which are cost- and human life intensive with dubious
long-term results in democratic consolidation. To paraphrase Madeleine Albright (speech
on May 12, 2006 in Miami): democracy is not one size fits all - democracies are multidimensional and it is an oxymoron to impose democracy. And, echoing Huntington's
emphasis on the significance of consolidating young democracies, Secretary Albright
continues: "you can't take your eyes off a democratization process once undertaken" [or
it may not succeed]... (Ibid).

104

References

Ableson, Donald E. 2002. Do think tanks matter?Assessing the impact ofpublic policy
institutes. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett ed. 1998. Security communities. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Adler, Emanuel, Peter Haas. 1992. Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order,
and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program. InternationalOrganization46,

no. 1: 367-390.
Albright, Madeleine. 2006. Speech in Miami on June 19, 2006.
Agh, Attila. 1998. The politics of centralEurope. London: Sage Publications.
Answers.com by Columbia University Press. CentralEuropeanInitiative. Internet online. Available from <http://www.answers.com/topic/central-european-initiative>.

[February 4, 2006].
Arato, Andrew. 2000. Civil society, constitution, and legitimacy. Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Balkan countries. Aneki.com. Available from
http://www.aneki.com/Balkan Countries.html.Accessed July 11, 2006.
Baroncelli, Leonardo. 2004. Promoting trade and enterprise in a changing European
economy. In UNECE executive forum on competing in a changingeurope1-3.
Trieste, Italy: Central European Initiative.
Berengaut, Julian, Katrin Elgorgh-Woytek. 2005. Anarchy and Dictorship (From: Who is
Still Haunted by the Spector of Communism? Explaining Relative Output
Contractions Under Transition, IMF Working Paper No. 05/68). IMF Survey 34, no.

16: 259.
Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Raivo Vetik, eds. 2001. Perspectiveson democratic
consolidation in centraland eastern Europe. Boulder: East European Monographs.

105

Biro, Ana-Maria and Petra Kovacs. 2001. Diversity in action: Local public management
of multi-ethnic communities in central and eastern Europe. Budapest: Local
Government and Public Service Reform Initiative.
Brusis, Martin. 2003. L'echelon egional en Europe Centrale et Orientale: Institutions,
Competences et Ressources. Revue d'etudes comparativesEst-Ouest 34, no. 2: 145-

171.
Brusis, Martin. 2003. L'Echelon REgional en Europe Centrale et Orientale: Institutions,
Competences et Ressources. Revue d'etudes comparativesEst-Ouest 34, no. 2: 145-

171.
Bunting, Madeleine. Regime change, European-style, is a measure of our civilisation. The

Guardian2005.
Burch, Kurt. 2002. Toward a constructivist comparative politics. In Constructivism and
comparativepolitics. Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe.
Buzan, Barry. 1993. From International System to International Society Structural
Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. InternationalOrganization

47, no. 3: 352-377.
Central Europe. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central Europe. Accessed July 11, 2006.
Central European Initiative. 2004. Know-how exchange program.
Central European Initiative. Organizationwebsite. Internet on-line. Available from
<http://www.ceinet.org/main.php?pagelD=25>. [January 6, 2006].
Central European Initiative. Organizationwebsite: Secretariatfor projects in London.
Internet on-line. Available from <http://www.ceinet.or/main?pageID=16>.

[November 29, 2005].
Central European Initiative. Organizationwebsite: Education.Internet on-line. Available
from <http://www.ceinet.org/main.php?pageID=58>. [November 29, 2005].
Central European Initiative Executive Secratariat. 2005. CEI youth orchestra.

106

Central European Initiative Executive Secratariat. CEI university network - knowledge
through mobility. 6.
Central European Initiative Executive Secretariat. 2005. CentralEuropeanInitiative:
Goals, Structure, Activities, Funds. Trieste, Italy: CEI.
Central European Initiative Newsletter. 2006. Volume 44: June.
Central European Initiative Secretariat for Projects. 2005. Know-how exchange
programme.
Cerny, Philip. 1990. The changingarchitectureofpolitics: Structure, agency, and the
future of the state. London: Sage.

Cerny, Philip G. 1995. Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action.
InternationalOrganization49: 595.

Christiansen, Thomas, Knud E. Jorgensen, and Antje Wiedner. 1999. The Social
Construction of Europe. Journalof European Public Policy special issue 6, no. 4:

528-544.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participationand opposition.New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Della Porta, Donatela, and Mario Diani. 1999. Social movements: An introduction.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice J. Lee, Martin
Lichtermann, Lindgren, Raymond, E., Loewenheim, Francis, L., and Van Wagenen,
Richard W. 1957. Politicalcommunity and the north Atlantic area.Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Dunay, Pal, Przemyslaw Grudinski, Andris Ozolins, Dan Pavel, and Stefan Tafrov. 1995.
A LastingPeace in CentralEurope? Institute for Security Studies of WEU.
EastAgri Member - Central European Initiative. Ruralfinance and learningcenter.
Internet on-line. Available from
<http://www.eastagri.org/member details.asp?id= 12)>. [February 4, 2006].

107

Eastern Europe - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern

Europe. Accessed July 11, 2006

Elster, Jon, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss. 1998. Institutionaldesign in postcommunist societies:Rebuilding the ship at sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
European Union. INTERREG III B CADSES neighbourhoodprogramme.Interneton-line.
Available from
<http://www.cadses.net/en/programme.html?PHPSESSID=5bd00576fdae69e 141 62a
78ff07d2...).>. [February 4, 2006].
Finnemore, Martha. 1996. Nationalinterests in internationalsociety. Ithaca, NY and
London: Cornell University Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1979. Disciplineandpunishment: The birth of the prison.New York:
Vintage Books.
Friedham, Daniel V. 1993. Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory
after 1989: Pact-Making and Regime Collapse. East EuropeanPolitics and Societies

7, no. 3: 482-512.
Gilpin, Robert. 2001. Globalpoliticaleconomy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Glasnost - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glasnost. Accessed July 11, 2006.
Green, Daniel M. ed. 2002. Constructivismand comparativepolitics. Armonk and
London: M.E. Sharpe.
Gunther, Richard, P. N. Diamandouros, and Hans-Juergen Phule. 1995. The politics of
democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in comparativeperspective. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Haas, Ernst. 1964. Beyond the nation state: Functionalismand international
organization.Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Haas, Ernst. 1961. International Integration: The European and the Universal Process.
InternationalOrganisation, no. 15: 366-392.

108

Haas, Ernst. 1958. The uniting of Europe: Political,social, andeconomicforces, 1950 1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Haas, Peter. 1992. Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination.
InternationalOrganization46, no. 1: Special Issue.
Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination. InternationalOrganization46: 1-36.
Habermas, Juergen. 1996. Der europaeische nationalstaat - zu vergangenheit und zukunft
von souveraenitaet und staatsbuergerschaft. In Die einbeziehung des anderen.
Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
Haftendorn, Helga, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander. 1999. Imperfect
unions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufmann. 1995. The politicaleconomy of democratic
transitions.Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hall, P., R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political

Studies 44: 936-957.
Hall, Rodney B. 2002. The socially constructed contexts of comparative politics. In
Constructivism and comparativepolitics. Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe.
Hay, Colin, Daniel Wincott. 1998. Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism.
PoliticalStudies 46: 951-957.
Held, David. 1996. Models of democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Herrmann, Richard K., Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer ed. 2004. Transnational
identities.Lanham, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Hewson, Martin, and Timothy J. Sinclair ed. 1999. Global governance theory. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Hobbs, Thomas. 1974. Leviathan. In Leviathan. New York and London: Collier
Macmillan.

109

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991-2. How Countries Democratize. PoliticalScience Quarterly

106, no. 4: 579-616.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The thirdwave: Democratizationin the late twentieth

century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Hurrell, Andrew. 1993. International society and the study of regimes. In Regime theory
and internationalrelations.Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ikenberrry, G. J., David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno. 1988. Introduction,
Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy. International
Organization42, no. 1: 1-14.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, cultural change, and
democracy. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
International Centre for Theoretical Physics. What's new: Going east. Internet on-line.
Available from
<http://www.ictp.triest.it/-sci info/News from ICTP/News 113/whatsnew.html>.

[February 4, 2006].
Jackson, Patrick T., Daniel Nexon. 2002. Globalization, the comparative method, and
comparing constructions. In Constructivism and comparativepolitics. Armonk and
London: M.E. Sharpe.
Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the
Debate. InternationalSecurity 24, no. 1: 42-63.
Johnson, James T. 1992. Does Democracy 'Travel'? Some Thoughts on Democracy and
Its Cultural Context. Ethics andInternationalAffairs 6: 41-55.
Kant, Immanuel. 1957. Morality, politics, and perpetual peace. In Indianapolis and New
York: Bobbs-Merrill Company.
Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. The culture of nationalsecurity. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond borders: Advocacy
networks in international politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

110

Keohane, Robert O. 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. International
Studies Quarterly32: 379-396.
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O., and Stanley Hoffmann. 1991. The new Europeancommunity.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Koehane, Robert O., Joseph Nye. 1971. Transnational Relations and World Politics: an
Introduction. InternationalOrganization25, no. 3: 329-350.
Keylor, Willam R. 2001. The twentieth-Century World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kohler-Koch, Beate. 2000. Framing: The Bottleneck of Constructing Legitimate
Institutions. Journalof EuropeanPublicPolicy 7, no. 4: 513-531.
Kopecky, Petr. 2000. What has Eastern Europe Taught Us about the Democratisation
Literature (and Vice Versa)? EuropeanJournalofpoliticalresearch 37, no. 4: 517-

539.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. Internationalregimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. Defending the national interest.Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Kratchowil, Friedrich, John G. Ruggie. 1986. International Organization: A State of the
Art on an Art of the State. InternationalOrganization40, no. 4: 753-775.
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1996. Is the ship of cultures at sea or returning? In The realm of
culture and identity in internationalrelationstheory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Kratochwil, Friedrich V. 1993. Contract and Regimes. Do Issue Specificity and
Variationsof FormalityMatter? Tuebingen/Germany Center for International
Relation/Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute for Political Science, University of
Tuebingen.
Kratochwill, Friedrich V. 1988. Regimes, Interpretation and the 'Science' of Politics: A
Reappraisal. Millennium: Journalof InternationalRelations 17: 263-284.

111

Kratochwil, Friedrich V. 1982. On the notion of "interest" in international relations.
InternationalOrganization36, no. 1: 30.

Kreid, Harald. 2006. Major CEI Annual Working Meeting. CEI Newsletter No. 44
(June): 4.
Kreid, Harald. 2005. Competitiveness - Innovation - Human Resources.
Kubalkova, Vendulka, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert. 1998. Internationalrelations in
a constructedworld. Armonck, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Kupchan, Charles, Clifford Kupchan. 1991. Concerts, Collective Security and the Future
of Europe. InternationalSecurity 16, no. 1, summer.
Lampe, Ronald H. (ed.). 1993. East Europeansecurity reconsidered.Washington: The
Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Lapid, Yself and Friedrich Kratochwil ed. 1996. The return of culture and identity in IR
theory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Lewis, Martin, and Karen Wigen. 1997. The myth of continents: A critique of
metageography.Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lijphard, Arend. 1992. Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland, 1989-1991. Journalof Theoretical Politics4, no. 2.
Limbach, Jutta. 2005. Making multiculturalism work.
Linden, Ronald H. (ed.). 2002. Norms and nannies: The impact of international
organizationson the centraland east European states. Lanham: Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problemsof democratic transitionand
consolidation.Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political legitimacy. American PoliticalScience Review 53: 69104.

112

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner. 1999. The New Wave of Regionalism.
InternationalOrganization53, no. 3: 589.
Maravall, Jose M. 1997. Regimes, politics and markets: Democratizationandeconomic
change in southern and eastern Europe. Oxford: University Press.
March, J. D. and J. P. Olsen. 1998. Rediscovering institutions.New York: Free Press.
Marks, Bary, Doug McAdam. 1996. Social movements and the changing structure of
political opportunity in the European Union. In Governance in the European Union.
London: Sage.
Marks, Gary, Doug McAdam. 1999. On the relationship of political opportunities to the
form of collective action: The case of the European union. In Social movements in a
globalizing world. London: McMillan.
Martin, Lisa. 1992. Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. InternationalOrganization46:

765.
Mazey, Sonia. 1998. The European Union and Women's Rights: From the
Europeanization of National Agendas to the Nationalization of a European Agenda?
Journalof EuropeanPublic Policy 5, no. 1: 131-152.
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. Introduction:
Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes - toward a synthetic,
comparative perspective on social movements. In Comparativeperspectives on
social movements: Politicalopportunities,mobilizing structures,and cultural
framings. New York: Cambridge University Press.
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1988. Social movements. In
Handbook of sociology. Newbury Park: Sage.
McGann, and Weaver. 2000. Think tanks and civil societies.New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers.
Miller, William, Ase B. Gordeland, and Ttyana Y. Koshekina. 2001. A culture of
corruption: Coping with government in post-communist Europe. New York: Central
European University Press.

113

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The choice for Europe: Socialpurpose and state powerfrom
Messina to Maastricht.Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics. InternationalOrganization51, no. 4: 513-553.
Moravcsik, Andrew, Milada A. Vachudova. 2003. National Interests, State Power, and
EU Enlargement. East EuropeanPoliticsand Societies 17, no. 1: 42.
Muller, Edward N., Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. Civic Culture and Democracy: The
question of Causal Relationships. American PoliticalScience Review 88, no. 3: 635-

652.
Norris, Pippa. 2004. Building Knowledge Societies: The renewal of democraticpractices
in knowledge societies.Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.
North, Douglass C. 20005. Understandingthe process of economic change. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitionsfrom authoritarian
rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertaindemocracies.Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. 1986. Transitions
from authoritarianrule: Prospectsfor democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
OECD. LEEDprogram. Internet on-line. Available from
<http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,2340,en 2649 34417 32341832 1 1 1 1,00ht

ml>. [April 27, 2006].
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Building
partnershipsfor progress:LEEDprogramme. Internet on-line. Available from
<www.oecd.org/document/8/0,2340,en 2649 34417 32341832 1 1 1 1,00html>.

[February 4, 2006].
Oliver, P. E., G. Marwell. 1992. Mobilizing technologies for collective action. In
Frontiersin social movement theory. New Haven: Yale University Press.

114

Olson, Marcur. 1971. The logic of collective action. New York: Schocken Books.
Onuf, Nicholas. 1989. World of our making: Rules and rule in social theory and

internationalrelations.Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Buildingpartnershipsfor
progress:LEED programme. Internet on-line. Available from
<www.oecd.org/document/8/0,2340,en 2649 34417 32341832 1 1 1 1,00html>.

[April 27, 2006].
Oye, Kenneth. 1986. Cooperationunder anarchy. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Pietrzyk, Dorota I. 2003. Democracy or civil Society? Politics23, no. 1: 38-45.
Plasser, Fritz, Peter A. Ulram, and Harald Waldrauch. 1998. Democratic consolidation in
east-centralEurope. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
Pollack, Mark A. 1997. Representing Diffuse Interests in EC Policymaking. Journalof
EuropeanPublicPolicy 4, no. 4: 572-590.
Powell, Robert. 1994. Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The NeorealistNeoliberal Debate. InternationalOrganization48, no. 2: 313-344.
Puchala, Donald. 2003. Theory and history in internationalrelations.New York:
Routledge.
Puchala, Donald J. 1999. Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European
Integration: A Review Article. Journalof Common Market Studies 37, no. 2: 317-

331.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making democracy work: Civic traditionsin modern Italy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Quigley, Kevin F. F. For democracy's sake: Foundationsand democracy assistancein
central Europe. Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
R.A.V.E.: Raising Awareness about the Value of Space Project. Home: About the project.
Internet on-line. Available from <http://ww.ravespace.org/RaveSpace/default.aspx/Sez1 .aspx>. [February 4, 2006].

115

Reinicke, Wolfgang H. 1998. Globalpublicpolicy. governingwithout government?
Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.
Rempel, Gerhard. 1995. Revolution in Eastern Europe: 1989. Available from
http://mars.wnec.edu/-grempel/courses/wc2/lectures/rev89.html. [July 11, 2006].
Revolutions of 1989 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available from
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutions

of 1989>, Accessed July 11, 2006.

Risse, Thomas. 2004. European institutions and identity change: What have we learned?
In Transnationalidentities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1996. Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations
Theory and Comparative Policy analysis meet the European Union. Journalof
Common Market Studies 34, no. March.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. Cooperationamong democracies: The European influence
on U.S. foreignpolicy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Democracy and its
alternatives.Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rosenau, James N. 1997. Along the domestic-foreignfrontier.exploring governance in a
turbulent world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenau, James N. 1990. Turbulence in world politics.A theory of change and
continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ruggie, John G. 1998. Constructingthe world polity. New York: Routledge.
Russett, Bruce M., and John R. Oneal. 2001. Triangulatingpeace: Democracy,
interdependence,and internationalorganizations.New York: Norton.
Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.
ComparativePolitics, April: 337-363.
Schedler, Andreas. 1998. What is Democratic consolidation. Journalof Democracy 9, no.

2: 91-107.

116

Schmitter, Philippe, Terry L. Karl. 1991. What Democracy is ... and Is Not. Journalof
Democracy 2, no. 3: 75-88.
Schroeder, Paul W. 1994. Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory. InternationalSecurity

19, no. 1: 108-145.
Secretary-General. 2002. Integrationof the Human Rights of Women and the Gender
Perspective.United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights - Fifty-Eighths session, Item 12 of the provisional agenda.
Serbia and Montenegro - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available from
<http://en.wikipedia.org/Servia and Montenegro>. Accessed July 11, 2006.
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and social revolutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Sledzinski, Janusz. 2004. GPS news from CEI. In 1-6. Warsaw: Civil GPS Service
Interface Committee, International Information Subcommittee.
Slovenian Foreign Ministry. Ministerdr. Ruppel to attend the CEI meeting in Milan on
22 June 2001. 19 June 2001 Internet on-line. Available from
<http://www.gov.si/mzz/eng/news room/news/01061901.html>, accessed

1/19/2006.
Snidal, Duncan. 1985. Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for
International Cooperation and Regimes. American PoliticalScience Review 79: 923.

Snow, D. A., E. B. Rochford Jr., S. K. Worden, and R. D. Benford. 1986. Frame
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. American

SociologicalReview 51: 464-481.
Stein, Arthur A. 1983. Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world. In
Internationalregimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Stone, Diane. 2000. Banking on knowledge: The genesis of the global development
network. London: Routledge.
Stone, Diane, Heidi Ulrich. 2003. Policy Research Institutes and Think Tanks in Western
Europe: Development Trends and Perspectives. Budapest: Local Government and
Public Service Reform Initiative.

117

Southern Europe - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Available from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern Europe. Accessed July 11, 2006.

Surel, Ives. 2000. The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making.
Journalof European Public Policy 7: 495-512.
Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. Making Social Science Work Across Spce and Time: A Critical
Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work. American Political
Science Review 90, no. 2.
Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in movement: Social movements, collective action and
politics.New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thelen, K., and S. Steinmo. 1992. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. In
Structuringpolitics:Historicalinstitutionalismin comparativeanalysis. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, Charles. 1985. War making and state making as organized crime. In Bringing the
state back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, Charles. 1975. The formation of the nation state. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Tilly, Virginia

Q. 2002. The role of the state in ethnic

conflict: A constructivist
reassessment. In Constructivism and comparativepolitics. Armonk, NY and
London: M.E. Sharpe.

Treeck, Wolfgang, Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. From National Corporatism to
Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market. Politics

and Society 19: 133-164.
Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. 2005. Internationalrelations theory. Boston and
London: Allyn and Bacon.
Volten, Peter e. 1990. Uncertainfutures: Eastern Europe and democracy. New York:
Institute for East-West Security Studies.
Vos, Robert. 2006. Diverging Growth and Development andthe UN's Role in Containing
it. Speech at the UN Headquarters on 19 July 2006 to Seton Hall University Summer

118

UN Program through the UN Development Policy and Analysis Division,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of internationalpolitics. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of internationalpolitics.New York: McGraw Hill.
Weber, Max. 1949. Essays in sociology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weber, Max. 1949. The theory of social and economic organization.New York: The Free
Press.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social theory of internationalpolitics. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics. InternationalOrganization46: 391-425.
Wendt, Alexander. 1987. The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations
Theory. InternationalOrganization41, no. 3: 335-370.
Whitehead, Laurence. 1996. Three international dimensions of democratization: Eastcentral Europe. In The internationaldimensions ofdemocratization:Europe and the
Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolf, Dieter and Bernhard Zangl. 1996. The European Economic and Monetary Union:
'Two-level games' and the Formation of International Institutions. European Journal
of InternationalRelations 2, no. 3: 355-393.
Zito, Anthony. Comparing environmental policy-making in transnational institutions.
Journalof European PublicPolicy 5, no. 4: 671-690.
Zuern, Michael. 1997. Assessing State Preferences and Explaining Institutional choice:
The Case of Intra-German Trade. InternationalStudies Quarterly41, no. 2: 295-320.

119

Appendix 1 - Institutional Review Board Approval and Completion Record for
Course in the Protection of Human Subject Research Subjects

120

Office of Sponsored Research Administration

* F IU

FLORIDA

INTERNATIONAL

430
Research Compliance, MARC

UNIVERSITY

Miami' public rrsearch university

MEMORANDUM
To:

Astrid Boening

CC:

Dr. Lisa Prugl
File

From:

Chris Grayson, CIMI, Institutional Review Board Coordinator

Date:

August 31, 2005

Proposal Title:

Democratization of Eastern Europe.

Approval #

052605-01

Your study was deemed Exempt by the Institutional Review Board at Florida International
University on May 26, 2005.
As a requirement of IRB approval you are required to:
1) Submit a completion report (Form B-2) upon completion of your project in order for the file
to be closed.
2) Submit a proposal and receive approval for any additions or changes in the procedures
involving human subjects.
3) Provide immediate written notification to the IRB of every serious or unusual or
unanticipated adverse event as well as problems with the rights or welfare of the human
subjects. You must confirm the receipt of serious AE reports with the IRB office.

Special Conditions:

N/A

Please note your approval number is indicated above. For further information, you may contact
the IRB Coordinator by email at irbiacuc a fiu.edu or visit the OSRA - Human Subjects website
at wwv.osra.fiu.edu.
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IRB Approved

Date:
No.:

__/_

//_
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FLORIDA INTERNATlONAL UNiRTSTvY

Consent to Participate in Research - Verbal Presentation

Dear Madam or Sir,
I would like to introduce myself, Astrid Boening, as a graduate student at Florida International
University in Miami/FL, USA. As a representative of a European government or a nongovernmental organization, I request your participation in a brief interview on the role of NGO's
in the democratization of Eastern European countries.
The purpose of my study is the field work required for my Master's Thesis on The role of NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), by example of the Central European Initiative in
Triest/Italy and others in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in knowledge transfer from
democratic institutions to newly democratized countries."
This interview will take approximately 30-60 minutes of your time iII your office.
There are no fIresecable risks or benefits to you for participation in this study. There is no Cost
or payment to you. If you have questions while taking part, please stop me and ask. You will
renvii n anonymous and your answers are confidential.

If you have questions after we have finished you may call me at +001-786-325-5597 and we will
answer your questions. If you have questions about being in a study or you feel as if you were
not treated well during this study, call Dr. Jonathan Tubman at 305-348-2494. I e is the Chair of
the Institutional Review Board at Florida International University in Miami/Fl, USA.
Your participation in this research is voluntary, and you will not be penalized or lose benefits if
you refuse to participate or decide to stop. May I continue?

University Park - Miami, FL 33199 - www.fiu.edu
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CITI Course in The Protection of Human Research Subjects
PrintThis Report
Friday, May 20, 2C

CITI Course Completion Record for Astrid Boening
To whom it may concem:
On 5'225, Asid Boening (usemame=astridboeningl@aol.com; UM ID Number=000)
completed all CT/l Program requirements for the Basic CITI Course in The Protection of Huma
Research Subjects.
Learner Institution: Universityof Miami
Learner Group: Group 4.
Learner Group Description: Investigatorsand staffconductingSocial/Behaviora Research
only who:
* Have direct contactwith subjects orsubjectrecords
. Work ONLY at the U ofMiami.
Contact Infonnation:
Gender: Female
Site: Other
Department European Studies Center
Which course do you plan to take?: Social & Behavioral Investigator Course Only
Role in human subjects research: Principal Investigator
May we re-contact you to complete a course survey?: Yes
Mailing Address:
20335 W. Country Club Dr. #106
Aventura
FL
33180
USA
Email: astridboening1@aol.com
Office Phone: 7886-325-5597
Home Phone: 305-933-9321
The Required Modules for Group 4. are:
Introduction

Date completed
05/09A)5

https://www.citipr g020.org/members/co0r3eidexwd/erticate.asp0strKeyID=7209892F...
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5/2005

History and Ethical Principles - SBR

05/11/05

Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBR

0511/05

The Regulations and'The Social and Behavioral Sciences - SBR

05/11/05

Assessing Risk in Social and Behavioral Sciences - SBR

05/13/05

Informed Consent - SBR

05/13/05

Privacy and Confidentiality - SBR

05/13/05

Research with Prisoners - SBR

05/15/05

Research with Children - SBR

05/15/05

Research in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools - SBR

05/17/05

international Research - SBR

05/17/05

Internet Research - SBR

05/18105

HIPAA and Human Subjects Research

05/19/05

Conflicts of Interest in Research Involving Human Subjects

05/20/05

University of Miami

05/20105

Additional optional modules completed:

Date completed

For this Completion Report to be valid, the learner listed above must be affiliated with a I
participating institution. Falsified information and unauthorized use of the Clii course si
is unethical, and may be considered scientific misconduct by your Institution.
Paul Braunschweiger Ph.D.
Professor, University of Miami
Director Office of Research Education
CITI Course Coordinator
CF 1081,3

https://www.citiprogram.org/members/couseandxam/certificate.asp?strKeyD=7209992F...
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FLORIDA INTERNATlONAt UNIVERSnY

Consent to Participate in Research - Verbal Presentation

Dear Madam or Sir,

I would like to introduce myself, Astrid Boening, as a graduate student at Florida International
University in Miami/FL, USA. As a representative of a European government or a nongovernmental organization. I request your participation in a brief interview on the role of NGO's
in the democratization of Eastern European countries.
The purpose of my study is the field work required for my Master's Thesis on "The role of NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), by example of the Central European Initiative in
Triest/Italy and others in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in knowledge transfer from
democratic institutions to newly democratized countries."

This interview will take approximately 30-60 minutes of your time in your office.
There are no foreseeable risks or benefits to you for participation in this study. There is no cost
or payment to you. If you have questions while taking part, please stop me and ask. You will
remain anonymous and your answers are confidential.

If you have questions after we have finished you may call me at +001-786-325-5597 and we will
answer your questions. If you have questions about being in a study or you feel as if you were

not treated well during this study, call Dr. Jonathan Tubman at 305-348-2494. He is the Chair of
the Institutional Review Board at Florida International University in Miami/Fl, USA.
Your participation in this research is voluntary, and you will not be penalized or lose benefits if
you refuse to participate or decide to stop. May I continue?

Uriversity Puk - M iwa, FL 331
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IGO QUESTIONNAIRE
I. Political Alliance
1. What type of program does your organization develop/back?
2. What is democracy in your organization's understanding?
3. Who are your collaborators/counterparts/partner organizations?
4. What is their relationship in defining the programs?
5. Is there a mutual definition of programs with them?
6.Who defines the program ideas in your organization?
7. Who in your organization develops them?
8. Who implements them?

IL Activities/Prourams
1. What theoretical approach do you pursue in your organization?
2. What practical approach do you pursue in your organization?
3. What assistance do you receive and from which agencies?
4. What recommendations do you have for future activities/programs?
5. What areas do your programs focus on?
6. Do the topics of your programs change or remain focused? On what?
7. How do these compare to the past?
8. How do these compare to the future?
9. How do your programs relate to think tanks?
10. Would you describe your activities as lobbyist?
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IHL Criteria for Success
1. What are your organizaiton's criteria for success of your programs?

IV. Prospects for Involvement in European Neighborhood Program?
1. How does your program differ from similar institutions, especially within the European

Union?
V. Fundinf
1. Do you receive proceeds only from a grant?
2. To whom are fund disbursements accountable?
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CENTRAL EUROPEAN INHATVE

Central European Initiative

Guidelines and Rules of Procedure
I. Principles and objectives
1.
The Central European Initiative (CEI)
among and between Its Member States.

is a regional

forum for co-operation and consultation

Member States of the CEI are: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
2.
The Member States of the CEI are guided by the principles of the UN Charter, of all the
documents of the Helsinki process/OSCE. They are guided as well by final declarations and
documents of the meetings of the Heads of Government and the Foreign Ministers of the CEI

(including those of the predecessor initiatives: Quadrilateral, Pentagonal, Hexagonal).
The CEI, as a part of the European integration process, endeavours to co-operate with
3.
European organisations and institutions, in particular with the European Union, the Council of
Europe and the OSCE as well as with other regional co-operation initiatives in areas of mutual

Interest.
The CEI also co-operates with the UN system and with other relevant International
organisations, in particular the UNECE, the OECD as well as with international financial institutions,
especially the EBRD.
4.

The strategic goals of the CEI are:

a) to work for cohesion of a united Europe, without dividing lines, a Europe with shared
values, embracing all countries, regions, peoples and citizens of the continent;
b) to focus co-operation within the framework of the CEI in particular on assistance to
strengthen the capacities of the least advanced member countries and of those having
the greatest need for accelerated economic development or recovery.

5.

The co-operation within the framework of the CEI shall aim at the following principal

objectives:
a) strengthening co-operation among and between Member States,
b) strengthening the participation of all Member States in the process of European

integration,
c) strengthening economic, social, legal and other aspects of the transformation processes.
6.

The

co-operation within

the framework of the CEI shall include, Inter ala, the following

areas:
-

consultations on political matters of mutual interest,

-

economic and technical co-operation,
development of infrastructure in transport, energy, telecommunication, agriculture,
strengthening the democratic institutions and observance of human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to national minorities as well as humanitarian matters,
protection of human environment,
co-operation in the field of science and technology, media, culture, education, youth
exchange, tourism
cross-border and interregional co-operation.

-

-
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II. Membership and participation in the CEI
7.

The CEI can invite 4ny interested third State, regional entity and International organisation

to participate In CEI activities, events, programmes and projects.

The CEI can also confer the status of special guest or other forms of partnership as

appropriate.

8.
The CEI shall promote co-operation with NGOs, professional associations, academic and
other institutions willing to co-operate on matters of mutual interest.
9.

Any Member State of the CEI which has seriously violated the principles referred to in Art. 2

of the present Guidelines may be suspended from its rights of representation by the Foreign

Ministers. If such Member State persists in these violations, the Heads of Government may decide

that It has ceased to be a Member of the CEI. The decision on that matter should be taken following
the rule of consensus minus one.

III.

Organisation and structure

10.

The CEI operates in a flexible manner through several bodies.

11.

The Governmental Dimension of the CEI consists of the following bodies:
Meeting of the Heads of Government (CEI Summit),
Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MFA Meeting),
Meeting of the Political Directors of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of CEI Member States
(PoD Meeting)
Committee of National Co-ordinators (CNC),
-

Working bodies (Working Groups, Expert Groups, Project Groups etc.),
Executive Secretariat (CEI-ES) and
as speclalised instrument the Secretariat for CEI Projects (CEI/EBRD Secretariat)1.

12.
The Parliamentary Dimension of the CEI functions according to its structure and rules of
procedure. It consists of the following bodies:
The Conference of the Speakers of Parliaments
-

The Parliamentary Assembly

-

The Parliamentary Committee

-

Working bodies (Ad Hoc Committees etc.).

13.
The Business Dimension of the CEI, which functions according to its own modalities, consists
of the following bodies:
- the Annual Presidents' Conference of the Central European Chambers of Commerce
Initiative (CECCI)
.

the Secretariat of the Annual Presidents' Conference of CECCI.

14.
The Meetina of the Heads of Government (CEI Summit) shall be convened once a year in
autumn. The following matters shall be decided by the CEI Summit:
principles and objectives of the CEI,
amendments to the 'CEI Guidelines and Rules of Procedure",
political and economic orientation for the co-operation within the framework of the
Initiative, including adoption of the Plan of Action,
suspension of membership,
approval of the Annual Report of the CEI-ES DG.
15.
The Meetin of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MFA Meeting) shall be convened once a year
in spring. The MFA Meeting shall decide upon specific issues of the CEI co-operation, including:
political co-operation,
- participation in CEI activities, as referred to in Art. 7,
I

The cERD
Secretariat is functioning on the basis of the Secretariat Agreement of 21 July 1998, conduded between the
CEI and the EBRD and the Fund Agreement concluded between the Government of Italy and the EBRO on a CEI Fund. The
Fund Agreement was concluded on 14 April 1992 and amended on 23 July 1997.

131

-

the organisational structure, areas and ways of co-operation,
matters concerning the establishment and the operational structure of the working
bodies,
the formula of the annual contributions, annual budget and scale of contributions of the
CEI Co-operation Fund,
the appointment and recall of the CEI-ES Director General and Deputy Directors General.

16.
The Meeting of Political Directors of the Ministries of Forelan Affairs of CEI Member States
(PoD) shall be convened at least once a year. As a rule, it will take place In Rome. Additional
meetings can be convened on an ad hoc basis In response to specific situations that might arise in
the CEI region or within the organisation.

17.

The Committee of National Co-ordinators (CNC) Is the key body responsible for the

management of CEI co-operation and the implementation of CEI programmes and projects through
appropriate structures. The CNC is convened regularly, in principle once a month, to discuss and to
co-ordinate co-operation within the various bodies of the CEI as well as in relation with other
International organisations and regional groupings.
The CNC, assisted by the CEI-ES, shall prepare the documents to be approved by the CEI

Summit or by the MFA Meeting.
The CNC shall discuss and review the activities of the CEI working bodies and shall provide

appropriate guidance to them.
The CNC, in consultation with the Director General of the CEI-ES, shall decide upon the
structure and the staff of the CEI-ES.
18.

In case of need the CNC can entrust specific tasks to a committee with reduced

membership, dealing, inter alia, with questions relating to technical and financial aspects of CEI
activities including those concerning co-operation with the EU/EC and other international

organisations and financial institutions.
The CEI-Executive Secretariat and the Secretariat for CEI projects shall participate in the

meetings of this committee.
19.
The Chairmanship of the CEI (Presidency) shall rotate annually at the beginning of the
calendar year based on the alphabetical order of the English names of CEI Member States, unless
decided otherwise. Regarding the chairmanship of the:CE! working bodies see Art. 20.
The Chairman-in-office shall be supported by the former and the next Chairman, which form
the Troika of the CEI.
The Presidency shall convene the meetings of the Heads of Government, the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, the Political Directors and the CNC. The meetings of the CNC may be convened also
In other countries. In case of impediment of the Chairman-in-office meetings of the CNC shall be
chaired, at the discretion of the Presidency, by one of the Troika members or by the CEI-ES Director
General.
20.
The principles and objectives of CEI co-operation shall be accomplished through appropriate
activities of a flexible structure of working bodies, meeting on expert, high official or ministerial
level.
Different forms of
lorking bodies (ad hoc or permanent Working Groups, Expert or Project
Groups, advisory bodies etc.) can be proposed to be set up upon the initiative of one or more CEI
Member States; their establishment, structure and field of activity shall be decided by the MFA
Meeting upon CNC recommendation.

As a general rule each Member State shall assume at least one chairmanship or cochairmanship of a working body.
The CEI Member State chairing a working body or applying for chairmanship shall present
the draft terms of reference, a draft programme of activities as well as a qualified candidate for the
chairperson to the CNC for approval. Where appropriate, a co-chairperson from another Member
State should be appointed.
The working bodies shall be assisted by the CEI-ES and by the Secretariat for CEI Projects in

performing their duties.
If a working body Is not carrying out activities during one calendar year the CNC shall decide
upon appropriate measures, including L.a. a rotation of the chair, adaptation of the terms of
reference or dissolution.
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21.
The CEI - Executive Secretariat (CEI-ES) Is located In Trieste, Italy, and shall be headeby
a Director General.
The CEI-ES, as permanent CEI body, shall provide continuous administrative and conceptual
support to both the decisfon-making and operational structures of the CEI and shall take any
appropriate initiatives aimed at promoting the realisation of the CEI co-operation objectives.
The tasks of the CEI-ES shall comprise, inter alla, the following areas:
- information and documentation
organisation, preparation and follow-up of meetings
participation In CEI meetings and other CEI-related events
- CEI programmes and projects.
The CEI-ES shall also fulfil other tasks assigned to it by the CEI Summit, MFA Meeting, the
Chairman-in-office and the CNC.
The structure and staff of the CEI-ES shall be decided by the CNC in consultation with the
Director General. The CEI-ES structure and activity, especially In the field of personnel and finance
should be consistent with the law of the receiving state.
In performing its duties the CEI-ES shall co-operate with National Co-ordinators,
chairpersons of the working bodies, other persons and subjects which are Involved in CEI activities.
The authorities of the receiving state shall finance activities of the CEI-ES as well as the
staff's salaries. Any Member State designating any official of the staff (including the Director
General and the Deputy Directors General) shall cover the respective costs. Any CEI Member State
can voluntarily allocate financial and material resources for the CEI-ES activities.
22.
The CEI-ES Director General (CEI-ES DG) shall be selected among candidates nominated by
the CEI Member States and shall be appointed/recalled by the MFA Meeting upon recommendation
of the CNC. His/her term shall last three years with the option of a one time renewal of up to three
more years.
The CEI-ES DG shall participate in the CEI Summit, MFA Meeting, PoD Meeting, CNC
meetings, meetings of working bodies at ministerial level, the Steering Committee of the Secretariat
for CEI Projects and in other major CEI events.
In co-ordination with the Chairman-in-office the CEI-ES DG or his/her representative shall
participate on behalf of the CEI In relevant activities of other European and international
organisations and institutions.
The CEI-ES DG shall prepare an annual report on activities of the CEI-ES including financial
aspects, which shall be subject to acceptance by the MFA Meeting upon recommendation of the
CNC.
The CEI-ES DG Is supported by up to two Deputy Directors General (CEI-ES DDGs). The DG
and the DDGs represent the Executive Level of the CEI-ES.
One of the posts of the Executive Level will be filled by the host country of the organisation.
The DDGs shall be selected among candidates nominated by the CEI Member States and shall be
appointed/recalled by the MFA Meeting upon recommendation of the CNC. The term of office of the
DDGs shall last three years with the option of a one-time renewal of up to three more years.
23.

For the duration of the Agreements on which it is based, the Secretariat for CEI Prolects
is assuming tasks aimed primarily at investment projects and, I.a., the
following areas:
economic co-operation
CEI Fund management and mobilisation of financial resources,
investment project promotion, identification, and preparation assistance
technical support for investment projects
system development and institutional programme support (e.g. organisation of international
events, training, advisory services, and Information systems).
24.

(CEI/EBRD Secretariat)

The Secretariat for CEI Projects is linked Institutionally to the CEI-ES and is located In the
CEI-ES Headquarters in Trieste, Italy, maintaining also a permanent office at the EBRD, London.
The CNC together with the Directors representing Member States in the Board of Directors of
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development form the Steering Committee of the
Secretariat for CEI Projects.
25.

The co-operation between the Governmental and Parliamentary Dimensions will be guided,

I.a., by the following modalities:
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-

-

A joint session of the enlarged CEI Trolka2 at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the
enlarged Troika of the CEI Parliamentary Committee will be organised on the occasion of the
MFA Meeting to permit'a general debate on the strategic goals and challenges of the CEI as well
as on the contributions of the Parliamentary Dimension to the overall work of the organisation.
The Presidency of the CEI Parliamentary Dimension will be Invited to participate in all high-level
meetings organised by the CEI with the right to take part in the debate.

-

The Chairpersons of the CEI Working Groups and the Chairpersons of the respective ad hoc
Committees of the CEI Parliamentary Dimension will establish a close working relationship,
exchange information on their mutual work programme and dedicate, in each of their sessions,
an agenda item to their co-operation.

-

Back to back with the last CNC meeting of each year, there will be a one day meeting between
the enlarged CEI Troika at the level of National Co-ordinators, the CEI Parliamentary Dimension
at appropriate level, the CECCI at appropriate level, the CEI-ES and the CEI/EBRD Secretariat to
review the work of the past year and to harmonise the activities of the incoming year.

-

Under no circumstance will the enhanced co-operation with the Parliamentary Dimension entail
any financial commitments of the Governments of the CEI Member States or the CEI
Secretariats.

26.
The co-operation between the Governmental and Business Dimensions will be guided, I.a.,
by the following modalities:
-

The Presidency of CECCI will be invited to participate in all high level meetings organised by the
CEI and in the meetings of CEI working bodies according to CECCI's interest.

-

The Presidency of CECCI will be invited to participate in specific missions of the CEI Presidency
or Troika as appropriate.

-

Back to back with the last CNC meeting of each year, there will be a one day meeting between
the enlarged CEI Troika at the level of National Co-ordinators, the CEI Parliamentary Dimension
at appropriate level, the CECCI at appropriate level, the CEI-ES and the CEI/EBRD Secretariat to
review the work of the past year and to harmonise the activities of the Incoming year.

-

The structures of CECCI in CEI member countries shall actively co-operate in the promotion and
organisation of the CEI Summit Economic Forum (SEF) by marketing activities of the SEF at

national level, organisation of SEF sessions, parallel events and networking receptions.
-

Under no circumstances will the enhanced co-operation with CECCI entail any financial

commitments of the Governments of the CEI Member States or the CEI Secretariats.

IV. Decision making procedure
27.
Subject to the provisions of Art. 9 and 18 the decisions within the CEI are taken by
consensus as a general rule.
Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a
Member State and submitted by it as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in
question.

Questions arising under procedural matters shall be decided by a simple majority of Member
States.

2

The enlarged cEI Troika consists of the CEI Troika plus the host country.
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V. Signing of Agreements

>e

28.
CEI Agreements to
concluded with third parties shall be signed on behalf of the CEI by
the CEI Presidency and the CEI-ES DG.

VI. Financing
29.
Each Member State is responsible for financing its own expenses connected with CEI
activities.
The costs incurred for the organisation of meetings shall, as a rule, be borne by the host
country.
Member States shall facilitate the implementation of CEI programmes and projects through

annual financial contributions to the CEI Co-operation Fund. The formula of the annual
contributions, annual budget and scale of contributions of the CEI Co-operation Fund shall be
decided by the MFA Meeting.

In order to facilitate the participation of all Member States in CEI and CEI-sponsored events
assistance can be provided for covering travel and accommodation expenses through the Solidarity
Fund managed by the CEI-ES in accordance with the Guidelines of the Solidarity Fund approved by
the CNC.

VII. Flag and language
logo in the middle. The CEI logo
"CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE",

30.

The CEI flag represents a blue field with the official CEI

31.

The working language of the CEI is English. CEI documents are produced In English.
If a participant in a CEI event wishes to use another language the translation has to be

consists of the block letters "CEI" with a block transcription
surrounded by a semicircle composed by 10 yellow stars.

provided by himself.

VIII. Amending the CEI Guidelines
32.
Any amendment proposed by a Member State shall be examined by the CNC. If agreed
upon, the CNC shall submit a recommendation to the Meeting of the Heads of Government for

approval.
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Appendix 4 - Central European Initiative
Document on Working Procedures
Of the Parliamentary Dimension
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CE.AL EOPEANU lAE

DOCUMENT ON WORKING PROCEDURES
OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION

1.

Parligmentary dimension

A parliamentary dimension of the CEI shall be established, which shall be
regulated by the following Working Procedures.
The parliamentary dimension consists of.
- the Parliamentary Committee, which shall meet in spring,
- the Parliamentary Assembly, which shall meet in autumn, and
- the Conference of the Speakers of Parliaments of the member States,
composed of the Speakers of the House or Houses of each Member State.
Ad hoc Committees may be established.
2. Obktve
The Parliamentary dimension of CEl shall pursue the following objectives:
-

-

to strengthen multilateral co-operation among the C.E.I. member States at
parliamentary level, complemented by bilateral relations,
to establish and deepen partnership structure based on principles of
parliamentary democracy and of guaranteeing human rights,
to promote and make easier the reform process and transition In Central and
Eastem Europe through the creative collaboration of the countries involved,
to improve the European environment in the member States and strengthen
the Helsinki process.

3. Mgmberhio

All C.E.I. member States shall be invited to nominate Members of Parliament as
their delegates to the Parliamentary Committee and Parliamentary Assembly.
Invitations shall be restricted to those States, which have democratically elected

Parliaments. The standard to be applied shall be the same criteria as for
membership of the Council of Europe.
Except in the case of appointment of a new national delegation, the term of
office of each delegate shall expire no later than six months after the first sitting
of the national parliament following parliamentary elections.
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4. Guests. observers. applicants for membershio
Members of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Councl of Europe may be invited by the chairholding country to the meetings or
to the special events as guests with the right to speak. Non member States or
other InterMational organisations may be invited to the Parliamentary Committee
or Assembly with the right to speak by the chairholding country with the consent
of the Troika, i. e. the Chairpersons of delegations from the countries holding
the previous, current and subsequent Chairmanship-in-office.
In organising parliamentary seminars, the chairholding country may, at its
discretion, invite guests and experts.
Conceming the admission of new members the Parliamentarians shall take
account of the decisions of the Governments but shall put forward their opinion
independently.
5.

Mestinas

At least two meetings shall be organised annually. They shall consist of
*
one meeting of the Parliamentary Committee in spring. These meetings
shall take place at least 15 days before the meetings of the Foreign Ministers.
Each state may send two delegates to Parliamentary Committee meetings (the
head of the parliamentary delegation and one other MP). Each delegation may
be accompanied by its secretary,
one meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly in autumn. This shall take
*
place at least 15 days before the meeting of the Head of .Governments and
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The size of delegations shall be calculated on the
basis of three delegates for a population of up to 5 million, five delegates for a
population between 5-12 million, and seven delegates for a population of more
than 12 million. Each delegation may be accompanied by its secretary.
Within the Parliamentary Committee or Assembly, Ad Hoc Committees may be
set up, in some cases, upon proposal of any of the Parliamentary delegations.
These Committees, which shall consist of up to nine members and nine
alternates, shall be charged with the monitoring of specific projects carried out

by the Working Groups. Each Ad Hoc Committee may hold joint meetings with
the relevant Working Group.
Each Ad Hoc Committee shall appoint a Chairman who shall be responsible for

the drafting of an opinion at the end of the project monitoring and for presenting
it to the Parliamentary Committee or Assembly. The Chairman of an Ad Hoc
Committee may also ask the Chairman of the relevant Working Group to submit
written reports on the activity of his Group.
These meetings shall be held "in camera".
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Where a parliament has two chambers it shall decide how to elect its delegates.
The term of office of members of each delegation shall be decided by each

parliament in accordance with its own rules and practices.
The chairholding country may, at its discretion, organise parliamentary
seminars.
Within the Assembly a Standing Committee is establshed, consisting of the
Heads of the delegations making up the Troika and the Chairpersons of the ad
hoc Committees. The meetings of the Standing Committee shall be organized,
before or in the intervals between the annual sessions of the Parliamentary
Committee and the Assembly, by the Parliament of the country holding the
Chairmanship of the CEI, and with the agreement of the country holding the
Chairmanship, by the request of any other member country of the Standing
Committee.
6.

&2210a1

WyOi

In addition to the above meetings, special events may be organised with the
consent of the Chairman, after consulting with the two Deputy Chairmen.
7. Chairmanship

The chairmanship of the Pardiamentary Committee and Assembly shall rotate
annually in line with the chairmanship at ministerial and heads on govemrment
level. The head of the parliamentary delegation of the chairholding country shall
be the Chairman of the parliamentary dimension of the C.E.I. and shall chair the
two meetings. Two Deputy Chairmen for the Parliamentary Committee and
Assembly shall be appointed. They shall be the Chairman of the parliamentary
delegations whose countries hold the proceeding and succeeding
chairmanship. The two parliamentary meetings shall be organised by the

parliament whose country holds the chairmanship. The Chairman of the
parliamentary meetings shall draw up a report after each meeting. This report,
together with the Final Document, shall be transmitted to all national
delegations and presented at the meeting of the CEl Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and of Heads of Govemment.
8. Venue pf the meetings
Venues of parliamentary meetings - up to the chairholding country - possibly
shall take place in the building of the parliament holding the chair.
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9. Agenda Of tmeetinSs
A draft agenda shall be proposed by the chairholding parliament one month in
advance of meetings. Appropriate proposals may be submitted by individual
delegations. In preparing the draft agenda due account shall always be taken of

the subjects which are going to be discussed at the meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs or Head of Government The draft agenda may include a
hearing of Government representatives of C.E.I. member States, upon invitation

of the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee or Assembly. The final agenda
shall be adopted by the Parliamentary Committee or Assembly at the beginning
of the meeting.

10. Co-ordination
The chief secretary of the parliamentary delegation of the chairholding country
may be nominated as a delegate to the meeting of national co-ordinators of the
C.E.I. who shall report to the Parliamentarians on results and future work.
Delegations shall keep in touch continuously via their secretaries.

11. PolitIcal document or declaration
The main subjects of the political document or declaration to be adopted at the
meeting of the Foreign Ministers or Heads of Government may be discussed
and commented on at the meeting of Parliamentarians, though not amended.
The Parliamentary Assemblies or Committees, however, may prepare and issue
a joint statement. This statement shall be annexed to the political document or

declaration of the foreign ministers or heads of government. This guarantees
the independence of the parliamentary dimension of the C.E.L. However,
continuous co-operation between the parliamentary bodies and the ministerial

and heads of govemment fora Is considered Indispensable.
12.Ega

Each delegation shall have a single vote. When taking decisions, efforts shall
be made to reach a consensus. If a consensus cannot be reached then a two-

thirds majority shall be required to take decisions. In such cases a separate
opinion shalt be expressed to the fora of the Foreign Ministers and Heads of
Govemment.
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13. Relations with other C.El. fora
The Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee or Assembly shall acquaint
Foreign Ministers or Heads of Govemments with the work of the Parliamentary

Committee or Assembly and the Padiamentarians' comments concerning the
political document or declaration. The Chairman shall participate in the press
conference together with the Foreign Ministers or Heads of Government.
The Chairman may be accompanied by the delegates representing the
countries of 'Troika".
The Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee or Assembly shall invite the
Director General of the CEI - Executive Secretariat to at least one of the annual
meetings of the parliamentary dimension where he shall report on the activity of
the Executive Secretariat.
Furthermore, the Director General of the CEI - Executive Secretariat may be
asked to send written reports to provide additional explanations on the
questions raised.
The Chairman shall Invite the National Co-ordinators from the countries
represented In the Financial Committee to at least one of the annual meetings
of the parliamentary dimension, where they shall provide information and
answer the questions asked by the Parliamentarians concerning both the
programmes and resources of the Initiative and specific projects of the Working

Groups.
The Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee or Assembly may invite a
representative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
a representative of the C.E.I. Secretariat of the Chambers of Commerce to one
of the annual meetings of the parliamentary dimension where they shall report
on the activity of their organisations.
14. LanlgMm
The working language of the meetings in English. Interpreting, if desired by a
delegation, shall be at its own costs. Interpreting requirements should be
conveyed sufficiently early to the host country, to allow It to provide the
technical facilities for interpretation.
15. d20t0

Parliamentary delegations shall bear their own costs, while organisation costs
and the framework programme shall be paid by the organising country.
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Appendix 5 - Samples of CEI Projects and Funding
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SECRETARIAT FOR CEI
PROJECTS (CEI-PS)
CETRA EUROPEAN \TI1ATITVE
The Central European Initiative (CEI) supports

CEI-PS Co-financing and TC contribution by
country 1993 - 2004 (( mit)

regional co-operation at economic and political level in
central and eastern Europe. Founded in 1989. the CEI
now counts 17 member countries
Albania Austna Beiarus. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria Croatia, Czech Republic
Hungary, Italy, Macedonia Moldova Poland
Romania Serbia and Montenegr0 Slnvak.a
Sloveria adi Ukram,,

3earas

5M

Since the establishment of the institutional and technical cooperation link with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRDi in 1991 the joint
CEI EBRD Secretariat has been funded by the Italian
government with a total of approximately (27 million
for the implementation of technical cooperation assignmerits alongside EBRD investments and for development and training activities in the region. So far. almost
(17 million have been utilised by the CEI for technical
assistance and co-financing projects. EBRD s investments supported by the CEI amount to over (330 million. with a total project value of over E1 7 billion

-

Rorrara
Sial RepubiC

'jkalre

CEI-PS co-financing and TC contribution by
sector 1993 - 2004 (¬ mil)

The Economic and Technical Dimension of the CEI
Project Secretariat (CEI-PS):
In its efforts to ensure the realisation of the CEI cooperation objectives of working towards a united Europe
and supporting the least advanced members of the
Initiative in their path to a market economy and a
multiparty democracy. the CEl-PS operations focus
on

a
a

a

Transport & Infrastructure 15.481

SMEs 4471
institutional i3.17
Agnculture 12 191

a

Municipal nirastructure 1.64)
-

Financialansurance (0.50)
Enertq

(0 401
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Providing Technical Co-operation assistance for
specific projects alongside EBRD investments:
Supporting institutional development through
the Know-how Exchange Programme (KEP) for
know-how and skill transfer between CEI countries through specific cooperation activities:
Supporting international events and training
thematically linked to the CEI areas of priority
intervention. namely south-eastern Europe and
the CEI countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). and in SMEs. agriculture
infrastructure and energy:
Promoting project opportunities through the busi
ness -Match-making programme". a database -f
projects seeking partners.

Albania: CEI Road Rehabilitation of Corridor VIII in
Albania

Macedonia: CEI Assistance to Macedonia Air
Navigation

The CEl-PS provided E1,700,000 in co-financing for
the EBRD Road Rehabilitation Project in Albania for
the improvement of the Elbasan - Librazhd (30 km)
section of the national road in the East-West Comdor
of Albania between the Port of Durres and the FYR
Macedonian border (EU Corridor VIII). Grant money
was provided by: EU-Phare (E1.8 million): Italian
Co-operation Fund (E2.3 million): Albania (EUR 0.3
million).

The CEI-PS provided E350,000 to support the Macedonian Civil Aviation Authority to comply with the
Intemational Civil Aviation Organisation standards
for the training of air traffic controllers. The CEl-PS
assistance was a part of a large EBRD investment
project comprising of a series of investments aiming at enhancing the safety of commercial aviation
in Macedonia, Project objectives include: enhancing
the safety of flights over Macedonia, coping with the
expected increase of traffic over the medium-term,
keeping the second main airport of Macedonia
(Ohrid) in operation and providing general support
to the development of civil aviation and institutional
reform.

Co-financiers were: International Development Association (E12.2 million): Govemment of Albania (E12.2
million); Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
(E7.5 million): EU-Phare (E21.8 million) and European
Investment Bank (E23.0 million)
EBRD Investment: E10 mil
Total Project Cost: E85 mil

EBRD Investment : E11.2 mil
Total Project Cost: E14.38 mil

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sarajevo Airport

CEI Project Secretariat Strategy

The CEI-PS contributed E607.412 to assist with the
preparation of a Master Plan for the medium term
(until 2008) and long term (up to 2020) development
of Sarajevo International Airport. The CEI-PS also
financed the purchase and installation of sequenced
flashing light system This project included extenand replacement
ive reconstruction f the r
of essential navigation aids of Sarajevo International
t nbldth irotto open for scheduled
Aiprt
Airportee
intemational commercial flights after having been
largely destroyed during the conflict

The following sectors remain priority areas for the
activities of the CEI-PS at the EBRD

EBRD

w

*

a

Investment: E11.2 mil

*

Transport, in particular for projects linked to the
development of corridors in central and southeastem Europe. including road and railway
n ala
esenErpicuigra
transport links, port and airport development, and
urastratevlopmns
Infrastructure, in particular municipalities, urban
regeneration, real estate and development of
infrastructures in the energy and environmental
sector: infrastructure for water management
Finance, in particular support to micro and smallmedium size enterprises, support to the intemalisation of enterprises:
Agriculture, including development of agribusinesses and support to wholesale markets and
micro-finance.

Priority countries for CEI-PS intervention remain those
of south-eastern Europe (Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia
and Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Romania and
Bulgaria): and those included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova)
The CEI-PS would also consider investing in the new
EU member countries if proposed projects have a
regional impact and are preferably co-financed by the
countries themselves.
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Appendix 6 - CEI Funding Unit - Samples of Activities and Results
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CE~fM EUROPEAN 1NMAKTVE
Executive Secretariat

CEI Funding Unit .
Cooperating in a Wider Europe
Activitiesand Results
1. BRIEF DESCRIPTION
The CEI Funding Unit was created in January 2004, with a view to evaluate the possibilities of

attracting EU funding for CEI projects and to join it with the CEI funds. This was linked also to
the Increased number of CEI countries, which after the EU enlargement became eligible for EU
funding. The CEI Indeed now encompasses:

-2
-5
-3
-4
-3

old EU Members (Italy, Austria);
new EU Members (Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland);
EU Candidate Countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia);
Western Balkans Countries (Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia);
NIS countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus).

2. FUNDING UNIT TASKS

1. PROMOTING CEI PARTICIPATION IN EU PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS
2. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
3. PARTNER SEARCH ASSISTANCE
4. FACILITATING AND SUPPORTING NON EU COUNTRY PARTICIPATION

3. PROJECTS AFTER FIRST YEAR OF ACTIVITY
Number of Projects submitted

16

Number of Projects approved

5

Number of Projects in pipeline
Sectors concerned

3

Transport, environment, information society
technologies, SMEs, cross border cooperation,
energy,

Total value of submitted proects
Total value of approved projects
CEI involvement in the approved projects

cultural

heritage, higher

15 m EUR approx.
6.858.229 EUR
499.763 EUR

CONTACTS
CEI - Executive

secretariat

Via Genova 9
34121 Trieste, ITALv
www.ceinet.org
Ms. Lara Tassan Zanin
Tel. +39 040 7786 731

Ms. Izabela Gostisa Pasic
Tel. +39 040 7786 741

Fax. +39 040 7786 766

Fax. +39 040 7786 783

E-mail: tassanzanin@cei-es.org

E-mail: gostisa@cei-es.org
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Appendix 7 - Sample of CEI Cooperative Technical Projects (2002)
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ranaort

F

Mmaeon

Ukraine: Kiev to

western border highway stUdy
CETIR: Central European Transport information ReportIng
Ukraine: Air navigation prOject
Bosnia and Hleroegovina: Sarajevo Airport master piani and traIning
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sarajevo Airport lighting and eluapment
Procuremnent assistance to the EBRO Transport Team
Albania: CEI road rehabititation of Corridor VlI
Romarnia: CEl Romanlan Railways cooperatIon project
FYR Macedonia: CDl assistance to Macedonian air navigation
Bulgaria: CEI assistance to Sofia parking system

0.8
1.5
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.1
1.7
0.4
0.7
0.2

Croatia: Agricultural wholesale markets

1.2

to the agrIcultural wholesale market (with UNECE)
for agricultural wholesale markets in CEI countnies (with FAO)

0.2
0.4

Poland: Assistance
Programme

SMEs

office Part I (with WB. UNECE)
office Part 2 (with WB)
Business Adisory Services (CEI BAS Croatsa. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovena. Bulgaria. FYR MacedonIa)
CEI TAM prvatisation supporUt to SMEs iFYR Macedonia, Moldova. Serbia and Montenegro. Ukralne)
Albania: CEl mcro-tinancing
AlbanIa: CEl mIcro-financing

Inatltution buidIng and Oter progrutlmaa wfth I~la
CEI Joit ittemanonal events
Commercial Law

2.4

0.6

0.9

training b

2.3

Commercial Law training

f

1.5

R

BOLD aird CEinet

Serbia: Investment climate

0.3
0.3

0.4

0.2
0.5

study

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Electric power systen ronstrucipon
CEI ContributiOn tO the Danube cleaning

0.1

152

Technical cooperation

The Secretariat for CEI Projects and the
Transport Economic Institute (ISTIEE) of Trieste
University organised this symposium, inviting
port experts. port authorities, urban planners,
young graduates and academics from various
European countries (particularly CEI countries)Subjects covered advanced theories and best
practice in port planning and design.
Part of the symposium was devoted to
investment opportunities for port planning in
the CEl region, covering methodologies and
best practice for identifying and financing
bankable projects. Several specific proposals
were presented, following the presentation by
Robin Earle (Transport Team. EBRO) on the Role
of the EBRO in financing port infrastructure.
The symposium results and proposals were
further elaborated during the following weeks.
and presented at the fifth CEI Summit
Economic Forum.

The fifth CEI Summit Economic Forum took
place in Skopje. FYR Macedonia. on 13-15
November 2002. Traditionally, it is held in
parallel with the CEI Summit Meeting of the
17 heads of government. organised under the
CEI Macedonian Presidency for 2002, attended
by Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi. EBRO
President Lemierre, heads of governments
and presidents of international institutions.
The Forum attracted 1.200 participants.
including: senior government officials,
industry leaders, regional cooperations,
national and international organisations,
financial institutions and IFIs, chambers of
commerce, investment promotion agencies.
professionals, consultants and hundreds of
business people. The Ministers of Economy
for the 17 CEI countries held their annual
round table focusing on SME development.
The Forum addressed the issues of transition
through projects and programmes for
institutional and business development
in central and eastern Europe, including:
development of trade within the CEI region
and towards global markets: infrastructure
projects: agriculture; banking and financial
products: technical cooperation projects:
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development of technology and human
resources: local development systems:
programmes for EU integration and crossborder cooperation: and EU enlargement.
There were numerous presentations of
privatisation and investment projects, private
sector projects. joint ventures and project
opportunities by country.
The Bank was actively involved in the
preparation of the Forum. Fifteen EBRO officials
and bankers represented the Bank. chaired
sessions and spoke in the Forum panels on
infrastructure, port development, municipal
finance and services. pension and insurance
reforms, consolidation of banks, trade
facilitation and SME support programmes.
The Forum conclusions include lists of projects
where interested partners have been identified
(business, infrastructure. transport, technology).
strategies and programmes for the development
of SMEs, local employment promotion schemes.
special support to countries that are not in
the next EU enlargement (via cross-border
cooperation and industrial out-sourcing across
borders), and further matchmaking

Appendix 8 - Memorandum of Understanding between
The CEI and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
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MEMORANDUM

OF

UNDERSTANDING

between

the Central European Initiative
Regional grouping comprising 16 States in Central and Eastern Europe, represented by
the CEI Chairman-in-office
and the CEI - Executive Secretariat based in Trieste, Italy, represented by the Director
General,
Thereinafter called

CE1 and CEI - Executive Secretariat (CEI-ES) respectively

and
the United Natlous Economic Commission for Europe
Regional Commission of the United Nations based in Geneva, Switzerland, represented
by the Executive Secretary,
Thereinafter called

UN/ECE

Considering that the cooperation within the CEI shall include inter alia the following
areas:
-

-

economic and technical co-operation;
development of infrastructure in transport, energy, telecommunication,
agriculture;
strengthening the democratic institutions and observance of human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as well as
humanitarian matters;
protection of human environment;
co-operation in the field of science and technology, media, culture, education,
youth exchange, tourism;
cross-border and interregional co-operation;
consultations on political matters of mutual interest;

and shall aim at implementing the comprehensive CEI strategy as defined in the
"Sarajevo Declaration", adopted by the CEI Summit, Sarajevo, 29 November 1997;
Considering also that the CEI Member State which chairs the CEI is supported by the
CE! - Executive Secretariat which operates in accordance with the Guidelines or
Operations of the CEI-ES, specfying its mandate;

2

hGUiddinkm for Activities and Rukes of Procedure of the Cenral European Initiative, Art. 3
Guidelines for Activities and Rules of Procedure ofthe Central European Initiative, Art. 11
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Considering that the mandate and aims ofthe UN/ECE include the following principles
contained in the ECE Plan ofAction adoptedat its 52ndjubilee session:
-

-

-

-

to support activities which are initiated by sub-regional groupings and which
relate to the ECE areas of expertise;
to facilitate the dissemination and implementation of ECE norms and
conventions through cooperation with sub-regional groupings;
to develop further the cooperation with organisations which have specific
activities or projects in the same field of work and in the same countries as ECE,
on the basis of comparative advantages. This include activities supported by
financing institution such as EBRD, World Bank, European Investment Bank
and UNDP;
to provide a forum for dialogue aimed at bringing about a better understanding of
different aspects of the transition process and for the negotiation of normative
frameworks in these areas;
to involve the private sector in its activities, taking particular account of the
development of the business sector in countries in transition;
to further diversify its activities and methods designed to assist the integration of
Central and East European countries into the European and world economies
especially through seminars, workshops and advisory services in such fields as
economic analysis, statistics, transport, environment, human settlements,
population, trade facilitation, investment promotion and energy;

The CEI, supported by the CEI - Executive Secretariat, will:
-

keep the UN/ECE informed of its current and planned activities of common
interest to both organisations, in particularthose relating to:
the country specific strategies
trade and transport facilitation
small and medium enterprises
transport
environment

-

secure continuous interaction between UN/ECE and the CEI Working

-

-

Groups/Project Groups and the Secretariat for CEI Projects at the EBRD
exchange information, publications and workprogrammes, as well as schedules of
meetings so as to secure UN/ECE attendance at the meetings of mutual interest;
give public information coverage to those meetings or activities organised jointly
by the UN/ECE and the CEI;
make arrangements in concert with the UN/ECE regarding the appointment of a
UN/ECE staff member who shall act as "focal point" for cooperation with the
CEI, its Executive Secretariat, the Secretariat for CEI Projects at the EBRD
(CEI/EBRD Secretariat) and the various Working/Project Groups. The function of
the focal point will start as soon as appropriate financial resources covering also
support costs are made available to the UN/ECE by the EBRD through its
Secretariat for CEI Projects and recruitment of the focal point is completed in
accordance with UN rules and regulations. Its terms of reference are specified in
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the relevant Cooperation Agreent between the UN/ECE and the CEJ/EBRD
Secretariat on Technical Support to the CEL Any other financial implications of
the cooperation agreed upon will be the subject of separate agreements.

The UN/ECE will:
within the limits of its own resurces and in line with the policy of the

Commission and the Economic and Social Council make available its expertise
especially in the fields of economic analysis, statistics, environment, energy,

transport,trade facilitation and enterprise development;
-

make available the ECE conventions, norms and standards, as well as other
technical knowledge relevant for the agreed areas of cooperation;
invite the CEI, through the CEI - Executive Secretariat to take part in the

-

UN/ECE meetings of mutual interest;
provide advisory services and professional support to the CEI Working/Poject

-

-

-

Groups within the limits of its own resources;
secure synergies between its cooperation with the CEI and other subregional
groupings and special initiatives.

meet the requirements specified in the cooperation agreement between the
UN/ECE and the CEI/EBRD Secretariat related to the use of the CEI Italian
Trust Fund at the EBRD, and aimed at the development of CEI project ideas into
bankable projects.

The Memorandum of Understanding will be renewed each year by tacit Agreement
unless either Party advises otherwise in writing.

For the CEI Presidency:

For the UN/ECE:

For the CEI-Executive Secretariat:
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Appendix 9 - The CEI Plan of Action 2004-2006
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The CEI Plan of Action 2004-2006
1. Economic Development
I.1. Agriculture

1.1.1. CEI Micro-fInancing Project
1.1.2. CEI Wholesale Merker Programme
1.2. Energy
1.2.1. Use of Blomass as an alternative source of energy
1.3. EnvIronmental Protection
I.3.1.'Implementation of 'EST goes EAST* pilot projects
1.3.2. Establishment of the EST clearing-house
1.4. SHE development
1.4.1. CEI Enterprise Programme (CEI-EP)
1.4.2. Extension of the BAS programme

LS. Tourism

1.5.1. Tourism

management

1.5.2. Development of tour-programmes encompassing various CEI countries (e.g. Amber
Route, Cruising the Danube Valley. pas I.eI.cpuntries)
1.6. Transport
1.6.1. Technical assistance in the field of air navigation and road network development In
Member States in special need
1.6.2. Support to port development and to the rehabIlitation and quality standards
Improvement of railway networks to promote combined transportin the CEI region.
1.7. Financial Instuons
1.7.1. Assistance to Insurance companies
J. Human devekpment

11.1.

Culture

U.1.1. Conservation of tangible and intangible cultural heritage

U.1.2. Know-how transfer in the field of cltuai management
11.2. Education
U.1.1. The CEI University Network
.3. Human Resource Development and Training
11.3.1. Ufe-long learning, including vocational training and adult education
11.3.2. Training programmes for young entrepreneurs
11.4. Science and Technology
11.4.1. The CE Scientific and Technological Network
11.4.2. Informatlon Society
II.5. Youth Affairs
U.5.1. Youth involvernent In Political Life
1.5.2. Youth Crime Prevention and Youth Unemployment
I. Instiutionaldevelopment

HI.!. Civil Protection

MI.1.1 Protection against the effects of natural and technological disasters
121.1.2 Cross-border procedures In case of emergencies

1U.2. Combating Organised Crime
111.2.1 financial frauds, with particular regard to Illicit credit card use and money laundering in
the CEI area
1n.2.2 Illicit trafficking (human beings and stolen vehicles)
11.3. InformatIon and Media
111.3.1. Cross-border television
111.3.2. Review of media legislation
111.4. Migration
111.4.1. TraIning of migration and poliea officers
M1.5. Minorities
11.5.1. Celebration of the 10* Anniversary of the CEI Instrument
IA.5.2. Support for the protection and promotion of minority languages

N. Horleontal issues

PV.1. Cross-border Cooperation and Local Development
V.1.1. Promoting and spreading knowledge about the advantages of Interregional and crossborder cooperation and demonstrating best practices in this field
IV.1.2. Building a network of cooperation for a "horzontale flow of experience and know-how
IV.2. Major Conferences and Events

IV.2.1.
IV.2.2.

Summit Economic Forum

Youth Forum
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Appendix 10 - Samples Joint CEI University Programs
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According to the Founding Charter, the Rectors of the Co-ordinating Universities constitute the CEI
University Network Executive Board; this body is responsible for the approval and the monitoring of
the so-called "Joint Programmes" carried out within the Network.
On 23 April, 2004 the first CET University Network Executive Board meeting took place at the CEI-ES
premises and was chaired by the Rector of the Trieste University, in his capacity of the CEI
University Network Secretary General. The meeting was attended by the representatives of seven
Universities. Decisions were taken on the following items:
relations to the Advisory Board
functioning of the Executive Board
identification of Participating Universities
-

-

-

the Joint Programmes

implementation of Joint Programmes
outside Funding
use of CEI Logo
cooperation with UNIADRION and other similar Academic Networks
Web-page representing the CEI University Network

In 2004 the following Joint Programmes have been approved:

Applicant

Prtepatn

yoint iProgramme

Parsc

Umce

artography

Tres

and Geographical Information

tyi-

Uielii.
Oniversltie

University of Tirana (Albania); University of Prague (Czech Republic);
Belarussian State University; University of Trieste; University of
Bucharest (Romania); Univeristy of Ljubjana (Slovenia).

-Business (Business to Business - Business
University of Graz (Austria); University of Maribor (Slovenia);
Consumer) in the framework of the
to
aster's on "e-Buslness and e-Government niveristy of Rijeka (Croatia), University of Trieste (Italy).

Trieste

echnologles

University of Trieste; The Abdus Salam International Centre of
Theoretical Physics, (ICTP) Trieste (Italy);
Geophysical Institute, Academy of Sciences, Prague (Czech Republic);

Seminar on the Geodynamical

National Institute for Earth Physics, Calugareni Bucharest-Magurele,
Model of

Central Europe for Safe Development of

Trieste

Ground Transportation Systems

Romania);

Institute of Mathematics and Informatics, Bulgarian Academy of

Sciences,
Central

Sofia (Bulgaria);
Laboratory for Seismic Mechanics and Earthquake Engineering,

BAS, Sofia (Bulgaria);
Seismological Observatory of GGRI, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest

nest.

Bologna

na

(Hungary).

Summer School of Classics

University of Trieste (Italy), University of Ljubljana (Slovenia),
University of Zagreb (Croatia)

MRES (Masters in Eastern

New Bulgarian University, Sophia (Bulgaria); Masaryk University, Brno
Czech Republic); University of Economics, Prague (Czech Republic);
Budapest Business School, (Hungary); Institute for Social and
European Studies, Szombathely (Hungary); University of Warsaw
(Poland); Warsaw School of Economics (Poland); National School of
Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest (Romania); University
Bucharest (Romania); University of Ljubljana (Slovenia); Matej Bel
University, Banska Bistrica (Slovak Republic); University of Sarajevo
(Bosnia Herzegovina); University of Novi Sad (Serbia); University of
Belgrade (Serbia); University of Tirana (Albania); University of Rileka
(Croatia); University of Zagreb (Croatia); European Humanities
University, Minsk (Belarus). Ongoing negotiations with: the University
of Chisinau (Moldova), as well as several non CEI Universities.

Vienna University of Economics
pen Adria Summer University

(Croatia);

(Austria);University of Zagreb

univeristy of Trieste (Italy);University

of Ljubljana

(Slovenia).

Within the activities related to the CEI University Network, the Seminar "University Networks,
Education and Research In Central and South Eastern European Countries" (Trieste 12-13
November), organized by the "Jacques Maritain Institute" in Trieste in co-operation with the
Secretariat of the CEI University Network, deserves particular attention. The event was attended by

161

various political and academic authorities, Rectors of Universities of CEI countries, as well as
representatives of the financial and business milieu.

Other Activities
The TF approved several, already implemented, initiatives in 2004.

The International Summer School: "Beyond the Enlargement. The Wider. Europe and the new
Neighbourhood" 3 , submitted by Italy, was held in Cervla-Ravenna on 5-18 September. The School
provided for two different courses, corresponding to 2 main study areas:
1 - Democracy, Human Rights and Political Institutions;
2 - Economics, Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection.

The Co-operation Activity" "European Cultural Identity in the Past and Present" - (IDEURO) 0,
submitted by the University Of Udine - Italy, within the Erasmus Intensive Programme, took place In
Udine from 28 June to 11 July 2004. The event aimed at: a) promoting dialogue and understanding
between "Western" Europe and the countries to join the EU acceding countries; and b) enabling to
look for new opportunities in the labour market.

"Key-elements of Train the Trainers in Education for Democratic Citizenship - using ICT Support 41 ,
was a Co-operation Activity submitted by Austria. The event, involving SEE and CEI countries, took
place in Budapest on 17 - 19 September and the outcomes can be summarized as follows:
-

-

Dissemination of the project results (EDC toolbox available via web side) on the

regional

level to strengthen and widen the network of EDC institutions
Dissemination In SEE-countries which have not taken part in the project so far
Enlargement of the established EDC-network In SEE- (and CEI-) countries
Enhanced exchange of experience between EDC-decision makers
More people will have access to EDC through the promotion of the tool box

The 1st International Seminar "Humanitaria", held in 2004 in Lovetc (Bulgaria) on 25-31 July 2004
aimed at contributing to the further development of humanitarian studies and civil society In CEI
countries as well as supporting young people and experts from countries undergoing serious

economic difficulties.
'Health, Ageing and Work: Strategies for the New Welfare Society in the larger Europe "'-

submitted

by Italy, was an event held In Trieste on 21-23 October. It dealt with the new trends due to the
extended life span. The speakers illustrated the current and future welfare policies linked to the
extension of the life span of the elderly (work, pensions, education and health).

Serbia and Montenegro organized a Summer School of European Studies 2004 Introducing the EU: A

crash course From Community to Union? The political and economic development of European

integration" from 21 August to 5 September in Novi Sad. The School aimed at promoting the
European dimension in the process of teaching and learning at the University of Novi Sad. The
Summer School represented a valuable multidisciplinary activity creating ties among students from
different parts of Europe.
The "EuroPACS-MIR 2004 in the Enlarged Europe's ,an event promoted by the University of Trieste
(16-18 September 2004), was represented in the 22th International Conference of EuroPACS,
combined In 2004 with the MIR (Management in Radiology). The Conference also hosted the DICOM
(Digital Imaging and Communication In Medicine), the IHE Europe (Integrating the Health

Enterprise) and the AURE (Academic University Radiologists Europe) meetings.

" Ref. No. 1202.013-04
4 Ref. No. 1202.032-04
"

Ref. No. 1202.034-04

"

Ref. No. 1202.051-04

4 Ref. No. 1202.035-04
4 Ref. No. 1202.046-04
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Appendix 11 - CEI Instrument for the Protection of Minority Rights
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CEI Instrument
tog the protectiou of minority rights

The Member States of the Central European Initiative
signatory hereto,
recognising that the question relating to national minorities
can only be resolved satisfactorily in a truly democratic
political framework which is based on the rule of law and
guarantees full respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens,
reaffirming that the protection of national minorities
concerns only citizens of the respective state, who will enjoy
the same rights and have the same duties of citizenship as
the rest of the population,
convinced that national minorities form an integral part of
the society of the States in which they live and that they are
a factor of enrichment of each respective State and society,.
bearing in mind that a very effective remedy to achieve
stability in the region are good relations between neighbours,
and being conscious of the need to avoid any encouragement
of separatist tendencies of national minorities in the region,
confirming that issues concerning the rights of persons
belonging to national minorities are matters of legitimate
international concern and consequently do not constitute
exclusively an internal affair of the respective State,
considering that respect for the rights of persons belonging to
national minorities, as part of universally recognised human
rights, is an essential factor for peace, justice, stability and
democracy in the States,
convinced that the international protection of the rights of
persons belonging to national minorities, as enshrined in the
present Instrument, does not permit any activity, which is
contrary to the fundamental principles of international law
and in particular of sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of States,
recognising the particular importance of increasing
constructive co-operation among themselves on questions
relating to national minorities, and that such co-operation
seeks to promote mutual understanding and confidence,
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friendly and

good-neighbourly relations, international peace,

security and justice,

expressing their condemnation of aggressive nationalism,

racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and
discrimination against any person or group and of
persecution on religious an ideological grounds
have agreed as follows:
ART. 1

States recognise the existence of national minorities as such,
considering them integral parts of the society in which they live and
guarantee the appropriate conditions for the promotion of their
identity.
For the purpose of this Instrument the term "national
minority- shall mean a group that is smaller in number than the
rest of the population of a State, whose members being nationals of
that State, have ethnical, religious or linguistic features different
from those of the rest of the population, and are guided by the will
to safeguard their culture, traditions, religion or language.
ART. 2
To belong to a national minority is a matter of free individual
choice and no disadvantage shall arise from the exercise or nonexemise of such a choice.
ART. 3
States recognise that persons belonging to national minorities
have the right to exercise fully and effectively their human rights
and fundamental freedoms, individually or in common with others,
without any discrimination and in full equality before the law. Those
persons shall be able to enjoy the rights foreseen by the present
Instrument individually or in common with others and to benefit
from the measures ensuring those rights.
ART. 4
States guarantee the right of persons belonging to national
minorities to express, preserve an develop their ethnic, cultural,
linguistic or religious identity and maintain and develop their
culture in all its aspects.
ART. 5
The adoption of special measures in favour of pen.s
belonging to national minorities aimed at promotion equality
between them and the rest of the population or at taking due
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account of their specific conditions shall not be considered as an act
of discrimination.
ART. 6

States shall take effective measures to provide protection
against any acts that constitute incitement to violence against
persons or groups based on national, racial, ethnic or religious
discrimination, hostility or hatred, including anti-Semitism;
ART. 7
States recognise the particular problems of Roma (gypsies).
They undertake to adopt all the legal administrative or educational
measures as foreseen in the present Instrument in order to preserve
and to develop the identity of Roma, to facilitate by specific
measures the social integration of persons belonging to Roma
(gypsies) and to eliminate all forms of intolerance against such
persons.

ART. 8
Without prejudice to democratic principles, States, taking
measures in pursuance of their general integration policy, shall
refrain from pursuing or encouraging policies aimed at the
assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against
their will and shall protect these persons against any action aimed

at such assimilation.
ART. 9
In case of modification of administrative, judicial or electoral
subdivisions States should take into account that such
modifications, among other criteria, will respect the existing rights
of the persons belonging to national minorities and the exercise of
those rights. In any case, they should consult, according to national
legislation, with the populations directly affected before adopting
any modification in the matter.
ART. 10
Any person belonging to a national minority shall have the
right to use his or her language freely, in public as well as in
private, orally and in writing.
ART. 11
Any person belonging to a national minority shall have the
right to use his or her surname and first names in his or her
language and the right to official acceptance and registration of
such surname and names.
ART. 12
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Whenever in an area the number of persons belonging to a
national minority reaches, according to the latest census or other
methods of ascertaining its consistency, a significant level, those
persons shall have the right, wherever possible, to use, in
conformity with applicable national legislation, their own language
in oral and in written form, in their contacts with the public
authorities of the said area. These authorities may reply as far as
possible, in the same language.

ART. 13

In conformity with their national legislation States may allow,
where necessary through bilateral agreements with other interested
States, in particular with neighbouring States, the display of
bilingual or plurilingual local names, street names and other
topographical indications in areas where the number of persons
belonging to a national minority reaches, according to the latest
census or other methods of ascertaining its consistency, a
significant level. The display of signs, inscriptions or other similar
information of private nature also in the minority language should
not be subject to specific restrictions, other than those generally
applied in this field.
ART. 14
Any person belonging to a national minority, exercising
religious freedom, shall have the right to use his or her own
language in worship, teaching, religious practice or observance.
ART. 15
Whenever in an area the number of persons belonging to a
national minority reaches, according to the latest census or other
methods of ascertaining its consistency, the mnJority of the
population in an area, States will promote the knowledge of the
minority language among officers of the local and decentralised
state administrative offices. Endeavours should be made to recruit,
if possible, officers, who, in addition to the knowledge of the official
language, have sufficient knowledge of the minority language.
ART. 16
States recognise the right of persons belonging to national
minorities to establish and maintain their own cultural and
religious institutions, organisations or associations, which are
entitled to seek voluntary financial and other contributions as well
as public assistance, in conformity with national legislation.

ART. 17
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States recognise the right of persons belonging to national
minorities to establish and maintain their own private preschools,
schools and educational establishment and possibly obtain their
recognition in conformity with the relevant national legislation.
Such establishments may seek public financing or other
contributions.
ART. 18

Notwithstanding the need to learn the official language of the
State concerned, every person belonging to a national minority shall
have the right to learn his or her own language and receive an
education in his or her own language. The States shall endeavour to
ensure the appropriate types and levels of public education in
conformity with national legislation, whenever in an area the
number of persons belonging to national minority, according to the
latest census or other methods of ascertaining its consistency, is at
significant level. In the context of the teaching of history and culture
in such public educational establishment, adequate teaching of
history and culture of the national minorities should be ensured.
ART. 19
States guarantee the right of persons belonging to a national
minority to avail themselves of the media in their own language, in
conformity with relevant State regulations and with possible
financial assistance. In case of TV and radio in public ownership,
the States will assure, whenever appropriate and possible, that
persons belonging to national minorities have the right of free
access to such media including the production of such programmes
in their own language.
ART. 20
States shall guarantee the right of persons belonging to.
national minorities to participate without discrimination in the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the society of the State
of which they are citizens and shall promote the conditions for
exercising those rights.
ART. 21
States shall allow persons belonging to a national minority to
establish political parties.
ART. 22
In accordance with the policies of the States concerned,
States will respect the right of persons belonging to national
minorities to effective participation in public affairs, in particularin
the decision-making process on matters affecting them. Therefore,
States note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions
for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious
identity of certain national minorities by adopting appropriate
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measures corresponding to the specific circumstances of such
minorities hs foreseen in the CSCE documents.
ART. 23
Every person belonging to a national minority, while duly
respecting the territorial integrity of the State, shall have the right

to have free and unimpeded contacts with the citizens of another
country with whom this minority shares ethnic, religious or
linguistic features or a cultural identity. States shall not unduly
restrict the free exercise of those rights. Furthermore, States will
encourage tranafrontier arrangements at national, regional and
local levels.
ART. 24
Every person belonging to a national minority shall have an
effective remedy before a national judicial authority against any
violation of rights set forth in the present Instrument, provided that
those rights are enacted in national legislation.
ART. 25
In any area where those who belong to a national minority
represent the majority of the population, states shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that those who do not belong to this
minority shall not suffer from any disadvantage, including such that
may result from the implementation of the measures of protection
foreseen by the present Instrument.
ART. 26
None of these commitments shall be interpreted as implying
any right to engage in any activity in contravention of the
fundamental principles of international law and, in particular, of
the sovereign
equality, territorial integrity and political
independence of State. Nothing in the present Instrument shall
affect the duties related to persons belonging to national minorities
as citizens of the States concerned.
Persons belonging to national minorities will also respect, in
the exercise of their rights, the rights of others, including those of
persons belonging to the majority population of the respective State
or to other national minorities.
ART. 27
This Instrument shall not prejudice the provisions of
domestic law or any international agreement which provide greater
protection for national minorities or persons belonging to them.
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